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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The aim of this dissertation is to describe and explain the variation in the reform of 
implementation management in Croatia by looking at various social services. While the 
reform was based on principles of effectiveness, efficiency and participation in one segment 
of those services, in the other segment it was used for development of partisan patronage 
networks. While combining comparative strategy with the process tracing method, the 
dissertation focuses on six social services and relies on interviews with policy actors, official 
documents and statistical data to map and explain different reform outcomes.   
By using comparable case strategy, dissertation identifies two factors that led to differences 
in implementation of reformed social services and affected the capacity of political parties 
to use social policy reform as an instrument of patronage. Sufficiently institutionalized 
setting in which services were provided prior to the reform, with both dense working 
procedures and professional standards, reduces the ability of political parties to integrate 
political patronage into implementation management. In the case of a minimal or non-
existent institutional setting, the involvement of service beneficiaries or actors advocating 
their interests constrains possibilities for party patronage. 
While employing the process-tracing method, the dissertation uses the notion of political 
metagovernance as a conceptual starting point and crafts a causal mechanism that can 
account for the distortive impact of partisan patronage on the reform of service provision. 
By analysing the case in which comparative analysis indicated distortions in the service 
provision, it reveals how the patronage-driven political executive inspired by network-based 
forms of governance failed to move traditional service provision into novel implementation 
mode but overly politicized the role of metagovernors instead while using the reform for the 
selective distribution of public funding and employment of party supporters as service 
providers. 
 
  
  
SAŽETAK NA HRVATSKOM JEZIKU  
Svrha ovog doktorskog rada je analizirati ishode reforme javnog menadžmenta u Hrvatskoj 
razmatrajući implementaciju socijalne politike. Dok se u jednom segmentu socijalnih usluga 
reforma temeljila na principima djelotvornosti, štedljivosti i sudjelovanja građana, u drugom 
segmentu se iskoristila za omogućavanje stranačkog pokroviteljstva. Doktorat uspoređuje 
šest socijalnih usluga koje su bile obuhvaćene reformom, a jednu dodatno istražuje analizom 
procesa. Obje analize temelje se na intervjuima s akterima uključenima u dizajn i provedbu 
izabranih usluga, službenim dokumentima te na dokumentima i službenim podacima 
vezanima za provedbu izabranih socijalnih usluga. 
Komparativom analizom izabranih usluga, doktorat pokazuje da je uslijed reforme došlo do 
različitih oblika implementacijskog menadžmenta te identificira dva činitelja koji su doveli 
do razlika u implementacijskom menadžmentu izabranih usluga i koji su utjecali na 
mogućnost političkih stanaka da koriste reformu upravljanja za pružanje socijalnih usluga u 
svrhu političkog pokroviteljstva. Razvijen institucionalni okvir u kojem su usluge bile 
pružane prije reforme, karakteriziran gustim procedurama i profesionalnim standardima, 
pokazao se kao činitelj koji umanjuje mogućnost političkih stanaka da političko 
pokroviteljstvo ugrade u menadžment pružanjem javnih usluga. U uslugama u kojima je taj 
okvir bio nedostatno razvijen, uključenost samih korisnika u dizajn i pružanje usluge i/ili 
postojanje aktera koji zagovaraju i/ili štite interese korisnika pokazao se kao ograničavajući 
činitelj za stranačko pokroviteljstvo.   
Uz primjenu metode analize procesa, doktorski rad iskoristio je koncept političkog meta-
upravljanja kao temelj za izgradnju kauzalnog mehanizma kojim se može objasniti način na 
koji je stranačko pokroviteljstvo negativno  utjecalo na reformu upravljanja pružanjem 
usluga i pervertiralo je. Analizirajući slučaj u kojem je komparativna analiza ukazala na 
prisutnost "pervertiranog", politički opterećenog upravljanja pružanjem usluge, doktorat 
pokazuje mehanizam kojim je izvršna vlast politizirala reformski proces i iskoristila ga za 
favorizirajuću alokaciju javnih sredstava te zapošljavanje članova i podražavatelja stranke 
na vlasti. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The study of public management and policy reforms is often divided between literature which 
traces different reform practices in developed, Western democracies, and that which addresses 
reforms in other contexts, including new democracies and countries in transition and post-
conflict societies. Of course, any attempt to break down this distinction has to deal with the fact 
that the 'prevailing conditions' in different societies are very different. This means that reforms 
implemented in one setting can never be merely transplanted to another, without the specific 
historical legacies and political agency rendering the effects of these reforms very different. At 
the same time, models developed in one context do have an impact, albeit not always the desired 
one, when implemented elsewhere. In the end, understandings of real reform efforts can refine 
and elaborate models of the reform process and be relevant in a broader range of societies.  
This dissertation aims to address what occurs in a young democracy such as Croatia in which 
the initial conditions of reform processes were to a large extent shaped by cumbersome 
transition and slow consolidation that were followed by a high level of political party 
penetration in state institutions and the public sector. As the patronage-driven strategy of the 
incumbents guided many executive decisions regarding the arrangements for provision of 
various public services, this dissertation asks what happens with policy implementation and 
service delivery when public management reforms 'meet' the politicized policy-making context. 
While focusing on services provided in the field of social policy, the dissertation seeks to 
describe, analyse and explain variations in reform results and to identify specific conditions that 
can account for the persistence of patronage practices within the reform processes.  
The introductory chapter proceeds as follows. Sections 1.1 and 1.2 set the stage for the 
dissertation by briefly describing how political conditions have shaped public sector reforms in 
Croatia and elaborates on the problem of uneven reform results that has been evidenced in 
Croatian social policy. Next, section 1.3 elaborates on the research question(s) and the level of 
scientific ambition, and section 1.4 provides the overview of methodological approaches that 
are used to answer research questions. Finally, section 1.5 outlines the structure of the 
dissertation.  
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1.1 Politics and public sector reforms in Croatia 
Since the country’s independence, Croatian politics has been dominated by strong divisions 
based on symbolic issues revolving around the definition of statehood,  interpretations of history 
and the role of religion and tradition in contemporary Croatian society (Šiber 2001; Zakošek 
and Čular 2004; Zakošek 2008; Henjak, Zakošek, and Čular 2013; Henjak 2017).  Even though 
these divisions were, in the first half of the 1990s, somewhat overshadowed by the atmosphere 
of state-building and war, they kept their prominence and shaped both the identification of 
voters and patterns of party competition. Due to that, and due to the combined effects of a strong 
semi-presidential system of government and an electoral system that produced majoritarian 
governments, partisan competition in the 1990s was characterized by bi-polarity in which the 
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) acted as the dominant right-wing party while successfully 
competing with several opposition parties, none of whom could gain the support of more than 
one third of centre-left voters.  
In January 2000, after the death of Franjo Tuđman in December 1999, HDZ lost parliamentary 
elections for the first time to a Social Democratic Party (SDP)-led coalition of six parties which 
soon introduced a parliamentary system of government and an electoral system based on a mix 
of constituency and proportional representation. After these institutional changes, partisan 
competition consolidated into two multi-party blocs formed around HDZ on the one side and 
SDP on the other side, reflecting dominant ideological and identity divisions in society 
(Zakošek and Čular 2004; Henjak, Zakošek, and Čular 2013; Henjak 2017).  
With divisions between the two main political blocs fuelled by issues of history, religion and 
symbolic values, economic interests were never clearly articulated and never became the main 
subject of political contestation (Zakošek and Čular 2004; Henjak, Zakošek, and Čular 2013; 
Dolenec 2013b). This is not to say that economic and distributive issues were not electorally 
relevant. Poor economic performance, perception of incompetence and corruption, were 
relevant in terms of elections, but only in terms of driving mobilization or demobilization of 
support for government and opposition parties (Henjak 2008, 2011).  In such a setting, parties 
were not held accountable for the policy outcomes they delivered but rather for how well they 
represented the expressive preferences of their voters. Even when parties had bad records of 
policy delivery or a record of using a policy for their own ends, the likelihood of electoral 
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punishment was increased only when a persistent stream of scandals and obvious negative 
outcomes became impossible to hide (Henjak 2017). All this created political conditions where 
parties are incentivized to use public policy and public management processes not to achieve 
collectively desired outcomes, but rather to highlight symbolic issues and send signals to their 
electorates that they support and implement their values.   
The second, and for this dissertation even more important, issue which shapes conditions for 
public sector development in Croatia is the nature of Croatian political parties, or—to be more 
precise—of the party that has, thus far, governed Croatia for 20 out of 27 years of the country’s 
independence. HDZ was formed in 1990s as a party with a clear objective of achieving 
independence from Yugoslavia through peaceful means. The party was also formed in a setting 
where everything was pointing to the likelihood of the process of resolution of the Yugoslav 
crisis turning into a long one, very likely ending in conflict.  
This resulted in a party which established a strong hierarchical organization, with decision-
making centralized at the top and with a wide network of territorial organizations covering 
every municipality and possibly every settlement (Čular 2005; Nikić Čakar 2013; Nikić Čakar 
and Čular 2017). After strong party organization was established, it needed to be maintained. 
The only way it could be maintained was to use government patronage at the national and local 
level to employ party activists of this large party organization in the public sector (Čular 2001; 
Henjak, Zakošek, and Čular 2013). This created a sort of a vicious cycle for HDZ where the 
state was used to support strong party organization through patronage and strong party 
organization was in turn used to support the electoral base and deliver electoral support.  
Patronage in the form of public sector jobs, contracts and partnership agreements, combined 
with privileged access to policy benefits, was also used to support clientelistic groups that were 
organized in numerous and influential alliances, and were mostly recruited from the ranks of 
transition losers: participants in the war and war-disabled persons; families of war casualties; 
displaced persons; refugees; political prisoners; and emigrants from the ex-regime. These 
alliances and groups were, in turn, reinforcing a partisan message, or were sometimes acting as 
a proxy to advocate for something the party could not do itself (Kasapović 2001; Dolenec 
2013a; Stubbs and Zrinščak 2015).  In the system of party patronage thus created, the party 
organization together with party affiliated groups were thus used to mobilize electoral support 
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on the ground or to provide representation of some segment of a society constituting the 
electoral coalition of the HDZ. When in power, other parties could not use this mechanism to 
the same extent, but parties with extensive organization did have incentives to use it to a degree 
in public companies and in local government.  
The distortion of the effectiveness of democratic accountability mechanisms and the need to 
preserve or spread patronage practices within the public sector, among others, during the 1990s, 
resulted in a further strong centralization of the system of governing which disrupted the legacy 
of local self-governance inherited from socialism, and after 2000 acted as a platform for the 
development and reform of public sector organizations. The beginnings of the 1990s were 
marked by a strong politicization of public administration, with purges of 'unfit' judges and 
senior civil servants, mostly on the basis of national and party membership criteria.  
After 1993, the politicization and growth of civil service positions were accompanied with 
limitation of the space for professionalism, the etatisation of public services that used to be 
provided by former local self-governing units and the establishment of a new regional self-
governance (county) system with limited powers (Koprić 2008, 2009). The latter was designed 
as a counterbalance to historical regional (semi-) autonomous units that represented a 'logical' 
decentralizing framework and as a counterbalance to the power of urban centers which, on the 
whole, were less prone to support the ruling party, HDZ. Political elites then justified the break 
with socialist polycentric governance by arguing that the centralization of the state structure 
was necessary for the process of accomplishing independence and building a state (Petak 2006; 
Koprić 2016). 
The sea-change, at least in terms of the general political climate regarding public sector reforms, 
came with the new millennium and the first shift of power which demarcated the beginning of 
a deeper democratization process and opened the space for the change of structures and 
processes within the public sector. One of the first of these changes was launched in 2001 with 
an ambitious “decentralization package” that was meant to devolve some parts of educational, 
social and health services to counties and cities (Perko-Šeparović 2001; Petak 2006, 2012).  In 
this top-down reformist initiative, however, the central government failed to boost the fiscal 
and governing capacities of regional and local governments which, in turn, demonstrated a 
reluctance or inability to handle decentralized services (Petak 2012). Moreover, even though 
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the announcements of reform of the local governance system highlighted the devotion to 
comprehensive decentralization, this, as well as subsequent reform initiatives, were not 
substantiated by corresponding territorial re-organization nor by the investments in local and 
regional development. As a result, the Croatian state structure is still a form of qualified  
centralization with only a modest transfer of responsibility to a rather limited number of local 
units (Koprić and Đulabić 2017). 
In 2004 Croatia was granted EU candidate status, and administrative reform became a part of 
the long-lasting accession process. Within that process, after regaining power in 2003 and 
holding it until the end of 2011, HDZ supported the transfer of management reform models and 
practices that were promoted and partly conditioned by the most relevant supranational actors. 
The modernization and professionalization of the civil service was promoted by the European 
Union and its member states, which led to the establishment of the civil servant training system, 
the improvement of administrative procedures and the adoption of a new legal framework 
enshrining the integrity, status and ethical standards of the civil service  (Koprić et al. 2014; 
Marčetić 2013).  
On the other hand, reform in the direction of greater efficiency, encouraged by the World Bank, 
insisted on the rationalization of the system (Pičuljan 2006). Even though it failed to foster the 
introduction of performance-related salaries, it paved the way for the establishment of 
regulatory impact assessment (RIA) and strategic planning procedures. Several projects that led 
to the rather troublesome development of the current Croatian RIA framework were run by the 
government, but were at the same time heavily supported and inspired by USAID, UNDP, 
World Bank and, later on, the OECD and the European Union. (Petak and Petek 2010; Kekez 
2016).  
It was not until 2008 that reform objectives and mechanisms became part of a national strategic 
document1, which, among others, envisioned the integration of strategic planning and RIA 
toolkits into the budgeting and legislation cycles as well the introduction of public tendering 
                                                 
1 Strategija reforme državne uprave za razdoblje 2008.–2011. 2008. Vlada Republike 
Hrvatske 
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into the recruitment of top civil servants. Despite a general hesitation in the implementation of 
envisioned reform measures, the mentioned analytical tools have gradually - although still with 
very limited effects - became part of governing practices (Kekez 2016). On the other hand, the 
implementation of provisions restricting political discretion over appointments tackled only the 
top of the patronage iceberg and were very short-lasting (Koprić et al. 2014; Koprić 2016).  
Moreover, as the recruitment of civil servants and implementation of examinations prescribed 
by adopted civil service laws were highly politicized, their operationalization was left to 
ministries and other state or local executive bodies responsible for hiring their own personnel 
(Koprić 2011; Meyer-Sahling and Mikkelsen 2016).  In that way, despite the fact that in the last 
15 years the Croatian public administration was constantly undergoing changes, the reform was 
driven by externally motivated and fragmented efforts, which therefore provided only limited 
and incoherent results. 
1.2 The problem of uneven reform results in social services 
Lack of continuity and intrinsic motivation to improve governance practices was also reflected 
in the reforms that tackled the management of social services, as a core element of public 
administration (Koprić 2011). Croatian reform of arrangements for the provision of social 
services, left largely unchanged since the socialist times, started after the election in 2000 and 
was induced by the Europeanization process and assistance provided by international actors 
such as the World Bank and UNDP (Stubbs and Zrinščak 2007). Additional implementation 
reform incentives also originated from the changes in the socio-economic environment such as 
the ageing population, change of structure and role of the family within society, which created 
a need for novel solutions in the provision of social services (Dobrotić 2016b). The pressure 
was also mounting to introduce new forms of management due to the change of goals and 
instruments of social policy which – as a consequence of Europeanization – began to, 
discursively at least, focus more and more on the social inclusion of users (Petek 2011; Stubbs 
and Maglajlić 2012). 
Various reformist packages affected services targeting all major social groups including older 
people, persons with disability, and children. The proclaimed objectives of the incumbents 
were: greater effectiveness, efficiency and, to an extent, equity. Whilst a ‘crowded playground’ 
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(Arandarenko and Golicin 2007) of international actors emerged, there was general agreement 
on the needed reform and of the importance of decentralisation, diversification of providers (so-
called ‘de-etatisation), and community-based services and social planning. While the 
diversification of service delivery arrangements involved the promotion of non-governmental 
not-for-profit and, to an extent, for-profit, actors as service designers and providers, the 
introduction of bottom up planning was meant to lead to the transformation of institutional long-
term care arrangements and the creation of alternative, community-based, modes of care 
provision. In a sense, this combined an emphasis on the introduction of competition in service 
provision with a focus on the design of more humane, people-centered services, at least at the 
level of rhetoric (Stubbs and Maglajlić 2012; Kekez-Koštro, Urbanc, and Salaj 2013).  
At the level of practice, however, the reformist efforts were impeded as a result of the  
reluctance of elected officials to lead any policy or management changes that could undermine 
the existing patterns of clientelistic exchange with chosen target groups of specific social 
policies (Stubbs and Zrinščak 2015). Moreover, the reform process and results were also 
undermined by efforts invested by national and local politicians in spreading clientelistic 
networks across policies which were considered the appropriate platforms for the capture of 
public jobs, contracts, and partnership agreements, and for the consequent transformation of 
party members and supporters into providers of various public services (Hoffmann et al. 2017).  
More than a decade after they were introduced, many reform packages in the provision of social 
services can be judged as having had limited and uneven results, and to have generated a number 
of unintended and unexpected consequences. Preliminary research (Kekez-Koštro, Urbanc, and 
Salaj 2013; Kekez 2014) which mapped the results of reform even indicated that while in some 
services the results that were there may have been a consistent adaptation of different reform 
principles, in others, on the other hand, the ruling party used reform for the distortion of 
implementation in line with patronage practices.  
  
8 
 
1.3 The research question and the level of scientific ambition 
This dissertation is an attempt to characterize and explain empirical variations in modes of 
implementation of different social services within the context of public management reforms in 
a patronage democracy. Given the initially documented differences in reformed implementation 
management of Croatian social services, three sub-questions are posed:  
1. What kinds of implementation modes were produced by the reform of social services in 
Croatia? 
2. Which factors can account for the variation in the implementation modes that the reform 
resulted in and, more specifically, for the presence and absence of clientelistic capture 
of the reformed service management?  
3. How does the clientelistic capture of service reform work?  
The first research question addresses the effects that management reform can have in the 
governance context marked by politicized allocation of appointments and jobs in the public 
sector. By documenting and characterizing different modes of implementation that the reform 
of Croatian social services resulted in, we can describe the effects of management reform in a 
clientelistic policy-making context.  
The second question addresses the factors most influential in shaping the process and results of 
management reform and, even more specifically, in preventing or enabling the occurrence of 
patronage practices in the reform process and resulting implementation mode(s). The ambition 
here is to deliver a causal explanation of the variation in reform results, with focus on the 
conditions that could be correlated with that variation.  
The third question addresses the causal mechanism at work in the clientelistic distortion of 
reform processes and results.  The aim is to move beyond simply describing a pattern of regular 
association between reform conditions and results in specific services, and thus open up the 
black box of causality to explain exactly how, in specific conditions, reform that is run by 
patronage-driven politicians can lead to the distortion of implementation in line with those 
patronage practices. 
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1.4 The use of qualitative methodological approach 
In finding answers to posed research questions, this dissertation uses mixed-method design and 
combines approaches within the broad and eclectic field of qualitative methodologies. The 
overview of methodology used in the dissertation draws on the categorization, recently offered 
by Blatter, Haverland, and Hulst (2016b), which locates qualitative approaches in a two-
dimensional conceptual field (see Figure 1). On the first dimension, approaches are categorized 
in relation to their ontological positions on the continuum between the holistic and 
particularistic pole. On this continuum, holism represents “the presumption that the interaction 
of units are strongly influenced by entire web of interaction, (…) and particularism signifies the 
claim that the individual units and their interaction traits are the sole or at least the main 
determents of those interactions” (Blatter, Haverland, and Hulst 2016a, p. xxi). In holism the 
whole thus has an ontological status on its own, while in particularism it is primarily conceived 
as a product of particular elements and their interplay.  
The positioning of approaches on the second dimension refers to their differences in the basic 
epistemological principles. Within this dimension, one pole is represented by the principle of 
conceptual and theoretical coherence which is considered as the essential criterion in 
interpretative research approaches.  The criteria which Blatter, Haverland, and Hulst see 
representing the opposing pole on this dimension is the principle of correspondence, often 
aligned with quantitative research and related positivistic “assumption that the truth of 
knowledge can be established in it fits with or correspondence to ‘objectively existing’ external 
reality” (Blatter, Haverland, and Hulst 2016a, p. xxi). This criterium, as Blatter, Haverland and 
Hulst show, also functions as the underlying principle for qualitative approaches such as the 
comparative case strategy and qualitative comparative analysis.  
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Figure 1 Categorization of qualitative methodologies 
Source: Blatter, Haverland, and Hulst (2016: xxi).
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To find out the results of the service reform and the reasons for their occurrence, I will employ 
the comparable case strategy which seeks to specify factors or independent variables (X) that 
exhibit a causal power on an outcome (Y) while understanding causation as a regular pattern of 
association between X and Y (Beach and Pedersen 2013; Marini and Singer 1988). The key 
assumption of this approach is that regular conjunction between X and Y exists in the specified 
population of similar cases and works independently of other causal forces (Brady 2008; 
Blatter, Haverland, and Hulst 2016a).  
This strong particularistic ontology is combined with a commitment to verify if the predicted 
hypothetical relationship between X and Y corresponds with empirical evidence, or to build the 
explanation of the causal relationship. While the explanation development occurs primarily 
through a theory-driven inductive strategy, the hypotheses on the relationship between X and 
Y in the deductive path can be derived from social science theories or can reflect the contested 
argumentation in the epistemic community (Blatter, Haverland, and Hulst 2016a; George and 
Bennett 2005).  
When tackling complex phenomena whose occurrence can hardly be explained by one 
independent variable, both inductive and deductive approaches in comparative case strategy 
can be facilitated by means of configurational or typological theorizing. According to George 
and Bennet (2005, p. 235), typological theory is: 
a theory that specifies independent variables, delineates them into the 
categories for which the researcher will measure the cases and their 
outcomes, and provides not only hypotheses on how these variables operate 
individually, but also contingent generalizations on how and under what 
conditions they behave in specified conjunctions or configurations to produce 
and effect. We call specified conjunctions or configurations of the variables 
“types”.  
 
12 
 
In an inductive path, often taken in the early stages of a research of complex problems, a 
researcher aims to build a typological theory by conducting an empirical analyss of cases, but 
it does so within an existing theoretical framework. In a deductive path, a researcher also starts 
with the theoretical framework, but they specify it by assembling relevant theories and variables 
whose interaction can account for the particular type or types of outcome. These two paths, 
nevertheless, are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, depending on research goals or 
stages, many research projects combine inductive with deductive means of developing 
typological theories. Typological theorizing is also used in many research projects for the 
integration of comparative strategy with the within-case analysis; this in turn enables structured 
iteration between cases and theories (George and Bennett 2005; Diesing 1979; Ragin 2014; 
Rihoux and Ragin 2008). 
In order to describe the kind of implementation modes produced by the reform of social services 
in Croatia and explain the prevention or occurrence of patronage practices in the reformist 
initiatives and resulting implementation mode(s), this doctoral research constructs a typological 
theory and uses it deductively to design and structure the comparison of similar cases. The 
sequence in which I address the first two sub-questions (the first being “what” and the second 
one “why”) will enable me to approach the explanation of service management reform results 
in a configurational manner. The initial identification of distinctive modes of implementation 
that the service reform resulted in will enable me to start out with a Y-centered perspective 
while tracing back the configuration of factors (Xs) that may account for the variation in reform 
results. In this research path, cases will be decomposed into their  theoretically meaningful 
components while the predicted hypothetical patterns of association between modes of 
implementation (Y) and causal factors X(s) will be verified and inferences made through the 
combination of cross-case perspective and within case complexity.  
To find out how the clientelistic capture of reform works, a case (of course, if identified) in 
which comparative analysis indicates the occurrence of clientelistic reform capture will be 
further studied with the employment of causal process-tracing. In this single case method, the 
aim is to specify the temporal sequence and the causal mechanism that takes X to produce Y 
(Blatter and Haverland 2012; Bennett and Checkel 2014). The causal mechanisms here function 
as a specific type of causal configurations - a set of interlocking parts transmitting causal forces 
in a causal relationship between X and Y (Glennan 1996, 2002; Bunge 1997).  
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By focusing on causal mechanisms instead on variables that can be ruled out with comparative 
analysis, this approach moves away from the regularistic understanding of causality (Beach and 
Pedersen 2013). However, it does not fully depart from the particularistic ontology since the 
overall functioning of the mechanism is conceived as a sequential work of its parts. As such, 
causal process tracing can be aligned with the ontology that is positioned between the 
particularistic and holistic pole (Blatter, Haverland, and Hulst 2016a).  
This qualitative approach takes the middle position also in respect to the underlying 
epistemological principles. The process-tracing logic and techniques can therefore be used to 
test if the theoretically-generated mechanism corresponds with empirical evidence and if it can 
be generalized within bounded context, but it can also be used to deepen the understanding of 
the relationship between factors of influence and outcomes (Blatter, Haverland, and Hulst 
2016b; Beach and Pedersen 2013). As shown in Table 1, the theory-testing variant of process-
tracing is applicable to situations in which the correlation between X and Y has been established 
and in which researchers have existing conjectures about the plausible mechanism or are in the 
position to derive the mechanism from existing theories and insights.  
In situations in which the correlation between X and Y has been established, but researchers 
are in the dark regarding the potential mechanisms linking the two and cannot generate it from 
existing theory, they can use process-tracing to build a plausible hypothetical causal mechanism 
whereby X is linked with Y. Theory-building process-tracing can also be employed in situations 
in which researchers know the outcome (Y), but are unsure about its causes (X).  The goal of 
such studies is then to uncover plausible causes and induce the causal mechanism. In addition, 
this methodological approach is correspondingly often used to explain a particular puzzling 
historical outcome by developing a minimally sufficient explanation in a single-case study 
(Beach and Pedersen 2013).   
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Table 1 Three variants of process-tracing: key features 
 
Source: Beach and Pedersen (2013: 21). 
Even though both theory-building and outcome-explaining variants of process-tracing aim to 
develop the explanation for an outcome, the one produced through the latter variant includes 
not only systematic, but also non-systematic (case-specific) parts of the mechanism. Due to 
that, while the mechanism crafted through theory-building process-tracing is intended to be 
generalizable in an explicitly bounded context, the explanation offered by the outcome-
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explaining variant cannot be detached from the case and the method can function only in stand-
alone single case studies. On the other hand, both the theory-testing and theory-building variant 
of process-tracing are not intended to stand alone, but to contribute with their comparative 
advantages in the mixed-method studies which specify systematic elements of causal 
relationships (Beach and Pedersen 2013). 
As the theorization on pathways though which the capture of service reform can occur in a 
clientelistic policy-making context is yet to be established, the comparative strategy in this 
mixed-method study will be complemented with the theory-building variant of process-tracing. 
The theorization and empirical investigation will be guided with the help of the framework 
developed by Beach and Pedersen (2013), illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 Theory-building process-tracing 
Source: Beach and Pedersen (2013: 17).
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The theoretical framework and an a personal theoretical lens to be presented in the upcoming 
chapter will be used to structure the collection of wide-ranging empirical records in step 1, all 
of them related to the reform and provision of social service identifiable by comparative 
analysis as the case of a clientelistic capture. In step 2, the collected empirical evidence will be 
used to make inferences about manifestations of a plausible underlying causal mechanism that, 
in specific conditions, links the patronage-driven interest of politicians with the capture of the 
service reform and its results. Nevertheless, in this step, the empirically-based clues about the 
manifestation of this mechanism will be detected and accessed in the light of existing theories 
and insights. As Beach and Pedersen highlight (2013, 17-18) 
Evidence does not speak for itself. Theory-building often has a deductive 
element in that scholars seek inspiration from existing theoretical work and 
previous observations…existing theory can be conceived as a form of a grid 
to detect systematic patterns in empirical material, enabling inferences about 
observable manifestations.  
After structured analysis of the material collected, and after several iterations between 
collecting the “facts” of the case and inferring the existence of the mechanism’s observable 
manifestations, the empirical analysis will be concluded in step 3, with the secondary leap from 
observable manifestation towards the inference on the existence of parts of a plausible 
hypothetical mechanism (Beach and Pedersen 2013).  
1.5 The structure of the dissertation  
Chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework and the model for the empirical analysis.  After 
the overview of existing approaches, the chapter elaborates my own theoretical framework for 
the study of the results, of influential factors and of the process of the social service reform in 
a clientelistic policy-making context. Chapter 3 presents the research design, the case selection 
procedure, as well as the methods employed for data collection and analysis.    
Chapters 4 and 5 contain the empirical analysis divided into two parts: in the first three sections 
of chapter 4, I study the effects that the management reform had on the provision of Croatian 
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social services. By combining within-case and cross-case analyses, I seek to characterize modes 
of implementation that were produced by the reform of selected social services. In the last 
section of chapter 4, I further investigate the selected services in order to validate and modify 
the proposed explanation of factors whose combination accounts for the presence or absence 
(prevention) of clientelistic capture of the reformed service management and for the variation 
in reform outcomes.  
By building on the findings from the comparative study, in chapter 5 I select a service in which 
reform led to the most evident clientelistic distortion of implementation management. By using 
process-tracing techniques, I address the causal mechanisms through which, in a clientelistic 
policy-making setting, the reform governed by patronage-driven politicians can lead to 
distorted implementation, in line with patronage practices. Finally, chapter 6 provides overall 
conclusions.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
As set out in the introductory chapter, this dissertation poses a three-part research question: 
‘What kinds of implementation modes were produced by the reform of social services in 
Croatia; what factors can account for the variation in the implementation modes that the reform 
resulted in, and for the presence and absence of clientelistic capture of the reformed service 
management; and how does the clientelistic capture of the reform work?’ This chapter presents 
both a theoretical framework and my own theoretical lens that will guide the empirical analysis.  
The chapter is structured as follows: Sections 2.1 and 2.2 draw on existing theories and insights 
to provide an overview of three dominant public management reform doctrines and their ideal-
type effects on public policy implementation. Section 2.3 synthesizes theories and evidence 
from public administration and public management, as well as public policy and comparative 
politics strands of literature whilst discussing numerous forces that can be at work in driving, 
guiding and restraining management change. Section 2.4 brings in the perspectives of 
governance theory and elaborates the public management process in the light of the 
metagoverning role that that political and administrative leaders can play in it. Sections 2.5 and 
2.6 draw on existing literature’s predictions and offer specific theoretical angles for the study 
of results, influential factors and the process of the social service reforms in clientelistic policy-
making context. These theoretical frames of reference are, then, operationalized in section 2.7. 
2.1 Public management reform models 
The growing complexity of collective problems and social needs aligned with pressures for 
cheaper and better public services have placed public management concerns high on political 
agenda in recent decades; all of this also generated a substantial amount of academic inquiry 
and thinking about the subject (Kettl 2000; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). Even though the quest 
to redefine the nature and role of the public sector in many democracies in North America and 
Western Europe in particular has led to often ambiguous and incoherent reform paths, it 
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sponsored three big reform paradigms that affected the study and reality of both public policy 
and public administration.  
The first reform path was inspired by the New Public Management (NPM) thinking in the 
1980s, and this sponsored a shift of the study and practice of public administration away from 
its traditional focus on organizational structure and behavior towards a more management-
centered one (D. Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Lane 2000; Aucoin 1995).  As a general doctrine, 
NPM envisioned effective, efficient and better-quality public services by proposing the 
replacement of hierarchy as the central coordinating mechanism with markets as well as the 
importation of businesslike concepts, values and tools into the functioning of public 
bureaucracy (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). For the real life of public administration and policy-
making, NPM served as a whole set of not always mutually aligned reform strategies that were 
opening the public sector to more competition – both within and outside of government (Hood 
1991; Pollitt 1995; Christensen and Lægreid 2007; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; S. P. Osborne 
2010).  
From the administrative perspective, NPM implied the emphasis on responsiveness to service 
users and supplementation of input-based control typical of traditional public administration, 
only with output-based measurement and management (Hood 1991; Pierre 2012).  The shift 
from adhering to arbitrary rules to achieving results was aligned with the introduction of more 
ﬂexible forms of work into the public sector, as well as of a more disaggregated organization 
of service provision.  Benchmarks, performance-related pay, organizational specialization and 
other private-sector management practices were not just promoted as efficient steering tools, 
but also as means for inducing public sector organizations and employees to compete against 
each other to provide better and cheaper services (Pollitt 1995; Grand and Bartlett 1993; Bell 
and Hindmoor 2009; S. P. Osborne 2010).   
In order to foster internal, but also external competition, NPM proposed the separation of policy 
formation and policy implementation, steering the provision of a large portion of services 
towards private, non-governmental actors and relatively autonomous agencies within the public 
sector (Peters 2011; Pierre 2012). For policy design and implementation strategies, this implied 
the reduction of vertical control over the implementation process and the replacement of 
traditional hierarchical or bureaucratic policy tools such as regulations and public enterprises 
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by mainly market-based tools (Hood 1991; D. Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Dunleavy and Hood 
1994; Ferlie et al. 1996). Selling public enterprises or their shares to the private sector was 
hence considered as a way to reduce the size and cost of the public sector by NPM promoters. 
In addition, by expanding the outsourcing of goods and services and public-private partnerships, 
this was presented as a logical consequence of efforts by the public sector to enhance not only 
the NPM-emphasized efficiency and effectiveness, but also flexibility and access to private-
sector innovation, technology and expertise (Kettl 2010; Farneti, Padovani, and Young 2010; 
Ponomariov and Kingsley 2008; Hartmann and Patrickson 2000; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).  
By organizationally distancing the implementation from policy-makers and by steering it 
toward “an arm’s length” away from organizations – or even away from public sector 
organizations – NPM has stimulated the efficiency and flexibility of the public service, but has 
at the same time worsened the problems of effectiveness and coordination of public policies 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Lane 2000; Kettl 2000; Peters 2011; Pierre 2012; S. P. Osborne 
2010). In dealing with the latter effects, governments became more and more aware during 
1990s that leaving it to the discretion of the market system was just not enough (Hill and Hupe 
2014). This implied that the privatization and initial elimination of rules in some policy areas 
needed to be accompanied by new regulation designed to protect public values (De Bruijn and 
Dicke 2006; Héritier 2002).  
By means of outsourcing and via other NPM-inspired practices, governments were suggested 
to use the embedded market approach in which they were not only providing funds, selecting 
services to be outsourced, codifying criteria for the selection of providers and specifying terms 
of contracts, but were also monitoring providers’ operative conduct and endorsing policy 
outputs. In this way, despite of  the NPM-introduced reduction of governmental control over 
the implementation process, it did not abandon the reliance on central steering throughout its 
evolution (Bell and Hindmoor 2009; Hill and Hupe 2014). 
A more substantial move away from the top-down practice and understanding of public 
management and public policy occurred during the 1990s with the second and still ongoing 
reform wave, recently labeled as the New Public Governance (S. P. Osborne 2010; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2011; Peters 2011), which searched for solutions to policy problems based on the 
inclusion of a wider spectrum of actors in the implementation processes, thus endorsing more 
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interactive forms of governance. Throughout its development, New Public Governance (NPG) 
broadened the goals of the network model while envisioning an improved effectiveness and 
democratic quality of public services. That is, NPG emerged from the network approach that 
moved the study and practice of public administration away from its focus on organizational 
and institutional changes within the public sector, towards the focus on changes in relations 
between the government and other actors (Klijn 2012; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).  
A better inter-organizational coordination of policy design and delivery, as well as more 
informed and flexible solutions to complex policy problems were all to be reached by  replacing 
hierarchies and markets as the central steering mechanisms with a networks of actors stemming 
from the government, market and civil society (Klijn 2012; Christensen and Lægreid 2012). 
This reliance on networks in NPG is accompanied with the idea of working in partnerships 
toward producing joint results and with stress on citizen participation in both policymaking and 
delivery (Peters 2011; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). Reliance on partnerships, it is considered, 
induces knowledge-sharing throughout the policy process, while co-production with citizens 
and their associations enables an injection of citizen values and priorities in the design and 
delivery of public services (Buuren, Klijn, and Edelenbos 2012; Ostrom 1996; Pestoff and 
Brandsen 2013).   
Unlike NPM which applied competitive contracts to foster governmental flexibility without 
really abandoning a state-led approach, NPG endorsed the establishment of much more 
horizontal relationships between governmental and other social organizations (Klijn 2012; 
Peters 2011). The level of authority shared through this new relationship may vary, but even 
with the moderate inclusion of citizens in the governing process—like the one that comes with 
mere consultations—NPG is meant to enhance the legitimacy of governmental decisions and 
eases its implementation (Buuren, Klijn, and Edelenbos 2012; Irvin and Stansbury 2004). To 
ensure intrinsic cooperation and participation, instead of precise specification of outputs and 
conduction of monitoring, NPG focuses on the building of trust, relations, and social capital 
(Hansen 2007; Hill and Hupe 2014; Klijn 2012; Agranoff 2007).  
NPM and NPG, with an abundance of variations in the existing labels for the former, are often 
presented as two alternative general reform models in scholarly discussions. Many country- or 
area-specific models originating from empirical research or theoretical innovation are often 
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subsumed under or correlated with one of these two conceptual hubs. However, as the 
comparative research on reform results shows, reforms in many Northern and Western 
European countries can hardly be correlated with paradigms behind either of the two big models 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). These countries have proven to follow a modernisation path which 
does not imply distancing the public sector from the bureaucratic nature of governance and of 
the hierarchy of the traditional model of bureaucratic power. Even though continental 
modernizers have sometimes been qualified merely as guardians of the “status quo” or as 
stragglers reluctant to abandon the notion of the “old” hierarchy, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) 
see their path as a distinctive reform model and label it as the Neo-Weberian State (NWS).  
The label itself expresses the conciliatory nature of this model which seeks to offer a solution 
of the tension between the quest for modernization and a devotion to preserve valuable 
Weberian foundations of public services such as “assumptions of a positive state, a distinctive 
public service and  particular legal order” (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011:120). For NWS 
modernizers the main task is thus to find a way to combine traditional values of public 
administration with new virtues of efficiency, responsiveness, flexibility and adaptability. This, 
from the policy perspective, implies not just reaffirmation of the role of the state as a driving 
force in facing challenges of modern society, but also the shift from rule following toward the 
holistic focus on meeting citizens’ needs. The NWS-inspired solutions to citizens’ needs can 
occasionally rely on the employment of market-based tools, but their core strength is in the 
professionalism and in the quality of the services which are designed and provided by the state. 
The incorporation of citizens’ perspectives in state-centered policy solutions in this reform 
model is meant to be ensured through the addition of participatory elements in decision-making, 
as well as in service delivery (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Pollitt 2008; Mazur and Kopycinski 
2017).  
Modernization of the Weberian administrative tradition, on the one hand, implies the renewal 
of the role that administrative law has “in preserving the basic principles pertaining to citizen-
state relationship, including equality before the law, privacy, legal security and the availability 
of specialized legal scrutiny of the state actions” (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). This renewal, 
nevertheless, should not undermine the respect for the authority of administrative regulations 
and procedures, but it should stipulate the combined focus on inputs and results in the 
management of resources within government. In the combination of both ‘Weberian’ and ‘neo’ 
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sides, NWS model seeks to preserve the distinctive status and the culture of public service, 
while simultaneously fostering the creation of citizens-oriented and professional bureaucracy 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Pollitt 2008; Lynn 2008).  
The simultaneous existence and influence of these three distinctive reform models, whose key 
features are summarized in Table 2, indicates that with the start of the new millennium 
governments did become aware of the need to distinguish between what they are and what they 
are not able to achieve; between what society can legitimately expect from them and what it 
cannot; and between what might be left to the market and what are areas in which the 
government should retain full responsibility (Hill and Hupe 2014). 
Table 2 Public management reform models: key features 
 Traditional 
Public 
Administration  
New Public 
Management 
New Public 
Governance 
Neo-
Weberian 
State 
Main goal: Legitimacy and 
compliance  
More effective, 
efficient and 
better-quality 
public service 
More legitimate, 
inclusive, 
flexible and 
effective 
government  
Modernized 
Weberian 
tradition of 
public service  
Coordinating 
mechanism  
Hierarchies Markets  Networks  Hierarchies  
Management 
style  
Bureaucratic  Post-
bureaucratic, 
competitive  
Post-
competitive, 
collaborative  
Professional- 
bureaucratic  
Key 
management 
tool 
Rules and 
input-based 
tools 
Benchmarking 
and other 
output-based 
tools 
Public 
participation and 
trust  
Rules in 
combination 
with outputs  
Key Policy 
Tool  
Direct provision 
by government 
Contract-out to 
private entities 
Co-production 
with citizens 
and their 
associations  
Professional 
and inclusive 
direct 
provision  
Source: adapted from Howlett, Kekez, and Poocharoen (2017: 489). 
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Although the three big reform models have induced the creation of different management and 
policy tools, or of different arrangements of older instruments as means of surmounting existing 
policy problems and improving policy outcomes, what they have in common is the focus on 
action (Hill and Hupe 2014; Howlett, Kekez, and Poocharoen 2017).  This focus is 
characterized as a fundamental characteristic of government transformation into governance 
and of an entry into, as Hill and Hupe (2014) call it, the contemporary governance paradigm. 
2.2 Ideal-type results of public management reform  
As a consequence of the parallel influence of the above-described reform models, the 
contemporary age of governance—if using the term in the sense of the contemporary phase in 
the evolution of Western government (Hill and Hupe 2014)—is marked by a wide range of 
practices with the existence of multiple governance modes, rather than of a  single one (Pollitt 
and Bouckaert 2011). Accordingly, Pierre and Peters (2000) developed three scenarios in which 
three big reform models lead to these corresponding modes of governance in Western 
democracies: "reasserting control": "letting other regimes rule"; and "communitarianism, 
deliberation and direct democracy". Along a similar line, Hill and Hupe (2014) recognize three 
modes of governance which follow the threefold distinction between hierarchy, market and 
networks and which can be aligned with the aforesaid big reform models.  
The first mode is the one of governance by authority, in which the government takes the role of 
a CEO while focusing on government regulation and on issuing orders. The second mode is 
labeled as governance by transaction, with the main stress on the creation of a framework within 
which other actors may carry out activities and government can evaluate them. In this mode, it 
is the government that takes the role of a regulator and complements it with the role of inspector 
as vertical connections become looser. The third mode is governance by persuasion, when 
government acts as a chairman by fostering participation of other actors in the policy process.  
The plurality of governance modes is especially evident in the implementation of public policies 
and delivery of public policy. So as to demonstrate this, Hill and Hupe (2014) elaborated 
‘enforcement’, ‘performance’ and ‘co-production’ as modes of implementation congruent with 
the three reform doctrines, and the corresponding governance modes. By conceptualizing 
implementation as the management of the process leading to the realization of policy 
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expectations or goals, Hill and Hupe (2014) showed how each of the three implementation 
modes implies distinctive management activities at different action scales (see Table 3). Modes 
of implementation thereby differ in the management of the policy process (at the system scale), 
the management of inter-organizational relations (at the scale of organizations), and in the 
management of internal and external relations (at the scale of an individual) (Hill and Hupe 
2014, p. 186).  
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Table 3 Modes of implementation in the context of management reforms 
Background reform model Neo-Weberian state New Public Management New Public Governance 
Fitting governance mode Governance by authority Governance by transaction Governance by persuasion 
Fitting governance role ‘CEO’ Regulator and Inspector ‘Chairman’ 
Fitting mode of 
implementation 
‘Enforcement’ (Management via 
inputs) 
‘Performance’(Management 
via outputs) 
‘Co-production ‘(Management 
via outcomes as shared results) 
 
Operational activities 
Managing policy process Making mandates explicit Creating ‘interfaces’ Appealing for responsibility 
Managing inter-
organizational elations 
Creating clarity on tasks and 
competences 
Taking care of sufficient resources 
Enhancing contract compliance Realizing partnerships 
Managing (internal and 
external) contacts 
Enhancing motivation and 
internalization 
Realizing compliance to standard 
operating procedures 
Leadership and training on the job 
Enhancing and maintaining 
service orientation 
Rewarding target compliance 
Enhancing professionalization 
 
Organizing response 
Central management 
mechanism 
 
Rules 
 
Contract 
 
Trust 
 
Source: with adaptation from Hill and Hupe (2014: 187). 
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In the enforcement mode which is congruent with the NWS doctrine and governance-by-
authority, the central government maintains monopoly over public services, and operational 
activities are managed within a hierarchical setting. With managerial reliance on inputs, 
management of the policy process is focused on the assignment of explicit mandates for the 
implementation of a particular policy. These mandates are, in the management of inter-
organizational relations, further clarified and substantiated with sufficient resources. With 
hierarchical vertical connections and rules as a central management mechanism, management 
of inter-personal contacts is focused on internalization of regulations, and standard operating 
procedures. Compliance with the rules is ensured through provision of leadership and training 
on the job (Hill and Hupe 2014; Hupe and Hill 2007).  Nevertheless, in the NWS-inspired 
modernization of resources management within the government sector,  strict reliance on rule-
following in this implementation mode is to a limited extent complemented by the focus on  
achievement of results and on meeting citizens’ needs (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Pollitt 
2008).  
The NPM doctrine and the governance-by-transaction mode give to implementation 
management the performance perspective in which output-based performance management 
becomes central. For  policy process management, this implies the emphasis on the creation of 
a framework and interfaces for competitive contracting of public services production (Hill and 
Hupe 2014). While the given framework enables arrangements with various private, public or 
non-profit contractors, relations with the selected ones are defined though contracts specifying 
not only costs, but also performance targets and output standards (English and Guthrie 2003; 
Pierre and Peters 2000; Pollitt 2003). Within this setting, the management of inter-
organizational relations is oriented towards ensuring contract compliance. Along the same line, 
the management of interactions implies the reliance on results-oriented personnel management 
and the creation of incentives for the prevalence of service orientation (Hill and Hupe 2014; 
Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Thomann, Hupe, and Sager 2017).  
Lastly, the NPG model and governance-by-persuasion are operationalized through a co-
production mode that places focus on collectively defined outcomes whose achievement relies 
on synergy between different levels of government, as well as public and non-public actors 
(Hill and Hupe 2014; Alford 1998; Poocharoen and Ting 2015). At the system level, co-
production implies managerial activities through which a government enables a meaningful 
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participation of other actors in the implementation process. At the level of inter-organizational 
relations, these activities are followed by the management of the networks created, but also by 
nurturing concrete manifestations of implementation partnerships.  
Achieving synergy rather than competitiveness among participating actors is fostered by the 
use of trust and shared values as the principal management mechanisms. The same mechanisms 
are also employed at the individual level in which co-production is materialized through focus 
on professionalization in the management of internal contacts and the adoption of a user-centred 
approach in managing external contacts (Hill and Hupe 2014). The latter includes the 
engagement of citizens in design and delivery of a professionally produced service. In this 
manner, via their input, citizens may contribute not only to a service which they personally, but 
also preform activities complementary to the core mission of the service-providing organization  
(Brandsen and Honingh 2015). 
The multiple-scale approach on implementation management proposed by Hill and Hupe 
(2014) corresponds with the contextualized working of reform processes which can result in 
both congruous and incongruous modes of implementation in practice. This means that more 
than one mode may be prevalent in a single state. Moreover, Hupe and Hill (2014) themselves 
point out that multiple modes of operational governance can be present in one policy area, or 
even in one specific policy in which, e.g., the performance mode on the individual street-level 
of implementation can co-exist with the enforcement mode of inter-organizational relations.  
In addition, simultaneous focus on actors, activities and scales of action (system, organisation 
and individual) enables a systematic and process-oriented exploration of implementation 
management which goes beyond the contestation between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ 
perspectives on policy implementation (Hill and Hupe 2014, 2006). Preoccupied with ways to 
face “what they regard as defects in the implementation process, both perspectives concern 
themselves with efforts to increase the capacity to steer the policy processes, either from the 
top or the bottom”  (Hill and Hupe 2006, p.571).  
On the contrary, the focus on implementation management lowers the risk of being trapped in 
the analysis of a success or a failure in the achievement of expected policy goals. It also provides 
a basis for theory-driven and yet contextual explanations in which the implementation process 
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is conceived as the dependent variable in the public management reform process. In this respect, 
this dissertation treats the aforementioned three modes of implementation as the ideal-type 
forms of results of a management reform. They are used as a heuristic device and thus form a 
grid with the purpose to detect and characterize empirical variations of the dependent variable. 
2.3 Forces behind the public management reform 
Goals and management tools introduced either by means of one reform or by a fusion of more 
reform models undoubtedly have significant impact on implementation modes that the public 
management reform can result in. Nevertheless, the choice of a particular model and its 
materialisation into implementation modes in practice also is also determined by numerous 
forces that can be at work in driving, guiding and restraining management change (Christensen 
and Lægreid 2012).  
After the analysis of public management reforms in 12 Western democracies, Pollitt and 
Bouckaert (2011) offered the public management reform framework (see Figure 3) in which 
they apply a top-down approach to the reform process by attributing executive politicians and/or 
senior civil servants a key role in conceiving and executing the change of public management. 
Although it is central for the adoption of a specific reform package, elite decision-making is 
surrounded by three large groups of factors, including the background socio-economic 
influences, political pressures and features of administrative system. It is the interplay between 
these factors that shapes the decisions of the policy-making elite and, consequently, leads to 
different paths and results of management change.   
The first group of factors includes the effects of global economic forces and national socio-
demographic aspects that provide incentives for politicians and civil servants to look for ways 
of easing the strain on the system. The second cluster of factors concerns structural and dynamic 
elements of the political system. While the former refers to general features of a system, such 
as the type of executive government, the latter encompasses the influx of management reform 
ideas combined with the pressure from citizens and party-political ideas. In taking a broader 
view, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) attribute the upsurge of reforms in the last 30 years to socio-
economic factors and to the supply of management reform ideas. On the other hand, political 
system actors, particularly groups with a vested interest in the status quo, can act not only as 
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sources of incentives, but may also demonstrate a lack of interest for management reform, or 
even recalcitrance to change. Resistance to change can also originate from the third group of 
factors which encompasses cultural, structural and institutional characteristic of the 
administrative system, often proven difficult to transform in more than merely incremental 
ways.  
The overview of forces behind the public management reform in this section draws on Pollitt 
and Bouckaert’s conceptualization of three groups of influential factors (see Figure 3). In the 
section ahead, specific factors within each group are elaborated through the lens of existing 
theories, but also based on evidence from public administration and public management, public 
policy and comparative politics strands of literature.  
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Figure 3 A framework of public management reform: focus on factors 
Source: Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011: 33).
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2.3.1 Forces behind the reform: focus on socio-economic factors 
The group of factors represented in Box A of Figure 3 involves diverse socio-economic forces 
that usually function as background conditions or drivers of public management reform. On a 
more general level, this cluster of factors entails mainly structural socio-economic features of a 
society such as population size and structure or macro-economic cycles and features, which do 
have an influential, although not a defining role in setting the climate for public management 
reform. On a more specific level, among other structural socio-economic features, Pollitt and 
Bouckaret (2011) identify global economic forces (Box B of Figure 3) and socio-demographic 
change (box C in Figure 3) as the background pressures which can have distinctive impact on 
public administration in a country.  
The influence of economic globalization is the most determining factor for the initiation of 
public management reforms. This can be perceived as the response to the effects of a country’s 
exposure to international economic upturns and downturns, or as the solution to problems 
induced by economic competition and market pressure (Christensen and Lægreid 2012). The 
globalization of capital markets and the intensification of international trade and competition 
over the past few decades has only limited the scope of macro-economic measures that national 
governments can employ when addressing unemployment and other social risks, but also 
encouraged the quest for lighter bureaucratic burdens on the private sector and for more 
competitiveness of the public or semi-public firms. After the global economic crisis of 2008, 
when democracies all over the globe faced severe imbalances  of public budgets, the call for 
public sector reform became more and more widespread and often associated with the demand 
for restrictions in public spending (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).  
The latter demand, as emphasized by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011), is often challenged or 
counterbalanced with the need to address social risks amplified by the same economic crises or 
induced by changes in the pattern of life and in the definition of social rights in modern 
societies. While the first group of risks primarily refers to job insecurity, unemployment and 
poverty, the latter two groups most notably entail the increased share of elderly people in our 
populations, changed family structure with more single-parent or single-person households and 
a broader scope of social rights granted to different segments of population including children, 
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persons with disability, minorities, etc. Even though each of these socio-demographic changes 
had a different prevalence in different countries, in many developed and young democracies 
they resulted in the rise of demand for public services and transfers in the social, health and 
educational policies.  
The economic and socio-demographic background pressures described do function as a strong 
impetus for the initiation of management and policy reforms, but at the same time have a merely 
indirect impact on patterns of change. This indirect impact is achieved through foreground 
socio-economic policy and political priorities (Box D of Figure 3) which reflect the background 
pressures and the pursuit of which can have decisive effects on the way the public sector is 
organized and managed. Devotion to the fulfillment of the Maastricht convergence criteria in 
many EU member states, for example, was often followed by downsizing or reshaping welfare 
policies (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). In most cases the later was achieved not only through 
redefinitions of their elements, of eligibility or the coverage of social services and transfers, but 
also through reorganization of the ways in which services were managed and provided. Among 
other formats, savings were sought via pluralization of service providers or a stronger reliance 
on voluntary inputs of communities and citizens in service delivery. The focus on public debt 
control as a macro-economic policy priority thereby affected not only a state’s welfare 
measures, but also its state apparatus mandated with the delivery of these measures. 
The striving for public-expenditure cuts or for the increased competitiveness of the public 
sector—both of which are aligned with the NPM-thinking—have quite often provoked reform 
in public administration practices, as well as in the implementation of public policies, but they 
did not straightforwardly lead toward NPM-inspired reforms in most countries. In a climate of 
budget cuts, the need to address high unemployment rates or the growth in the number of retired 
persons during the last decade often provided strong incentives for many governments to seek 
reform strategies to enable them to ease the strains on the state apparatus while maintaining the 
quality of public services. The timing, scope, content and the fate of these strategies, 
nevertheless, varied significantly from country to country and in many countries was to a large 
extent shaped by the interplay between another two elements: political and administrative 
clusters of influential factors (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Christensen and Lægreid 2012).  
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2.3.2 Forces behind the reform: focus on political factors 
A second cluster of factors that can have a decisive influence not only on the emergence 
management reform, but also on its course entails structural and dynamic features of the 
political system represented by Box of Figure 3 (including Boxes K, G and H).  Among 
structural, constitutional and more general functional characteristics, Pollitt and Bouckaert 
(2011) identify the state structure and the nature of the executive government as those with the 
biggest impact on the speed and the scope of management reform. Their comparative research 
has shown that in highly centralized and unitary states (e.g. UK or New Zealand) in which the 
decision-making power of central government is not shared with other tiers or bodies of 
government, management reforms tend to have a broader scope and a more uniformed character 
than those reforms conducted in decentralized states, be it unitary or federal ones. In contrast, 
reforms in highly decentralized states (e.g. Germany, Australia and Belgium), often resemble 
experimental reform sites as different entities or tiers of government tend to diverge not only in 
their aspirations, but also in the adopted paths or management reform timing (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2011; Schröter and Wollmann 1997; Halligan and Power 1992; Brans, Visscher, and 
Vancoppenolle 2006).  
State structure and the constitution usually act in combination with the nature of executive 
government at the national level, a feature illustrative for the principles by means of which a 
political system operates, as well as of habits of government. Ranging from majoritarian 
principles associated with single-party governments or governments with bare majority, toward 
consensual conventions  linked with minority cabinets or grand coalitions (Lijphart 1984, 
2012), the nature of executive government can significantly affect the process and the results 
of management reform. Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2011) comparison of the reform process led by 
majoritarian systems (Australia, Canada, New Zealand until 1996 and the UK) with the ones 
conducted in consensual regimes (Finland, Italy and the Netherlands) showed that the form of 
the political executive affects not only the leeway that the executive can have when launching 
the reform, but it also has an impact on the stability of the reform process and its potential to 
induce the sense of ‘ownership’.  
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Whilst deep and swift changes proved to be most politically feasible for majoritarian 
governments in centralized countries, managerial novelties adopted by single-party government 
were not necessarily considered legitimate by public servants supposed to implement them, nor 
were thy necessarily maintained after the party that promoted them lost power. On the other 
hand,  new managerial values and ideas—particularly those inspired by NPG—adopted through 
the consensus of diverse political entities and interests proved to have a smaller scope, but 
stronger prospects for internalization and sustainability in the implementation phase. In the 
middle of those two extremes, there is also a mixed category with countries that, for example, 
have an intermediate political regime (e.g. France) and are qualified with moderate scope and 
speed of  reform, or that have an extensively decentralized state structure (e.g. Germany) which 
can outweigh the leadership of a strong or homogenous executive in carrying out the uniformed 
reform (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Ansell, Sørensen, and Torfing 2017). 
By setting the boundaries for politically feasible management change, state structure and the 
nature of executive government jointly determine the ability of political and administrative 
leaders for swift or decisive adoption of reforms. When affecting elite decision-making, 
nevertheless, these two structural features of the political system act in combination with its 
more dynamic counterparts. For Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011), the most noteworthy among them 
is the influx of new management ideas (Box F of Figure 3), pressure from citizens (Box G of 
Figure 3) and party-political ideas (Box H of Figure 3). In the interplay between ideational and 
political factors, decisions made by political and administrative leaders are the most 
straightforwardly influenced by political ideas of the ruling party – or parties. Even though such 
ideas may derive from a specific ideology or political agenda developed by party activists, they 
are in practice often driven by inputs from the electorate and molded by management advice 
that decision-makers are exposed to.  
As public management reform has become a fashionable topic of inquiry over last three 
decades, management advice to the political executive is not only provided by senior public 
servants or political advisors, but also by academic specialists, independent consultants, 
business corporations, think tanks and other types of reform entrepreneurs. The role of diverse 
reform intermediaries has become even more prominent during the 1990s with the 
internationalization of management reform and consequent engagement of various international 
organizations such as the OECD, World Bank, IMF, WTO and the EU in the provision of 
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management ideas and advice. Among them, the OECD and its Public management service 
(PUMA) stipulated substantial inter-country borrowing among prosperous democracies of 
Europe, Australasia and North America, while the IMF and World Bank have been influential 
advice-providers for governments of many a young democracy (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; 
Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall 2002). 
For governments in transitional societies, international bodies often acted as the sources of 
external pressure and providers of myths on most appropriate reformist ideas and tools. During 
the 1990s these myths mostly endorses the imitation of NPM reforms originating from Anglo-
Saxon countries, but after the 2000s the ideological domination of managerialist approach was 
challenged by the emergence of myths inspired by other management doctrines (Christensen 
and Lægreid 2012; Sahlin-Andersson 2001). In the post-communist EU member and candidate 
states, significant role was played by the EU which, often in cooperation with OECD or World 
Bank, provided support for management reform through technical assistance (the OECD 
SIGMA program) or through various funding schemes. By aligning membership conditionality 
with the creation of a legal framework to enshrine a stable and professional administration, the 
EU was also directing Central and Eastern European governments toward the adoption of 
reform models prevalent in continental Europe. EU conditionality, however, was effective only 
till the accession was granted, while in candidate countries it was often counterbalanced by 
political disinclination toward civil service legislation and concurrent disposition toward 
businesslike reform approaches (Verheijen 2012; Dimitrova 2002). 
Although the proposal or validation of reform strategies seldom gets in the prime focus of public 
discussions, advocacy campaigns or media front pages, citizens can still generate the relevant 
and, on occasions even vital, pressure for management change. On a more general level, such 
pressure can be exerted by expressing dissatisfaction with the speed, flexibility, equity and other 
standards of services provided or financed by the state. To function as the driver of reform, 
citizens’ discontent need not be - and it is often not - accompanied by specific proposals for 
change; it also need not be communicated directly to the decision-making elite. Local or 
national political representatives can act as effective messengers in such cases, while media or 
civil society organizations may reinforce citizens’ pressure and articulate reform suggestions.  
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As Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) highlight, the strength of citizens’ pressure often increases with 
the incidence of chance events (Box I of Figure 3) such as scandals, disasters and accidents, as 
such occurrences tend to shift the focus of public attention towards the quality, equity or 
accountability issues in public management. By shedding light on the dysfunctionalities of 
existing governance regimes, such events may even trigger a wider public outcry for 
management reforms. 
Whilst citizens can generate important reform stimuli in their general electorate role, in the role 
of target population for specific public policies, they can also affect party-political ideas on 
reforms that may be adopted within particular policy areas. Politicians and, more importantly, 
elected officials, have various incentives when engaging in the policy process, but two motives 
among them are the most prominent. One of them is to govern design and implementation of 
public policies that will assist them in their (re)election, and the other is to accomplish 
effectiveness in addressing widely-acknowledged public problems (Schneider and Ingram 
1993, 1997). Access of target group(s) to sources of political power such as votes, money, and 
propensity of a group to mobilize and act—if regarded in the light of potential electoral 
implications—is of vital importance as it stimulates political parties to develop those policy and 
management ideas which provide political opportunities and discourage them from actions 
aligned with political risks.  
In competitive party democracies, the interplay between pressure from citizens-voters and 
party-political ideas is most vividly reflected in strategic linkages that politicians and parties 
develop with citizens in general or with subsets of citizens as those target populations of specific 
public policies. As they have the potential to either boost or undermine the process and the 
effects of management reform, the types of strategic linkages and their implications for public 
management reform, as evidenced by different strands of literature are summarized in Table 4 
and elaborated in the text that follows it.  
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Table 4 Types of citizen-politician linkages and their implications for management reform 
 Strategic citizen – politician linkages 
Programmatic 
valence policy 
competition 
Programmatic  
policy 
competition 
Clientelistic 
policy 
competition   
Clientelistic  
patronage  
Focus of 
electoral 
mobilization 
strategy 
General 
electorate 
Target 
populations of 
specific 
policies 
Target 
populations of 
specific 
policies 
Individual 
citizens 
Contingency 
of exchange 
and modes of 
party 
competition 
No 
contingency, 
politicians 
compete by 
demonstrating 
own abilities to 
successfully 
provide public 
goods 
Spatial or 
directional 
competition 
based on 
indirect 
unconditional 
exchange 
 
Competition 
based on 
conditional 
and direct 
exchange  
Allocation of 
valuable and 
rare goods as 
the reward for 
loyalty or 
payments for 
past political 
support 
Nature of 
goods offered 
to voters 
Collective 
goods that are 
favored by and 
accessible to 
the whole 
polity 
Club goods 
that are typical 
part of 
(re)distributive 
policies) 
 
Club goods 
mainly in a 
form of highly 
selective 
benefits 
Private goods, 
primarily 
appointments 
and jobs in the 
public sector 
Implications 
for public 
management 
reform  
Mobilization 
of public 
opinion for the 
public 
management 
change may 
induce 
politicians to 
demonstrate of 
commitment to 
the reform 
Politicians are 
inclined to 
support 
adoption of 
management 
reforms, 
especially in 
policies 
highlighted by 
their 
programmatic 
strategy 
Reformist 
initiatives are 
often 
countervailed 
with reluctance 
of politicians 
and groups 
with a vested 
interest in the 
preservation of 
high political 
discretion   
Widespread 
patronage 
generates 
resistance to 
management 
reform, and 
can even 
incentivize 
politicians to 
engage in the 
politicized re-
engineering of 
reform ideas 
Source: elaborated by author based on Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), Cruz and Keefer 
(2015), Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011), Kopecký et al. (2016), Chandra (2007), Grindle (2012), 
Peters (2010b). 
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When appealing to the general electorate, politicians tend to mobilize voters by promising them 
successful delivery of collective goods favored by and accessible to the whole polity. In this 
mode of strategic linkages, which Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) refer to as the programmatic 
valence policy competition, politicians compete not by promising different packages of 
preferred public goods, but by demonstrating own abilities to successfully provide them. Such 
electoral mobilization strategy is mainly focused on the salient issues such are the employment, 
national security, monetary stability, or national health care. Nevertheless, mobilization of 
public opinion for public management change may induce politicians to appeal to citizens by 
demonstrating commitment to a more accountable, effective or hospitable public administration 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).  
When the mobilization strategy is focused on target populations of specific policies, on the 
other hand, the goods being offered to voters have the nature of club goods which include, but 
are not limited to, differential access to social insurance benefits, tax schemas and other, 
categorical social benefits. Club goods are typically part of redistributive policies providing 
benefits to one and imposing burdens to other categories of citizens. When developing voter 
mobilization strategy focused on such goods, politicians can choose between a programmatic 
or a clientelistic linkage with targeted constituencies. The choice of the former, which Kitschelt 
and Wilkinson (2007) refer to as the programmatic policy competition, implies spatial or 
directional competition with other parties based on the offer of distributive policies targeting 
voters with different policy preferences. The choice of the clientelistic strategy, on the other 
hand, implies party competition based on conditional exchange. Politicians thus offer the 
provision of of highly selective benefits to targeted groups of citizens and expect political 
support in the form of votes or various contributions to political party in return. 
When becoming office incumbents, parties that have opted for the programmatic path will 
frame the design and implementation of policies to achieve indirect exchange with their 
constituencies while hoping that policy outcomes will ensure sufficient support for the re-
election of their party. In the application of rules guiding the distribution of benefits and costs, 
party preferences of policy implementers and beneficiaries will not affect their status. 
Clientelistic office holders, on the other hand, will engage in the formulation and 
implementation of policies mainly to ensure the conditions for direct and contingent exchange 
with their clients. By favoring ambiguous rules to allow them significant discretion over the 
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implementation process, they try to maintain the large leeway for politicized tailoring of 
benefits to the needs of targeted citizens whose voting behavior can be predicted and monitored 
(Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Piattoni 2001).  
The choice between these two strategies can significantly affect the fate of the public 
management reform. As evidence from studies encompassing both large and smaller samples 
of countries suggests, political systems in which public sector reforms were evaluated as more 
or less successful are characterized by the prevalence of programmatic parties (Cruz and Keefer 
2015; Geddes 1996). In countries ruled by parties that tend to opt for the clientelistic mode of 
electoral mobilization, on the other hand, reformist initiatives are often countervailed by the 
reluctance of politicians and groups with a vested interest in the preservation of high political 
discretion  (Cruz and Keefer 2015; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). By analyzing evaluations of 
World Bank public sector reform loans in over 100 countries, Cruz and Keefer (2015)  even 
evidenced the smallest chances of success for those reform meant to increase the transparency 
of public sector financial management.  
Additionally, public management reforms efforts can be significantly undermined by a 
particular kind of clientelistic practices referred to as the party patronage in which allocation of 
valuable, rare and private goods occurs in retail transactions to individual citizens who receive 
those goods as a reward for loyalty or payments for past support (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; 
Chandra 2007). Even though the wide list of goods that can be exchanged through this type of 
citizens-politicians linkage encompasses public service projects and contracts, personal rewards 
and gifts, as well as privileged access to medical care, land or housing, a more precise definition 
limits the concept to its most widespread form which refers to the politicized allocation of 
appointments and jobs in the public and semi-public sector (Kopeckỳ and Spirova 2011; 
Kopecký et al. 2016). In its latter meaning, party patronage is closely linked with the 
phenomenon labeled by public administration literature as the politicization of civil service 
which in its most dominant interpretation refers to the replacement of merit-based criteria with 
political ones in the recruitment and management of public servants (Peters and Pierre 2004; 
Dahlström and Niklasson 2013; Rouban 2012).  
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When strictly bound to politicization of civil servants’ careers and activities, however, 
patronage neither has to be clientelistic, nor does it directly lead to illegal or corruptive 
practices. Public jobs allocated through patronage may undoubtedly be used as a resource for 
vote-buying and building the network of loyal party supporters. On the other hand, it can also 
function as a management tool used by political leaders to gain or maintain control over the 
state apparatus and public policies. Political appointees can therefore be placed or employed in 
core civil service, state-owned companies, agencies or even in organizations contracted by the 
government not just to receive a reward for their political support, but also to guarantee the 
design and implementation of public policies that will correspond with politicians’ aims 
(Kopeckỳ and Spirova 2011; Kopecký et al. 2016).   
These two motivations can function both separately and combined and, as recent research on 
patronage conducted in 22 countries demonstrated, the pattern of patronage tends to be linked 
to its scope (Kopecký et al. 2016). In political systems in which politicization is limited to senior 
positions in civil service, patronage is mainly motivated by the desire to control the bureaucracy 
so that political appointees act as high-ranked intermediaries between politicians and the state 
apparatus. On the other hand, in polities characterized by substantial politicization which 
spreads wide across and deep into state institutions, patronage tends to simultaneously function 
as a control and electoral resource. Political appointees in such systems mainly act as parts of a 
network of political activists and supporters which penetrate the state apparatus, while enabling 
the party not only to pursue its policy goals, but also to capture state resources for clientelistic 
purposes (Kopecký et al. 2016).  
Clientelistic deals through which jobs are given to political allies are widespread in countries 
with high levels of economic inequality and job instability, with the latter exhibiting the 
tendency to amplify the value of public employment. The inclination to engage in patronage 
practices of this type can nevertheless be found among political actors in most advanced 
democracies, at the local level in particular, and it can lead to ethically problematic or even 
illegal practices (Rouban 2012; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Keefer 2007). Patronage-driven 
elected officials have been argued to need opportunities for retail transactions and are 
consequently incentivized to engage in the distortion of policy design and implementation (Ruth 
forthcoming; Chandra 2007). Proven to be a highly adaptive strategy of electoral mobilization, 
patronage can not only generate resistance to management reform, but can even incentivize 
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politicians to engage in the re-engineering of reform ideas and tools so as to fit in their rent-
seeking needs (Grindle 2010, 2012; Peters 2010b). 
2.3.3 Forces behind the reform: focus on administrative factors 
While political system actors, particularly groups with a vested interest in the status quo, can 
act not only as sources of incentives, but may also demonstrate a lack of interest or recalcitrance 
for management reform, resistance to change can also originate from the administrative group 
of factors represented by Box K for Figure 3. This broad group of factors entails cultural, 
structural and institutional characteristic of the administrative system in which the reform takes 
place, and which often proves difficult to transform in more than merely incremental ways 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).  
Cultural features primarily refer to the dominant philosophy and beliefs of administration 
gradually institutionalized into historical-cultural traditions while constraining or directing 
pathways of management reforms (March and Olsen 1989; Christensen and Lægreid 2012). 
Administrative traditions differ among countries, and even among sectors and organizations in 
a single country, but over the course of the past 30 years some general patterns of their impact 
on management reforms were distinguished (Christensen and Lægreid 2012; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2011). While the pragmatic administrative culture of Anglo-American countries 
(Australia, New Zealand, UK and USA) proved to be a conducive context for the far-reaching 
reforms inspired by the NPM doctrine, the legalistic traditions of Continental European and 
Scandinavian countries served as better ground for the incremental modernization of traditional 
bureaucracies either with managerial (e.g. France, and later on, Belgium and Germany below 
the federal level) or more participatory (e.g. Finland, the Netherland) tools (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2011; Peters 2010b). 
Lower levels of enthusiasm for sweeping reformist initiatives were also evidenced among 
Southern European countries (e.g. Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece) in which new management 
ideas had to be reframed in order to fit the legalistic thinking. Reformist initiatives in these 
countries were primarily inspired by managerial ideas and tools, but modernization was 
impeded with the formalism and the politicization of administration (Ongaro 2009; Christensen 
and Lægreid 2012). The potential of administrative tradition to undermine reform efforts was 
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even more prominent in developing countries, such as those in Africa and in parts of Latin 
America, in which the functioning of a highly legalistic bureaucratic apparatus is not supported 
by an appropriate cultural infrastructure. As civil sector politicization in such regimes, a 
phenomenon dubbed by Fred Riggs (Riggs 1964) as ‘prismatic’ administrations, tends to be 
followed by a the mismatch between the rules-in-form and the rules-in-use, the reforms were 
rarely implemented as formally announced (Peters 2010b).  
The combination of politicization and administrative ‘double talk’ also constrained the 
enforcement of reform packages adopted in post-communistic states of Central and Eastern 
Europe and former Soviet Union during 1990s and 2000s. Bureaucracies in communistic 
systems of governance primarily functioned as executive machines of communistic parties and  
thus developed and maintained extensive formal structures, but lost large portions of 
impersonality and authority (Peters 2010b; Verheijen 1995). Following the initiation of 
transition, post-communistic administrative systems were left with the lack of policy-making 
capacities and a damaged reputation in the society. In the states of Central/East Central Europe 
such legacy seriously undermined EU-conditioned attempts to depoliticize civil service and 
model its architecture after traditional European bureaucracies, while in most states of former 
Soviet Union it allowed for the occurrence of troubled cohabitation between performance-based 
and law-based approach.  
The former Yugoslav states were an exception from this pattern, as the notion of professional 
civil service was preserved there. Such legacy of the socialist administrative system made these 
states more confident in public sector solutions and more receptive toward administrative 
models and modernization approaches prevailing in Continental European countries. However, 
the conducive conditions for the consisted incremental change of formalized civil service 
systems in the Western Balkans countries were often countervailed with the tradition and the 
practice of civil service politicization due to which--just like in other transitional states—
political leaders displayed low interest in any changes that could decrease their ability to 
interfere into public sector employment (Verheijen 2012).  
The second feature of the administrative system that can have significant effects on the 
management reform is its structure. As a rather general concept, the administrative structure 
most broadly refers to the way relationships work between politics and administration, and 
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within different elements of administrative organization. While both sorts of relationship are 
considered a product of deliberate and strategic design, they are also heavily conditioned by 
historical-cultural traditions, which can make them more or less conducive for the adoption of 
new management ideas  (Dahlström 2012; Whitford 2012). In countries in which one or two 
ministries have decisive power, such as the Ministry of Finance and the State Service 
Commission in New Zealand or the Treasury in the UK, reforms could include large-scale 
changes of the existing administrative structures and practices. Such a scenario, on the other 
hand, was hardly possible in countries with a more fragmented administrative structure (e.g. 
the Netherlands or Germany) in which no single ministry or any other agency at the national 
level could lead the reform process as the unified action center (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).   
As to the relations between politics and administration, in systems in which the carriers of top 
civil servants are integrated with those of executive politicians, such as is the case with the 
French grand corps, the reform content and path tend to be jointly shaped by politicians and 
their mandarins. In this kind of a structure, however, reform ownership  need not neccesarily 
be shared by the middle or lover level echelons of administration, where public officials feel 
little association with top civil servants and their political principals. The gap between 
mandarins and rank-and-file public officials and the consequential problems in reform 
implementation tend to be larger in countries qualified with the above-discussed politicization 
of top civil service positions.  
More conducive conditions for continuity of the reform process, on the other hand, can be found 
in countries such as Canada, New Zealand or the UK, qualified by the separation of the carrier 
paths of politicians and top servants (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). The limitation of political 
influence and stability of top civil service posts, however, can also bring setbacks in the form 
of conservative attitudes towards the management change and a limited scope of related 
experience. In such scenarios, with a lack of consonance with the highest strata of the state 
apparatus, politicians tend to bypass it by relying extensively on the workings of a new 
intermediate category of political advisors (Peters and Pierre 2004; Aucoin and Savoie 2009; 
Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).   
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Finally, on a more operative level, traditions and structure tend to reflect themselves in 
personnel regulation and institutionalized norms of various public service professions. On a 
street level, labor conditions and rules under which public officials operate embed  their 
discretion, but at the same time, they structure the standard procedures in which operative 
situations are handled (Hupe and Hill 2007). This institutional dimension of administrative 
system tends to be built up over the years and create a tangle of interlocking rules and standard 
operating procedures, which can be very difficult to fundamentally reduce and revise. 
Management reforms looking for efficiency gains through technological modernization of the 
ways in which public officials handle operative situations will involve substantive investments 
in staff and equipment, or might even face resistance of staff or their unions before changes are 
carried through (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).  
Despite all sorts of material, human or time-related costs they might involve, and despite 
“potentially formidable obstacles to radical or rapid changes, reform processes are launched, 
and frequently do make and impact” (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011, p. 43). In Pollitt and 
Bouckaert’s framework (2011), the process through which reforms are launched and adopted 
most notably refers to the choice of specific content of the reform package (Box L of Figure 3) 
and the governing decisions through which the selected content is being turned into public 
management and policy implementation practice (box N in Figure 3).  The following section 
addresses how this particular process might unfold, and which specific governing activities it 
might involve.     
2.4 Public management reform process as a metagovernance process 
The framework of management reform developed by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) presents an 
open schematic and heuristic tool that can accommodate a specific empirical contexts and a 
variety of more specific theories and causal explanations for different outcomes of management 
reforms. Moreover, due to its twofold focus on the factors affecting the management reform 
and the process through which the reform unfolds, the specification of elements within the 
framework can seek to account for not just ‘why’, but also ‘how’ public management reform 
leads to specific outcomes.  
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 In the attempt to do the latter, the dissertation draws on Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2011) top-
down conceptualization of the reform process and focuses on the key role that political and 
administrative leaders have in the initiation and execution of management change. The process 
through which new management ideas are turned into implementation practice is conceived 
here through the governance theory lens. Decisions of the elites on structure and process 
changes in the public sector are, as Figure 4 shows, subsumed under the concept of 
metagovernance which “in its most basic and general (but also most eclectic) sense, denotes the 
governance of governance” (Jessop 2011, p. 106).  
The basic conceptualization of metagovernance relies on the distinction between three levels of 
governance, among which metagovernance refers to the second- and third-level ones (Kooiman 
2003). The exercise of the third level governance, which is also referred to as the constitutive 
governance, includes fundamental decisions about the setting in which policy formation and 
implementation takes place. These decisions are meant to affect decision-making on policy 
content as well on about organizational arrangements for its delivery (Hill and Hupe 2014; 
Ostrom 2007).  
Within this setting, the second-level governance, also known as directional governance, 
provides the conditions for the “formulation and decision-making about collectively desired 
outcomes” (Hill and Hupe 2014, p. 129). The actual management of a process leading to the 
realization of these goals then in turn occurs at the level of operational governance shaped by 
the structure and the content designed at the two higher levels of governance  (Hill and Hupe 
2014).   
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Figure 4 A Framework of public management reform: focus on the process 
Source: elaborated after Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) and Hill and Hupe (2014). 
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When applied to the management reform process, the political and administrative exercise of 
constitutive governance implies the fundamental decisions about the initiation of governance 
reform and constitution of a structure in which policy formation and implementation take place. 
Decisions made at this highest level of governance involve the creation or a change of the 
general principles guiding and justifying the ways in which governance occurs and governors 
act. In the reform process, the modification of the normative framework is followed by the 
choice between different reform models and, with models corresponding, between governance 
modes (Kooiman 2003; Jessop 2011; Meuleman 2008; Torfing et al. 2012). Even though the 
creation of a setting by default implies the decisions about the design of institutions on a system 
scale, political and administrative leaders employ their metagovernorning capacities at 
organizational and individual loci of political-societal relations. This includes not only the 
explication of mandates and codification of the (inter)organisational setting, but also interaction 
with individuals implementing or benefiting from a policy on the street-level scale (Hill and 
Hupe 2014; Howlett and Ramesh 2016). 
Within the normative and material structures created by the constitutive governance, the 
directional governance involves decision-making about the incorporation of an adopted reform 
package in the formulation of specific policy goals and tools.  The metagoverning task at this 
level includes not only the integration of reformist principles, goals and tools into the policy-
making framework and policy design, but also hands-on efforts through which metagovernors 
engage in reflexive (re)design of policy and management tools  promoted by adopted reform 
model and the corresponding governance mode (Jessop 2011; Kooiman 2003; Torfing et al. 
2012). The ways in which political and administrative metagovernors will approach the exercise 
of directional governance depends, among other things, on the ideal roles that different reform 
models assign to elected politicians and civil servants (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Kooiman 
2003). Key features of these ideal-type roles are indicated in Table 5.  
  
50 
 
Table 5 Directional governance in three reform models: roles for politicians and mandarins 
Model Role for political leaders Role for administrative leaders 
NPM Strategic goal setting Autonomous managers authorized to 
establish performance framework and 
choose specific kinds of policy tools.   
NWS Traditional - takers of 
authoritative decisions, both 
big and small 
Technical experts and professional 
implementers of governing decisions made 
by political leaders.   
NPG Driving force behind 
consensus based policy 
solutions 
Network managers and partnership leaders  
Source: with adaptation from Polllitt and Bouckaert (2011:169). 
When metagoverning is inspired by the New Public Management paradigm, elected officials 
are supposed to keep authority over goal-setting in their directional governing efforts, but also 
to enable administrative leaders to act as autonomous governors while making decisions about 
policy  content as well as about its implementation (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Klijn 2012; S. 
P. Osborne 2010).  The logic of the parallel stimulation of effectiveness and efficiency in this 
model is intertwined with the empowerment of public managers and with authorizing them to 
define performance indicators, choose or favour specific kinds of policy tools and stipulate 
functional devices for monitoring the implementation of public policies (Peters 2011; Pierre 
2012; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). In the NWS model, by contrast, executive politicians are left 
with the traditional role and envisioned as the key decision-makers in both strategic and 
operative matters. In such a setup, top civil servants are expected to ensure the implementation 
of governing decisions adopted by their political principals. When preforming this task, they 
are supposed to foster professionalism and high technical expertise (Pollitt and Bouckaert 
2011). 
By fostering this interactive character of governing, NPG complicates the picture by removing 
politicians away from the substance of government policy and giving them primacy over the 
facilitation of a collaborative process – that which should generate common interest and 
solutions (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000). In this new role, executive politicians are stipulated to 
relinquish the idea of dominating and controlling the policy-making process and to command 
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actors to come up with a particular solution, but are invited to act as facilitators and the driving 
force behind a network of multiple stakeholders (Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997; Agranoff 
and McGuire 2004; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Sørensen and Torfing 2009). In this reform 
model, the political exercise of directional governance is complemented with the administrative 
endeavor to turn created networks and partnerships into smoothly functioning mechanisms for 
consensus-based formulation of policy solutions  (Sørensen and Torfing 2009, 2016; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2011). 
These sets of roles represent only the ideal-type versions of metagoverning exercise as 
envisioned by the three general reform paradigms. Nevertheless, decisions made by elites can 
be inspired by particular reformist principles and ideas, but are also dependant on numerous 
socio-economic, political and administrative forces discussed in the previous section which 
drive, restrain and guide management change. Due to that, the metagoverning choices are rarely 
pure reflections of ideal-type models in practice, but are frequently assemblages of 
contextualized combinations of ideas promoted by different reform models (Dean 2009). 
Moreover, as studies of reform processes have evidenced, while administrative leaders tend to 
struggle with the fulfilment of metagoverning tasks, politicians are often reluctant to confine 
themselves to the roles assigned by the models or are even ready to engage in the conversion 
of reform strategies when being determined to keep control over the public sector (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2011; Peters and Pierre 2004).  
2.5 The model of public management reform in a clientelistic context 
In order to account for the variation of outcomes in the reform of social service delivery in 
Croatia, this dissertation uses the elements of Pollitt and Buckaert’s (2011) public management 
reform framework by emphasizing the centrality of elite decision-making while at the same 
seeking to identify structural and dynamic factors enabling or constraining political executives 
in carrying out their version of the reform. In crafting the explanation for the reform outcomes, 
the dissertation adopts an actor-centered institutional perspective which seeks to explain 
governing choices and outcomes by focusing on policy-making institutions but treats the effects 
of institutional conditions as contingent upon actors and their interaction, as well as upon 
socioeconomic structures and policy legacies (Scharpf 1997, 2000).  
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Actor-centered institutionalism, to be more specific, treats global economic forces and socio-
demographic change affecting the socioeconomic structures and policies as accountable for the 
creation of challenges to which policy-makers may have to respond. These responses are driven 
by the dimensions of collective problems that need to be addressed, but the actual course of 
policy and management action is then influenced by political-administrative institutions and 
institutional rules. Among all these rules, formal institutional rules are the ones with the most 
significant effect and they impose  limitations on the repertoire of permitted courses of actors’ 
actions (Scharpf 1997, 2000). The effects of substantive prohibitions imposed by such rules are 
further complemented by the less general rules defining “the constellations of actors that may 
participate in the adoption and implementation of policy responses and their permissible modes 
of interaction” (Scharpf 2000, p.775).  
Within this repertoire, the actual choice between permissible actions is affected by institutional 
rules which give structure to incentives by referring to self-interest of governments, political 
parties, mandarins, interest groups and other collective actors involved in decision-making 
processes. However, there rational choice inspired predictions in actor-entered institutionalism 
can be complemented with by  hypotheses focusing on the possible effects of institutionalized 
norms and role obligations  on an actor’s strategies (Scharpf 1997, 2000; Mayntz and Scharpf 
1995). Moreover, actors’ strategies and interacting choices are assumed to be proximate causes 
of policy responses and are, accordingly, “treated as a theoretically distinct category—
influenced but not determined by the institutional framework within which interactions occur “ 
(Scharpf 2000, p. 771).  
While drawing on the actor-centered institutional framework, this dissertation attributes the 
upsurge of management reforms in Croatian social policy to growing demographic and socio-
economic pressures and the influx of new management ideas promoted by various international 
actors.  In a causal model of service management reform in Croatia (see Figure 5), these 
elements from Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2011) groups of socio-economic and political factors 
are considered as relevant forces at work in initiating the change, but not as influential factors 
in preventing or enabling clientelistic capture of reformed services or in selecting the direction 
of the actual transformation of service management. The features of the political and 
administrative system and interaction between political actors and citizens are, on the other 
hand, treated as the factors that generated variation in implementation modes that the reform 
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resulted in. Nevertheless, among all of these factors, the model pinpoints the key features of 
national politico-administrative regime from the relevant institutional and dynamic features of 
the specific policy setting in which services were delivered prior to the reform and in which 
management reform actually took place.  While the former are treated as scope conditions, the 
latter ones account for the prevention and occurrence of clientelistic capture of the reformed 
service management and the variation in the reform outcomes.  
Figure 5 Model of social service reform in clientelistic policy-making context 
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In the model, the socialist and transitional legacy of civil sector politicization and state 
domination by a single party whose strong and wide territorial organization needed to be 
maintained through patronage are conceived as the conditions not merely discouraging political 
leaders from investments in systematic management change, but also incentivizing them to 
engage in clientelistic capture of the reform process. The politicization of top civil service 
positions, the persistence of the administrative ‘double talk’ and the dominant - often 
majoritarian - position of one party in the government are also considered as conditions that 
have, along with the centralized state structure, provided the political executive with 
considerable latitude for the adoption, dismissal or misuse of particular reform paths.  It is 
further assumed that the given latitude was enhanced by the decentralized job placement system 
which restrained the capacity of the national legal framework to prevent the integration of 
patronage practices into services undergoing management change. Nevertheless, while 
allowing the plurality of institutionally permissible recruitment options, the same system 
created the space for variation in the reform results across different institutional settings for 
service provision.  
As the body of civil sector politicization studies shows, civil service systems in which 
recruitment function is performed by ministries or subnational bodies provide  politicians with 
more opportunities for the employment of partisans than the systems in which centralized 
personnel organizations are in charge of hiring public servants (Peters 2010; Meyer-Sahling 
2006; Meyer-Sahling and Jáger 2012). Nonetheless, the degree of political discretion provided 
by the national civil service framework in a particular sector or an institution can be reduced 
with the rules institutionalizing operative conduct and providing incentives for the participating 
actors. Moreover, the incentives and disincentives provided by rules can be complemented with 
professional norms and standards of behavior shared within public institutions; the recruitment 
function may even be delegated to professional bodies and independent civil service 
commissions (Grindle 1997; Leonard 2010; Kopecký et al. 2016; Meyer-Sahling 2006; Peters 
2010). Even in systems in which top civil service positions are politicized, the ability of political 
parties to penetrate deep into the structures of state institutions can be limited by the “dense 
web of formalized standards and procedures that serve to ensure the professional ethos of the 
civil service” (Meyer-Sahling 2006, p. 700).  
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When this line of argumentation is used to address the reform of social services provision in 
Croatia, the corresponding expectation is that the existing procedures and standards would pose 
limitations to political pressures for control over reform process and its results in services  
provided in a sufficiently formalized implementation setting prior to the reform. In the politico-
administrative systems qualified by a frequent usage of ‘double talk’, however, the formal rules 
are not necessarily practiced in ongoing situations and are thus not the most adequate 
representations of rule-ordered action (Peters 2010b).  
To account for this challenge, the social service implementation reform model in Croatia draws 
on the strand of institutional studies which highlight the analytical potential of the concept of 
rules-in-use. These set of rules, also labeled as the working rules, may or may not be formalized, 
but are necessarily referred to when actors are asked to explain or justify own actions (Ostrom 
2007). In line with that, the model identifies working procedures and establishes professional 
standards as features of the institutional setting for service provision whose presence or absence 
constrained or enabled political parties in the development of clientelistic practices within the 
provision of social services and led to diverse reform paths in social services. 
Had the provision of social services been institutionalized with dense working procedures and 
well-established professional standards before the reform, it is argued that executive politicians 
would have a limited ability to decisively run the service management reform and would need 
to invest considerable energy if trying to overtake implementation with the scope of establishing 
patronage practices. In this way, the existing institutional setting for service provision would 
offer constraints for the political capture and discourage political actors from rapid or 
comprehensive service management reform. In line with that, the model predicts that in services 
characterized by a well-established institutional setting, meta-governors will perceive and use 
refrom primarly as a way to ease the strains of the welfare system. Accordingly, new 
management ideas will be embedded into existing implementation practice incrementally and 
consistently and the resulting implementation mode will represent a modernized version of the 
mode that was prevailing prior to the reform.  
On the other hand, in services characterized by minimal or nonexistent working procedures and 
professional standards prior to the reform, the implementation setting can be considered as 
lacking institutional constrains for the politicization of reform process and results. In such cases, 
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it is argued, whether or not and to what extent politicians will be incentivized to misuse reform 
for patronage purposes can be explained by their re-election calculus. As Schneider and Ingram 
(1993 and 1997) claim, an important part of the re-election calculus is the anticipation of the 
ways in which target population(s) of a certain policy will respond to this policy, as well the 
ways in which others will perceive the target group and its claim/rejection of its entitlement to 
benefits or burdens.  
In clientelistic policies, even though ‘clients’ engaged in this exchange as the recipients of jobs, 
contracts or positions are likely to accept and comply with a clientelistic bargain, those real 
clients – the target group of public policy used for patronage purposes – are most likely to 
disapprove of the clientelistic capture. The success of this disapproval, if regarded in the light 
of its potential electoral implications, depends partly on the political power of the target group 
itself (constructed as votes, money, and propensity of the group to mobilize and act), but also 
on the extent to which others reject or support content and management of benefits or costs 
being directed towards that target (Schneider and Ingram 1997).  
In other words, in order to reduce attractiveness of patronage strategy for the ruling party, 
citizens targeted with policy under reform need be able to politically mobilize or to have strong 
advocacy groups promoting their wellbeing and deservingness. The model predicts that while 
the presence of empowered individuals and/or organizations that represent the interest of a 
target population will discourage political capture of the service reform, the lack of pre-existing 
working rules will enable comprehensive (re)design of arrangements for the service provision. 
As a setting with such institutional and dynamic features political leaders will be incentivized 
to appeal to service beneficiaries with the offer of a programmatic package based on innovations 
in social service provision, service will have the best chances to result in a novel mode of 
implementation that would consistently reflect the reformist ideas. 
In services marked by a minimal or non-existent institutional framework and politically weak 
and non-represented target groups, the transformation of implementation management may be 
used to enhance political control over implementation. Free from limitations of institutional 
rules and pressures of a politically potent target group, the political executive will have no 
constrains or disincentives to swiftly and decisively lead the reform while pursuing rent-seeking 
interests of a ruling party. The model predicts the reform to be led primarily by political leaders 
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and include the comprehensive transformation of implementation management in which 
reformist ideas will be introduced selectively in order to enable political interference in 
implementation management. Moreover, the argument being proposed in this dissertation is 
that principles and mechanisms of public management reform can even be modified and merged 
with the patronage practices in such services. In this way, new management ideas presented by 
reform promoters as a means to improving policy implementation can be misused for easier 
employment of party supporters as service providers and reform can therefore result in a novel 
implementation mode distorted by patronage practices.  
2.6 Building the causal mechanism of captured metagovernance  
The causal model identifies conditions that could account for the variation of reform results in 
Croatia, but it only takes a very general look at the pathways through which the reform unfolded 
and led to different implementation modes. While the mechanisms through which the two 
uncaptured modes of implementation emerged could be understood with reliance on the existing 
theories and studies of meta-governance, the captured pathway and its outcomes are still rather 
puzzling. In seeking to unpack the causal mechanism through which management reform could 
be used as a route to turn service provision into opportunities for the employment of party 
supporters as service providers, the dissertation identifies New Public Governance as reform 
path most prone to for political capture. 
Even though the traditional and Neo-Weberian models of bureaucratic power have often been 
criticized for their rigidity, they offered a straight line of accountability combined with the rule 
of law and predictability. It may not always work like that in practice, but it is understandable 
and clear in principle (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). In its quest for more governmental 
flexibility, New Public Management brought market providers onto the accountability map, but 
it did not abandon the  reliance on the central steering of public services (Klijn 2012). By 
favoring contracts over command and specification of performance indicators over assignment 
of explicit tasks, however, it took away the role of the chief executive from the government and 
assigned it the entrepreneurial one, but gave novel authority to state managers, regulators and 
inspectors in their oversight and control (Hill and Hupe 2014; Bell and Hindmoor 2009; 
Sørensen 2012).   
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By contrast, the usage of trust instead of contracts or rules as key management mechanisms 
logically led NPG toward the invalidation of state oversight functions. In addition, the 
endorsement of complex implementation networks and partnerships converted the assignment 
of responsibilities into an extremely difficult task, to say the least (Klijn 2012). With such 
underlying properties, NPG in itself holds the potential to blur out accountability and offer 
politicians – and other strong actors – with a space to edge away from regulatory and other 
institutional constraints (Papadopoulos 2007; Hansen 2007; Pierre and Peters 2005).  
In a contexts qualified by the prevalence of consensual and decentralized governing 
conventions or the presence of pressure from the democratic public, networks and partnerships 
can be metagoverned by means of soft institutional forms so as to represent an asset instead of 
a threat to democracy (Sørensen 2013; Ansell, Sørensen, and Torfing 2017). However, as this 
dissertation claims, the reliance on soft steering may be turned into the possibility for the 
political capture of the implementation management should the metagoverning role be 
performed by politicians incentivized to engage in rent-seeking action.  
In order to craft explanations of how the latter, the captured outcome, may be possible, the 
dissertation focuses on the role of politicians in metagovernance processes through which NPG-
inspired reform ideas are turned into implementation practice.  In doing so, in what follows 
below (see Table 6), it builds on the existing theorization of higher orders of governance and 
elaborates the activities on the scale of the system, the organisation or the individual entailed 
by political metagovernance when it is inspired by NPG thinking. After being operationalized, 
the elaboration is used as a conceptual grid in the building of the causal mechanism that can 
account for the captured version of reform results. 
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Table 6 Political metagovernance inspired by New Public Governance thinking 
 
 
Action scale 
Action level of political metagovernance  
 
Operational 
governance Constitutive governance Directional governance 
System 
Initiating institutional 
(re)design and creating 
governance arena  
General rule-making and 
endorsement of policy 
content 
 
Collaborative 
policy 
implementati
on and co-
delivery of 
public 
services 
Organization 
Devolving mandate and 
codifying the 
(inter)organizational setting 
Participating in the 
negotiated decision-making 
process 
Individual 
Fostering internalization of 
core norms and values 
Ensuring acceptance and 
interactive rule application 
Source: elaborated by author based on Hill and Hupe (2014), Sørensen and Torfing (2016), 
Papadopoulos (2016), Kooiman (2003). 
When constitutive governance as the highest-order governance is inspired by NPG reformist 
thinking, it is guided with the aim of structuring more or less institutionalized governance 
arenas that will reflect NPG’s vision of a more inclusive, flexible and effective public 
management (Kooiman 2003). The actual constitution of governance arenas need not be the 
result of a strategic institutional design as they can also be created by societal actors, but it has 
to be substantiated with sufficient legitimization. In both cases, democratically elected 
politicians—alongside citizens themselves—act as the most convincing source of authorization. 
In a top-down creation of governance arenas, political leaders are the ones setting the NPG 
reform on the agenda and proposing allocation of some policy functions to local communities 
and societal actors. In a more bottom-up process, political metagovernors are those who 
enhance the legitimacy of self-organizing networks by granting them with rule-making 
authority (Papadopoulos 2016; Sørensen and Torfing 2016). 
When acting as metagovernors, not only do politicians share authority with networks and 
partnerships, but are also securing the integrity and representativeness of the resulting 
governance arrangements. The fulfilment of the first of these two democratic principles implies 
that the government has devolved the explicit mandate and has committed administrative 
resources to empowered decision-makers (Sørensen and Torfing 2016; Fung and Wright 2003). 
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The adoption of the second principle can be considered accomplished if the new governance 
arena is constituted and functioning in a way which reflects the diversity of stakeholder 
interests. Even though the NPG endorses the usage of soft-management tools in the actual 
management of networks and partnerships, the overly flexible constitution of the governance 
arena and its mandate may challenge the policy-making capacity of authorized actors 
(Papadopoulos 2016).  
Moreover, the lack of appropriate procedures for selecting representatives of stakeholder 
interests and for balancing power asymmetries between them may lead to domination of the 
policy-making process by unrepresentative local elites (Papadopoulos 2016; Hysing and 
Lundberg 2015; Irvin and Stansbury 2004). In order to ensure democratic safeguards against 
such scenarios, political metagovernors engage in designing the (inter)organisational setting in 
which collaborative policy-making will take place, with the task of framing fundamental 
conditions and procedures that will not only guide authorization and its potential withdrawal, 
but will also determine the eligibility of actors acting as implementers and beneficiaries of a 
policy (Papadopoulos 2016; Hill and Hupe 2014; Bell and Hindmoor 2009; Ostrom 2007).  
The codification of the interactive arena and the relations within it can nevertheless properly 
influence policy-making only if it is based on a rich and diversified problem diagnosis and if 
internalized by individual members of a political community. To attain this cause, political 
leaders need to persuasively communicate their constitutive decisions and substantiate them 
with reasoning derived from face-to-face interaction with public employees, citizens and other 
stakeholders. In this hands-on task, political action can be complemented—though not 
replaced—by the expertize and managerial activities taken on by leaders of public 
administration and public-sector employees (Sørensen and Torfing 2016; Hill and Hupe 2014).  
Within the setting inspired by NPG thinking, the aim of directional or second-order governance 
is to provide a framework and foster an interactive formulation of policy content that will 
operationalize NPG’s quest for mobilization and empowerment of local communities and users. 
In order to ensure the legitimacy of decision-making premises of collaborating actors and their 
alignment with the overall goals of the government, political actors need to define fiscal, legal 
and discursive conditions that will frame the joint strive toward policy outcomes. At a later 
stage of policy formation, there are also the legitimizing results of negotiations characterised 
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by the acceptance or rejection of trade-offs between different policy outcomes and, as a 
consequence, of endorsing the proposed solution (Sørensen and Torfing 2016).  
The important ingredients of this hand of metagovernance are the accountability procedures 
which function as the defining milestones for collaborative policy formation while 
simultaneously ensuring the scrutiny of elected bodies and affected constituencies over  the 
consequent implementation process and its results. This implies that even if executive 
politicians are expected to steer collaborative implementation by leaving space for discretion 
of participants in governance arena, in the exercise of directional governance, however, they 
still need to stipulate the functional devices for the monitoring of the arena’s operative conduct 
and the endorsement of its outputs (Papadopoulos 2016; Bovaird and Loeffler 2016; Koppenjan 
and Klijn 2004; Jessop 2002).  
After ensuring the framework for policy-making, political metagovernors engage in shaping 
decision-making about collectively desired outcomes by negotiating policy content with other 
participants in the interactive arena and by persuading uncooperative participants to act within 
the NPG policy-making premises. Politicians can enhance their influence gained through 
participation in a negotiated policy-making process by empowering civil servants and making 
them responsible for the facilitation of collaborative interaction and the management of created 
networks and partnerships. NPG suggests that this managerial aspect of directional governance 
should be focused on the building of trust, reciprocity and social capital, which will act as 
essential components of interorganizational relations in the implementation of negotiated policy 
content (Sørensen and Torfing 2016; S. P. Osborne, Mclaughlin, and Chew 2010; Klijn 2010; 
Peters 2010a; Agranoff and McGuire 2004).  
Last but not least, politicians are providing the important input for easier implementation of a 
new policy by communicating the negotiated solution and its normative background to the 
general public (Sørensen and Torfing 2016). The acceptance of a policy content by its 
beneficiaries is a general prerequisite for successful implementation with the equal weight in 
state-based, market-based or collaborative arrangements. In collaborative implementation, 
however, those demands associated with the fulfilment of this prerequisite are weighted with 
an NPG-inspired devotion to user-empowerment and a holistic approach in addressing their 
needs (S. P. Osborne 2010).  
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The alignment with NPG’s principles is only possible if users are enabled to provide inputs for 
operational decisions made by employees of organizations that provide services and contribute 
to their directional decisions on a situation-bound rule application (Hill and Hupe 2014). For 
political metagovernors this implies that the promotion of a policy should also include invitation 
for co-productive design and delivery of public services. By placing more trust in decisions 
made by users and communities, and by ensuring the transparency of such decisions, politicians 
can also foster development of creative relationships with implementing actors in which 
communication flows in both ways (Bovaird and Loeffler 2016; Pestoff 2009; Voorberg, 
Bekkers, and Tummers 2015). 
2.7 Operationalization of the causal model and the initial causal mechanism 
The threefold research question guided the design of research activities towards three 
consequent phases that were conducted in order to: 
1. describe what kind of an implementation mode (or modes) were produced by the reform 
of social services in Croatia,  
 
2. validate and modify the proposed explanation of factors and conditions whose 
combination accounts for the variation in the implementation modes that the reform 
resulted in and, more specifically, for the presence and absence of clientelistic capture 
of the reformed service management, and 
 
3. build a plausible causal mechanism through which reform led by patronage-driven 
politicians can lead to distortion of implementation by patronage practices in services 
qualified with a non-existent or minimal institutional setting and weak or unrepresented 
beneficiaries. 
As to the first phase, in the documentation and analysis of the reform results—which is treated 
as the dependent variable—implementation mode as the key concept— was regarded as 
prevailing in the actual management of a process leading to the realization of policy goals. Such  
management encompasses activities on the system, on an organizational and individual action 
scale (Hill and Hupe 2014). In line with that, the operationalization of reform results focused 
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on the social policy implementation a decade after the reform was initiated and it employed 
indicators looking for actors, management mechanisms and operational activities with the locus 
on individuals, organizations, and the systems composed. The collection and analysis of data in 
the first phase was thus guided by the following specific questions: 
 
1. Who are the actors and what are the activities prevalent in the management of the policy 
process? 
2. Who are the actors and what are the activities prevalent in the management of inter-
organizational relations? 
3. Who are the actors and what are the activities prevalent in the management of (external 
and internal) inter-personal contacts? 
4. What role does the government take in the implementation management of the service 
and what are the central and adjutant management mechanisms? 
The specific modes of implementations that the Croatian management reform could result in 
were neither a priory theorized nor operationalized, but were left to be documented and 
identified through the empirical research. The analysis of collected empirical evidence was, 
nevertheless, guided by Hill and Hupe’s conceptualization of the modes of implementation 
which correspond with reformist strategies. Their elaboration of the operative was entailed by 
‘enforcement’, ‘performance’ and ‘coproduction’ perspectives on the implementation 
management and it informed the creation of a provisional list of indicators. This list structured 
the process of data collection and analysis, but was used in an open manner so as to enable an 
informed formation of data driven insights.  
In the second phase—the operationalization of the explanation for the variation in reform 
outcomes—focus was placed on the two factors that the causal model identifies as the ones that 
could account for diverse reform paths in Croatian social services. The first factor concerns the 
degree of institutionalization of social services provision prior to the reform, whereas the second 
deals with the power and representation of the population that is the target group of a policy. 
As shown in following figure (Figure 6), the operationalization of the first among the two 
factors was done through indicators which take into consideration the following:  
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1. Formal rules and regulations, 
2. Working rules and standard procedures, and  
3. Professional codes or bodies.  
The second condition that refers to power and representation of the target group was 
operationalized through indicators encompassing:  
1. The presence of an active individual or groups of users in service design or delivery, 
and  
2. The involvement of domestic or international organizations that promote the 
interests of service beneficiaries.  
The service was considered as having a well-established institutional setting if the provision of 
service was institutionalized through a dense web of working rules and standard operating 
procedures prior to the reform. This implies that the existing rules-in-form were referred to by 
actors engaged in service delivery when they were asked to describe standard practices and the 
ratio of their operative decisions. As the incentives given by working rules in this kind of setting 
could have been complemented by the effects of professional norms, the presence of 
professional codes or the engagement of professional associations in the management of service 
provision were also considered as indicators of sufficient institutionalization of service 
provision. The services in which formalized rules or the institutionalized professional norm 
were scant and were not referred to in actors’ descriptions of implementation practices were 
considered as minimally institutionalized.  
Furthermore, service beneficiaries were considered as influential or represented if, prior to the 
reform itself, the policy that the service was a part of was marked by the presence of an active 
individual or groups of users and by the involvement of domestic or international organizations 
that promote the interest of service beneficiaries. If both of these characters were missing, 
service users were regarded as politically weak and unrepresented.   
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Figure 6 Operationalization of a model of social service reform in clientelistic policy-making 
context 
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Such operationalization resulted in the following working hypotheses. 
Working hypothesis 1:  
In social services formerly provided in a well-established implementation setting, ruling 
parties will have limited ability and incentives to integrate patronage practices into 
service provision and reform principles will be incrementally and consistently integrated 
into existing implementation management.  
Working hypothesis 2:  
In services with a prior minimal or non-existent institutional setting of service provision, 
the activity of service beneficiaries and heavy involvement of actors advocating their 
interests constrain the use of reform for development of party patronage practices within 
the service provision. 
Working hypothesis 3:  
In services with prior minimal or non-existent institutional setting of service provision 
and with politically weak and unrepresented target population, there is a space for 
political capture and distortion of the reform process and new management tools with 
patronage practices.  
In the third phase, as illustrated in Figure 7, the non-existent or minimal institutional setting 
and weak or unrepresented beneficiaries were considered as policy-specific conditions in which 
patronage-driven interest of executive politicians (X) can lead to distortion of implementation 
with patronage practices (Y) within the general context of public management reforms in a 
patronage democracy. The theorized metagoverning role which executive politicians can 
exercise in the conditions conducive for the adoption and realisation of NPG-inspired reform 
was used as a heuristic device for the crafting of a mechanistic explanation of the captured 
version of management reform.
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Figure 7 Focusing and bounding process-tracing study
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In order to structure the theory-building process, the existing explanations were re-
conceptualized into a causal mechanism being comprised of parts in which, as illustrated in 
Figure 8, ENTITIES engage in activities to bring about the outcome. Entities “are engaging in 
activities (the parts of mechanism –i.e. toothed heels), while activities are producers of change, 
or what transmits causal forces through the mechanism (the movement of wheels)” (Beach and 
Pedersen 2013: 49). 
 
Figure 8 A mechanismic conceptualization of causal mechanism 
Source: Beach and Pedersen (2013: 50). 
The conceptualisation activities of NPG-inspired constitutive and directional governance on the 
system, as well as the organizational and individual action scale were thus re-conceptualized 
and operationalized as a mechanism comprised of set six parts: 1) Institutional (re)design, 2) 
Reforming the (inter)organizational setting, 3) Fostering internalization of core values and 
norms, 4) General rule-making for policy-making, 5) Reshaping the policy content, and 6) 
Interactive rule application.  
The resulting mechanism, illustrated in Figure 9, was used as a form of grid guiding structured 
collection and analysis of empirical material. 
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Figure 9 Political metagovernance as a causal mechanism 
 
  
OUTCOME: Interactive policy implementation and production of public services
CM part 6: Interactive rule application
POLITICAL LEADERS foster acceptance of policy and interactive rule application
CM part 5: Reshaping the policy content
POLITICAL LEADERS participate in the negotiated decision-making process
CM part 4: General rule-making for policy-making
POLITICAL LEADERS frame policy-making and endorse negotiated solution
CM part 3: Ensuring internalisation of core norms
POLITICAL LEADERS foster internalization of NPG vision and constitutive norms
CM part 2: Reforming (inter)organisational setting
POLITICAL LEADERS codify mandate and secure the arena’s representativeness  
CM part 1. Institutional redesign
POLITICAL LEADERS endorse NPG reform and constitute interactive policy arena 
CONDITION: 
Program-driven interest of political leaders
SCOPE CONDITIONS: 
Presence of NPG reform drivers and ideas
Consensual and decentralized governing conventions 
Presure from citizens and civi society  
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This chapter provides the research design overview and the methods used to select cases, collect 
and analyze data. Section 3.1 unfolds the procedures and the criteria for case selection in both 
the comparative and the process-tracing part of this mixed-method study. Section 3.2 elaborates 
the process and techniques used for data collection, with section 3.3 continuing with the 
overview of the processing of data collected by using qualitative data analysis. Three 
subsections of the section 3.3., then, provide a more detailed account on the steps and 
procedures used for the qualitative data analysis in each of the three consequent phases of the 
research. 
3.1 Overview and case selection 
In the comparative part of this mixed-method research, a focused comparison was achieved 
through the most similar cases design based on Mill’s method of difference in outcomes (Teune 
and Przeworski 1970; Gerring 2007; George and Bennett 2005). When it is used in a 
confirmatory mode (hypotheses-testing), the most similar system design relies on the 
comparison of at least a pair of cases and uses theory and propositions as a template with which 
to compare the empirical results. If the results predicted are confirmed by data in comparative 
analysis (e.g. if X then Y) and, what is more, if the expected contrasting results are confirmed 
for the reasons predicted (if NOT X then NOT Y), then the replication may be claimed (Yin 
2003; Seawright and Gerring 2008).  In the purest form of this research design, the selected 
cases are similar in all aspects except in the outcome (Y) and causal factors (X). As regards 
practical application, this implies the selection of cases with a similar context and the 
consequent checking of value or types of the X and Y outcome (Gerring 2007; Landman 2008). 
In this study, the similarity among researched cases was controlled through case selection 
procedures, whilst data collection and analysis was focused only towards the dissimilar factors 
and towards those which can explain the differences in the social service reform results. The 
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cases selected were identified as similar given the presence of reform drivers, the relation to the 
change of environment and the goals of specific social policies, as well as on the presence of 
reform “packages” promoted by international organisations. Research focus on social policy 
implementation implied the emphasis on services instead on transfers. Namely, services require 
more complicated forms of operational activities and management reform thus reflects upon 
them more strongly. As illustrated in Figure 10, cases were selected from a whole universe of 
social services targeting populations included in the domain of the Croatian Ministry of Social 
Policy and Youth that was coordinating the overall social policy at the time of data collection 
and analysis. These populations are:    
1) The elderly in need of care,  
2) Children and families at risk,  
3) Persons with disability,  
4) Adults with mental health problems,  
5) Drug and alcohol addicts,  
6) Victims of domestic violence,  
7) Victims of trafficking,  
8) Asylum seekers,  
9) The homeless, and  
10) Youth. 
In order to extract those services with a similar background, it was important to focus on the 
ones with a primary social character in its narrow meaning, which signifies a primary focus on 
vulnerable social groups and the primacy of social sector. This implied the exclusion of youth 
policy as well as of policies in which the social dimension is just complementary to the work 
of other sectors, primarily the judiciary and the police sector, such as is the case with services 
addressing victims of domestic violence and victims of trafficking. The similarity was also 
enhanced by focusing on services with a national scope and a clear service design that implies 
the exclusion of services for the homeless and asylum seekers. While the policy for the 
homeless in not designed as nationwide policy, but with services designed and implemented in 
some localities only, the policy for asylum seekers still does not have clearly defined services 
and it functions primarily as a pilot project with a rather small scope of beneficiaries.   
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Figure 10 Summary of the case selection procedure 
 
•The elderly in need of care, 
•Children and families at risk, 
•Persons with disability, 
•Adults with mental health problems, 
•Drug and alcohol addicts, 
•Victims of domestic violence, 
•Victims of trafficking, 
•Asylum seekers, 
•Homeless, and
•Youth.
Whole universe of social 
services targeting 
populations included in the 
domain of the Croatian 
Ministry of Social Policy 
and Youth.
•The elderly in need of care, 
•Children and families at risk, 
•Persons with disability, 
•Adults with mental health problems, 
•Drug and alcohol addicts, 
•Asylum seekers, and
•The homeless.  
Among them, left services 
in policy fields with social 
character in its narrow 
meaning: vulnerable social 
groups and the primacy of 
social sector.
•The elderly in need of care, 
•Children and families at risk, 
•Persons with disability, 
•Adults with mental health problems, and
•Drug and alcohol addicts.
Among them, left services 
within policies with the 
national scope and clear 
service design. 
•The elderly in need of care, 
•Children and families at risk, and
•Persons with disability.
Among them, selected 
services in policies with 
presence of socio-
demographic drivers or
changes of policy goals and 
instruments.
•Long-term care in homes and foster homes for 
elderly, 
•Home care for elderly, 
•Long term care in homes and foster homes for 
children without parental care,
•Supervision of parental care
• for families in risk, 
•Long term care in homes and foster homes for 
persons with disabilities and 
•Personal assistance for persons with disabilities.
Within these three polici 
fiels selected six most 
relevant and most 
substantial- in terms of funds 
in coverage- services (two  
in each field)
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The selection among the five remaining policies was undertaken given the similarity of services 
based on the presence of changes in the policy environment, in relation to demographic and 
social-economic challenges, along with significant changes in the frames of policy goals and 
instruments which target a specific population. Both changes increased the demand falling on 
state- provided services and the administrative reform presents a way to ease the strains of the 
welfare system. Additionally, similarity in relation to reform drivers implied the supply of the 
administrative reform idea in the services selected. This refers to the inclusion of social services 
in some reform packages that were introduced during the 2000s and mainly promoted the 
reform toward devolution, deetatisation and deinstitutionalisation.  
Preliminary interviews with social policy actors, analysis of documents and review of existing 
research reports indicated that policies for elderly in need for care, children and families at risk 
and persons with disabilities were characterized by the presence of these factors in the year 
2013, whilst this was not the case with the policy for adults with mental health problems and 
policy for drug and alcohol addicts. Finally, to enable a feasible comparison of implementation 
modes of social services that the reform resulted in (Y), the research encompassed the most 
relevant and the most substantial (in relation to funds and scope) social services provided within 
the three policy fields characterized by the presence of reform drivers. These services include 
the following:  
1. Accommodation in homes and foster homes for the elderly,  
2. Home care for the elderly,  
3. Accommodation in homes and foster homes for children without parental care, 
4. Supervision of parental care for families at risk,  
5. Accommodation in homes and foster homes for persons with disabilities, and  
6. Personal assistance for persons with disabilities. 
To ensure an empirically plausible and focused collection and analysis of data, the services 
selected that were treated as the unit of the analysis, were bound on the definition provided by 
relevant domestic regulatory and strategic documents (see Table 7).  
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Table 7 Definition of selected services 
Accommodation in homes 
and foster homes for the 
elderly.  
 The accommodation service is a service of care outside 
one's own family, which is consumed as institutional care 
in homes or other legal entities, or as non-institutional 
care in a foster family, a foster home, organised housing 
or in a community of housing units.  Accommodation can 
encompass the following services: housing, meals, care, 
health care, social work, psychosocial rehabilitation, 
physical therapy, work therapy, work activities, active 
leisure, education, , depending on the established needs 
or choices of users. The service is also often referred to 
as the long term care (Social Care Act). 
Accommodation in homes 
and foster homes for 
persons with disabilities 
Accommodation in homes 
and foster homes for 
persons with disabilities 
Home care for the elderly The home care is a non-institutional service designed to 
assist older persons in their everyday activities in their 
home. The service includes assistance in the following 
areas: personal hygiene, housework and shopping, basic 
health care, cooking, psychosocial supper and mediation 
in exhibiting various rights (Catalog of Rights and 
Services in Social Care). 
Personal assistant for 
persons with disabilities 
Personal assistance is a non-institutional service 
designed to assist persons with the hardest mode and 
rate of disability. The service includes assistance with 
personal hygiene and living space maintenance, 
traveling and work-related activities, assistance and 
accompaniment to social activities, daily support in 
upbringing the user’s children and, in general, assistance 
in activities of daily life, depending on the physical 
needs of the user (Catalog of Rights and Services in 
Social Care). 
Supervision of parental 
care for families at risk 
Supervision of parental care is a measure for the 
protection of the rights and well-being of the child. It 
involves psychological and social support to parents for 
which Centers for Social Welfare have identified 
mistakes and shortcomings in their parenting or the need 
for particular care in the upbringing of the child (Family 
Act). 
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The selection of a case to be studied through process tracing study was build upon prior cross-
case analysis. After the analysis of empirical evidence from all six cases indicated one service 
- home care for elderly-  with presence of distorted variant of co-production implementation 
mode (Y) together with the underdeveloped institutional setting and politically weak target 
population (scope conditions) and patronage-driven decision of executive politicians (X) , that 
case was chosen for further investigation through process-tracing method. The focus of the 
further investigation in this case was, as illustrated in Figure 11, on the mechanism through 
which the capture of reform took place.
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Figure 11 Illustration of case selection criteria in the process tracing study 
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3.2 Data Collection  
In order to develop converging lines of inquiry and triangulation, interviews as the main sources 
of evidence were combined with documents and official statistical data related to the reform 
and the implementation of the chosen social service. The selection of these three types of 
sources and the actual collection of data was guided by operationalization of the casual model 
of service management reform in a clientelistic policy-making setting (see Figure 6) and the 
causal mechanism of political metagovernance (see Figure 9).  
Whilst following the classification offered by Beach and Pedersen (2013), sources were 
selected that could provide the following types of evidence: (1) pattern evidence, (2) sequence 
evidence, (3) trace evidence, and (4) account evidence. The characteristics of each of these four 
types of evidence are presented in the Table 8, while the tables following it provide for the 
elaboration of the specific types of evidence used in order to document the dependent variable 
(Table 9), measure the predictions of the causal model (Table 10) and so as to build the causal 
mechanism of captured metagovernance (Table 11).  
Table 8 Types of evidence and sources of data aligned with them 
Account evidence  
 
This type of evidence deals with the content of empirical 
material, be it document or an oral account of what took 
place, given in an interview. 
Pattern evidence  This type of evidence relates to the prediction or revealing 
of a statistical or another pattern in the data.  
Sequence evidence   
 
This type of evidence deals with the temporal and spatial 
chronology of events. 
Trace evidence  
 
The type of evidence whose mere existence provides proof 
that a part of the predicted causal relation or mechanism 
exits. For example, the existence of the official minutes of a 
meeting, if authentic, provides for strong proof that a 
meeting actually did take place. 
Source: Beach and Pedersen (2013: 175-180). 
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Table 9 Types of evidence used to document the dependent variable 
Indicators  
Type of evidence used to document the 
dependent variable 
Actors and activities prevalent in the 
management of the policy process. 
Documented using pattern evidence from 
official statistics, and account evidence from 
interviews with participants and documents 
adopted by the government and its ministries.  
Actors and activities prevalent in the 
management of inter-organizational 
relations. 
Documented using account evidence from 
interviews with participants and (both external 
and internal) documents produced by ministries 
and organizations mandated with the 
management of service provision. Account 
evidence here is complemented with pattern 
evidence from official statistics. 
Actors and activities prevalent in the 
management of (external and 
internal) inter-personal contacts. 
Documented using account evidence from 
interviews with participants and (both external 
and internal) documents produced by ministries 
and organizations that are mandated with the 
management of service provision.    
The role that the government takes 
in the implementation management 
of service. 
Documented using account evidence from 
interviews with participants and (both external 
and internal) documents produced by ministries 
and organizations that are mandated with the 
management of service provision. 
The central and adjutant 
management mechanisms. 
Documented using account evidence from 
interviews with participants and (both external 
and internal) documents produced by ministries 
and organizations that are mandated with the 
management of service provision. Account 
evidence here is complemented with the trace 
evidence in the form of documents that 
materialise the particular management 
mechanism (e.g. contracts or code of ethics).  
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Table 10 Types of evidence used to measure predictions of the causal model 
Indicators  
Type of evidence used to measure factors 
and process predicted by the model of public 
management reform in the clientelistic 
context 
The degree of institutionalization of 
social services provision prior to the 
reform: formal rules and 
regulations. 
Measured using trace evidence in the form of 
documents institutionalizing the service 
provision. Trace evidence here is complemented 
with the account evidence from interviews. 
Degree of institutionalization of 
social services provision prior to the 
reform: working rules and standard 
procedures. 
Measured using account evidence from 
interviews with participants and (both external 
and internal) documents produced by the 
ministries and organizations engaged in the 
service provision.  Account evidence here is 
complemented with pattern evidence from 
official statistics or secondary data sources. 
Degree of institutionalization of 
social services provision prior to the 
reform: professional codes or 
bodies. 
Measured using account evidence from 
interviews with participants and (both external 
and internal) documents produced by the 
ministries and organizations engaged in the 
management of service provision.   
The power and representation of 
service beneficiaries: presence of 
active individual or groups of users 
in service design or delivery. 
Measured using account evidence from 
interviews with participants and reports 
produced by the governmental or non-
governmental actors. Account evidence here is 
complemented with pattern evidence form 
official statistics or secondary data sources. 
The power and representation of 
service beneficiaries: involvement 
of domestic or international 
organizations that promote the 
interest of service beneficiaries. 
Measured using account evidence from 
interviews with participants and reports 
produced by the governmental or non-
governmental actors. Account evidence here is 
complemented with pattern evidence from 
official statistics or secondary data sources. 
The process of management change: 
elite decisions on the reform content 
and roles they take in the process in 
which the adopted content is turned 
into implementation practice.   
Documented using sequence evidence dealing 
with the chronology of the reform process and 
account evidence from interviews with 
participants and (both external and internal) 
documents produced by the government and its 
ministries.  
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Table 11 Types of evidence used in crafting the mechanism of captured metagovernance 
Parts of mechanism 
Type of evidence used to build causal 
mechanism of captured metagovernance  
Part 1: Institutional (re)design Documented using sequence evidence dealing 
with the chronology of the reform process and 
account evidence from interviews with 
participants and documents adopted by the 
government and its ministries. 
Part 2: Reforming the 
(inter)organizational setting 
Documented using account evidence from 
interviews with participants and (both external 
and internal) documents produced by the 
ministries and organizations mandated with the 
service provision management.  Account 
evidence here is complemented with pattern 
evidence from official statistics and sequence 
evidence dealing with the temporal and spatial 
chronology of the reform process. 
Part 3: Fostering internalization of 
core values and norms 
Documented using account evidence from 
interviews with participants and (both external 
and internal) documents produced by the 
government and ministries.   
Part 4: General rule-making for 
policy-making 
Documented using account evidence from 
interviews with participants and (both external 
and internal) documents produced by the 
ministries and organizations mandated with the 
management of service provision.  
Part 5: Reshaping the policy 
content 
Documented using account evidence from 
interviews with participants and (both external 
and internal) documents produced by the 
ministries and organizations mandated with the 
management of service provision. Account 
evidence here is complemented with pattern 
evidence from official statistics and sequence 
evidence. 
Part 6: Interactive rule application Documented using account evidence from 
interviews with participants and (both external 
and internal) documents produced by the 
government and ministries.   
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In line with the study design, interviews were conducted in two phases, with the first being a 
part of a comparative and the second one of the process-tracing study. Interviews were 
conducted on the sample of 80 participants, selected on the basis of their active engagement in 
the service provision and variations in the position on the action scale of implementation 
management. In relation to the latter criteria, participants were divided into: 
1. Actors conducting activities at the scale of the system, including political officials and 
civil servants in the ministry, researchers and consultants, representatives of umbrella 
organisations of associations for selected target groups and representatives of 
international development agencies and ombudsman offices.  
2. Actors active on the organisational scale, including political officials and civil servants 
in regional and local government, managers in Centers for Social Welfare, public and 
private and non-profit organizations providing the services selected. 
3. Actors engaged in the implementation on individual scale, including ccoordinators of 
service provision teams, street-level workers and service beneficiaries.  
Semi-structured interviews2 were framed in accordance with the indicators used to document 
the variable (Table 9), measure predictions of the causal model (Table 10), as well as to 
document parts of the causal mechanism (Table 11). They were conducted in different country 
regions in its individual form with 74 participants, while 3 group interviews encompassed 6 
participants. Interviews were conducted by the author of the dissertation mostly at participants’ 
work places, with the first phase encompassing the period between July 2013 and April 2014, 
and the second one the period from June to November 2015. With participants’ approval, all 
interviews were recorded while ensuring the privacy and confidentiality of transcripts3. 
                                                 
2 Interview protocols for both stages of the interviewing process are provided in Appendices 
B and D.  
3 Statements of Ethics for both stages of the interviewing process are provided in Appendices 
C and E 
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Summaries of interviews conducted in both stages, together with the labels assigned to each 
interview, are provided in Table 12 and Table 13.  
Table 12 Summary of interviews conducted in the first phase 
Scale Type of participants Numb. Location Interviews’ 
labels4 
 
SYSTEM 
Assistant Minister 1 
 
Zagreb 1 
Managerial civil servants 
in Ministry of Social 
Policy – Head of Sectors 
and Head of Departments 
7 
 
Zagreb  2 -8 
Senior civil servants in 
Ministry of Social Policy – 
Advisers 
3 
 
Zagreb 9-11 
Junior servants in Ministry 
of Social Policy- Referents  
1 
 
Zagreb 12 
Representatives of 
umbrella organisations of 
associations for senior 
citizens, children and PWD  
4 
 
Zagreb and 
Dalmatia 
13-16 
Researchers and 
consultants   
5 
 
Zagreb  17-21 
Representatives of 
international development 
agencies and ombudsman 
offices  
3 Zagreb 22-24 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 The groups of interviews with managers of organisations providing the service, coordinators 
of service provision and service beneficiaries included one group interview each.  
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Table 12 con’t Summary of interviews conducted in the first phase 
Scale Type of participants Numb. Location Interviews’ 
labels 
ORGANIZATION  Political officials in 
regional and local 
government 
2 
 
Dalmatia and 
Slavonia 
15-16 
Senior civil servants in 
regional and local 
government 
5 Zagreb, 
Dalmatia, 
Slavonia, 
Northern 
Croatia  
27-31 
Managers in non-profit and 
religious organisations that 
are providing services for 
elderly, persons with 
disability or children  
11 Zagreb, 
Dalmatia, 
Slavonia, 
Northern 
Croatia, Istria 
32-41 
Managers in homes for 
elderly, persons with 
disability or children 
without parental care 
6 Zagreb, 
Dalmatia, 
Slavonia 
42-47 
Managers in Centres for 
Social Welfare 
3 Zagreb, 
Dalmatia 
48-50 
INDIVIDUAL Coordinators of service 
provision teams in public, 
non-profit and private 
organisations 
7 Zagreb, 
Dalmatia, 
Slavonia 
51-56 
Direct service providers in 
public, non-profit and 
private organisations 
6 Zagreb, 
Dalmatia, 
Slavonia, Istria 
and Kvarner 
Gulf 
57-62 
Service beneficiaries 6 Zagreb, 
Dalmatia, 
Slavonia 
63-67 
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Table 13 Summary of interviews conducted in the second phase 
Scale Type of participants Numb. Location Interviews’ 
labels 
 
SYSTEM 
Managerial civil servants 
in Ministry of Social 
Policy – Head of Sectors 
and Head of Departments 
1 
 
Zagreb   
68 
Senior civil servants in 
Ministry of Social Policy – 
Advisers 
1 
 
Zagreb  
69 
Researchers and 
consultants   
1 Zagreb 70 
ORGANIZATION  Political officials in 
regional and local 
government 
1 
 
Dalmatia and 
Slavonia 
71 
Senior civil servants in 
regional and local 
government 
2 Dalmatia and 
Slavonia 
71-73 
Managers in non-profit and 
religious organisations that 
are providing home care 
services for elderly  
1 Slavonia 74 
Managers in homes for 
elderly 
1 Dalmatia 75 
INDIVIDUAL Coordinators of home care 
teams  
1 Dalmatia 76 
Home care provider 1 Dalmatia 77 
The interviews in the second stage of the interviewing process were designed so as to 
complement and deepen accounts collected through the first stage. Due to that, five of them 
were conducted with actors interviewed in the first stage, but this time around with a protocol 
primarily addressed towards the reform process of the home care for the elderly.  
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The documents collected include regulative acts and programmatic documents referring to the 
services selected. Moreover, as the summary presented in Table 14 shows, to ensure insight 
into implementation activities, the documents collected and analyzed encompassed guidelines 
for implementers, tenders and open call documentation, as well as monitoring and evaluation 
reports related to service provision.  
Table 14 Summary of collected documents5 
Type of document  Examples 
Strategic and 
programmatic 
documents 
Program of Development of Services for the Elderly within 
the System of Intergenerational Solidarity 2008-11. 2007. 
Government of the Republic of Croatia. 
Laws  Social Care Act, NN 157/13, 152/14 
Bylaws  and standards Quality standards for social services in social protection 
area. 2013. Ministry of Social Policy and Youth. 
Operative documents   Open Call for Units of Regional/Local Self-administration 
to Engage in the Implementation of the Program of 
Intergenerational Solidarity. 2011. Ministry of Family, 
Veterans and Intergenerational Solidarity. 
Informative and 
promotional materials 
Catalogue of Rights and Services in Social Care. 2013. 
Government of the Republic of Croatia. 
Internal documents Statement/clarification by a senior civil servant to the 
Minister of Family, Veterans and Intergenerational 
Solidarity on the home care programs. 
Monitoring and 
evaluation reports  
Report on the implementation of the National Strategy for 
Creating Equal Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities 
2007-2015 for the 2012. 2013. Ministry of Social Policy 
and Youth. 
                                                 
5 List of all documents with their original labels in Croatian is provided in Appendix A   
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Findings from the analysis of these two sorts of qualitative data sets were complemented with 
the results of the descriptive statistical analysis applied on official data available referring to 
the implementation of selected services. Table 15 presents the key types of sources that the data 
was collected from.  
Table 15 Summary of sources used for collection of statistical data6 
Type of source Example 
Annual Statistical Reports published 
by the Ministry of Demography, 
Family, Youth and Social Policy, 
former Ministry of Social Policy and 
Youth 
Annual Statistical report on Homes and 
the Social Care Users in 2013. 2014. 
Ministry of Demography, Family, Youth 
and Social Policy 
Faculty of Political Science database 
on election results in Croatia 
Results of elections for county and 
municipal governments in 2009. 
Internal databases created for the 
monitoring of service provision 
Data on approved grants for personal 
assistants in 2012. 2012. Ministry of 
Social Policy and Youth 
Monitoring reports and secondary 
data sources 
Initial Report of the Republic of Croatia 
on the Implementation of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities. 2011. Government of the 
Republic of Croatia. 
 
  
                                                 
6 List of all sources with their original labels in Croatian language is provided in Appendix A   
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3.3 Data Analysis: an overview 
Qualitative data analysis is the contextualized feature of a research process that cannot be 
separated from the conceptual problems that the research is analyzing in relation with data 
collected (Gibson and Brown 2009). In this dissertation research, data analysis was planned and 
conducted as integrated with the conceptualization of a research problem, integrated into the 
research design and related to actual data collection. The key data analysis steps thus followed 
the canons of comparative and process-tracing research approaches.  
The quest for rich empirical insight meant to enable answers to posed research questions 
resulted with the collection of a substantial amount of qualitative information in the form of 
over 500 pages of interview transcripts, numerous documents and ancillary materials, all 
collected during field work. In order to avoid data overload and to enable later data retrieval, 
data processing was integrated with data collection as the analysis was taking place in parallel 
with the filed work. Over this process, data retrieved from documents collected early in the 
research, as well as the initially conducted interviews was condensed and analyzed 
immediately.  
Early qualitative data analysis, it is considered, informs and energizes the fieldwork while the 
interaction is ongoing between the processing of existing data and designing strategies for the 
collection of new data (Miles and Huberman 1994). Insights gained through the early analysis 
were used to identify participants of interviews, documents or sources of statistical data not 
initially sampled, but proved to be valuable sources of evidence during the field work. Also, 
early analysis enabled the identification of gaps in the initial cycle of data collection, with these 
insights used as guidance for the improvements of the protocols for semi-structured interviews.  
While taking place in parallel with the interaction with data collection, data analysis was 
conducted through three congruent flows of activity illustrated in Figure 12. When conceived 
as a cyclic process, data analysis involves transparent and systematic data reduction and 
consequent (inductive or deductive) analysis and interpretation of patterns in the coded data. 
Over  this process, data display by means of matrices, graphs, charts or networks is often used 
to enhance the drawing and verification of conclusions (Miles and Huberman 1994).  
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Figure 12 Data analysis cycle 
Source: Miles and Huberman (1994:12). 
The foundational activity in this data analysis cycle it the data reduction through which 
qualitative information is made manageable and retrievable. It is a process in which data 
encompassed in the documents or in interview transcripts is selected, bound, simplified, 
abstracted and transformed into manageable units. When used for structured analysis, such as 
the ones conducted with comparative or process-tracing methods, data reduction is initiated 
with the activities of segmenting data into coding units with descriptive or inferential 
information. Those units are then assigned with a meaning through a coding process. Codes 
that emerge are then categorized into the coding scheme that serves as an important tool for 
pattern-seeking and claim verification of claim (Miles and Huberman 1994). 
In practice, coding units can encompass chunks of varying sizes or nature. While in the textual 
type of data these chunks can refer to words, sentences, paragraphs, speech turns or even topics, 
in this dissertation paragraphs were accessed as the most applicable choice for the structured 
analyses envisioned by both the comparative and the process-tracing strategy. Data in the form 
of paragraphs was segmented into coding units by means of the NVivo, a computer-assisted 
qualitative data analysis software package that enabled for a faster and more comprehensive 
handling of the large amount of data collected in the field work. The choice of paragraphs as 
the coding units was followed through consistently over the entire data analysis process and it 
was, as illustrated in next two figures, applied on both documents and interview transcripts.  
89 
 
 
 
Figure 13 Illustration of data segmentation in the analysis of an interview in NVivo 
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Figure 14 Illustration of data segmentation in the analysis of a document in Nvivo
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After the segmentation of the units, they were assigned with the codes which refer to “tags or 
labels for assigning the meaning to the descriptive or inferential information compiled during a 
study” (Miles and Huberman 1994, p.53). By enabling data retrieval and management, 
qualitative data analysis codes function as key safeguard tools against the data overload. 
Moreover, when the coding procedure is applied via data analysis software, codes foster 
structured analysis by enabling not only the view on the coded segment of text within its 
context, but also outside that context. In the latter, the decontextualized, view option, a segment 
is pulled together with other units tagged with the same code (Bazeley and Jackson 2013).  
Figure 15 illustrates the way in which the segmented paragraphs of analyzed documents and 
interviews in this dissertation were assigned with the codes in Nvivo. As both the comparative 
and the process-tracing study were designed to combine deduction with induction, codes 
assigned to units varied in their level of abstraction. By drawing on Miles and Huberman’s 
(1994) approach to qualitative data analysis, the three types of codes were used:  
1. Descriptive codes as the most inductive codes usually used to attribute a class of phenomena 
to a segment of a text  
2. Interpretative codes that reflect a researcher’s understanding of data; and, 
3. Pattern codes as a more inferential type of codes explaining data in the light of frameworks, 
theories and models.  
The illustrative examples of all three types of codes are provided in Figure 16. 
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Figure 15 Illustration of the coding process done in NVivo
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 Figure 16 Code types and examples 
Source: Paré (2017). 
When the codes created – be it descriptive, inferential or descriptive – are organized, they are 
awarded hierarchical and thematic families and categorized in the coding scheme. The coding 
scheme enables a structured analysis and is used as important tool, even a grid, guiding a 
researcher to detect systematic patterns in coded data or verify hypothesized claims.  
The examples and the elaboration of steps in which these three code types were applied and 
categorized in the coding scheme of the three consequent phases of this dissertation research 
are provided in the following subsections. 
Descriptive codes
They entail little or no 
interpretation by researcher
"People who volunteer in 
dangerous places  are 
adventuorous"
code-adventurous
Interpretative codes
They reflect researcher’s 
understanding of the data
"Some people don't think 
about danger when they  
volunteer"
code = recklessness
Pattern codes
They are capturing the pattern 
or explaining the data in the 
light of theory
"I admitt that I take risks 
when I go off in disaster 
areas but nothing will happen 
to me"
code= risk taking (theory of)
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3.3.1 Data Analysis: describing variation in modes of implementation 
In the first stage of the study, aimed at describing what kind of an implementation mode (or 
modes) were produced by the reform of social services in Croatia, the collected qualitative data 
was processed, with a qualitative cross-case analysis preceded by within-case analyses (Miles 
and Huberman 1994) While the within-case analysis mounted to provide in-depth insight into 
implementation management of the service selected, comparison across cases enabled the 
clustering of similar implementation practices into joint modes of implementation.  To enable 
this in a preparatory analytical step, data from interview transcripts and documents was 
segmented with the NVivo software into codes resembling indicators used for 
operationalization of the dependent variable, as shown in figure below. 
 
Figure 17 Data segmentation in the first stage of the research 
Segmented data was then coded with the use of a provisional scheme of pattern codes organized 
hierarchically in a list of thematic families. The provisional coding scheme presented in Table 
16 was inspired by the Hill and Hupe’s threefold distinction between ‘enforcement’, 
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‘performance’ and ‘co-production’ modes of implementation and conceptualisation of activities 
that each mode entails in the management of the policy process, inter-organisational and 
interpersonal activities. The scheme also included codes that were to enable the coding of data 
units which could not be aligned with theory-driven, pattern codes.  
Table 16 Describing variation in modes of implementation: the initial coding scheme 
Implementation activities 
Managing of the policy process (system level) 
E- Making mandates explicit  
P- Creating framework for contracting 
C- Evoking joint responsibility 
I - Data on system scale management for inductive coding 
Managing inter-organizational relations (organizational level) 
E -Providing resources and assignments 
P- Enhancing contract compliance 
C- Realizing partnerships 
I – Data on organization scale management for inductive coding 
Managing interpersonal contacts (individual level) 
E- Realizing compliance 
P- Service orientation 
C- User empowerment 
I- Data on individual scale management for inductive coding 
Management mechanism 
E-Rules 
P-Contracts 
C-Trust 
I- Data on management tool for inductive coding 
Role of government 
E- CEO 
P-Inspector 
C- Coach 
I- Data on the role of government for inductive coding 
Service type 
Home care for older persons 
Home and foster care for children without parental care 
Home and foster care for older persons 
Home and foster care for PWD 
Personal assistance for PWD 
Supervision of parental care for families in risk 
Legend: E= Enforcement, P = performance, C= Co-production, I=Inductive coding
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By using this scheme, segmented data was coded both deductively and inductively. In the 
deductive coding, which is illustrated in Figure 18 below, the patterns used were, as mentioned 
above, based on the conceptualization of ideal-type modes of implementation presented in the 
second chapter. 
 
Figure 18 Illustration of deductive coding in first stage: extract from a document 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Activities of intergenerational solidarity are 
contributing to the creation of conditions for a 
dignified living of elderly citizens, protection of their 
human rights, insurance of their independence, social 
inclusion and active participation in the decision-
making about their life and the life of their 
community, awareness-raising among younger 
generations about aging and the need of their elderly 
family members, neighbors and community 
members, and engagement of young and elderly 
citizens in programs that meant to enhance mutual 
understanding, the sharing of knowledge and joint 
action that should bring benefit to all. Solidarity 
among generations at all levels; in family, 
neighborhood, local community, regional and state 
level follows the United Nations’ devotion to the 
creation of a society for all generations.” (Program for 
Development of Services for Elderly Citizens in the 
System of Intergenerational Solidarity, 2007: 3) 
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As this part of the analysis was also used to identify and fill the gaps in the existing 
conceptualization of implementation modes and to describe the potential political capture of 
implementation, provisional pattern codes were used in an open manner. The coding units 
adding some new insights were, as illustrated in Figure 19, extracted and further coded with the 
use of more inductive types of descriptive and interpretative codes. 
 
Figure 19 Illustration of inductive coding in the first stage: extract from an interview 
The repeated regularities arising from inductive codes were, with the final coding scheme 
presented in Table 17, formalized through new pattern codes assigned to those existing ones.  
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Table 17 Describing variation in modes of implementation: the final coding scheme 
Implementation activities 
Managing of the policy process (system level) 
E- Making mandates explicit  
P- Creating framework for contracting 
C- Evoking joint responsibility 
D -Fostering local ownership, but keeping political control 
Managing inter-organizational relations (organizational level) 
E -Providing resources and assignments 
P- Enhancing contract compliance 
C- Realizing partnerships 
D -Local politicians left with the possibility to pursue their own interests 
Managing interpersonal contacts (individual level) 
E- Realizing compliance 
P- Service orientation 
C- User empowerment 
D- Local political leaders leaving or politicizing micro-management. 
Management mechanism 
E-Rules 
P- Contracts 
C-Trust 
D- Trust vs. party patronage 
Role of government 
E- CEO 
P-Inspector 
C- Coach 
D- Enabler vs. clientelistic capo 
Service type 
Home care for older persons 
Home and foster care for children without parental care 
Home and foster care for older persons 
Home and foster care for PWD 
Personal assistance for PWD 
Supervision of parental care for families in risk 
Legend: E= Enforcement, P=performance, C= Co-production, D=Distorted co-production 
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While the coding units referring to implementation activities in five services were clustered so 
to form two modes (performance embedded in enforcement and novel co-production) that could 
be aligned with what is conceptualized by the implementation literature, the interpretation of 
the codes related to one service resulted in the formation of the new, third implementation mode 
characterized by distortion of implementation with patronage practices. These three modes are 
elaborated in first three sections of chapter four. 
 
3.3.2 Data Analysis: verifying the predictions of the causal model 
Three implementation modes that were established in the first stage of study, in the second stage 
were treated as a variation on dependent variable (Miles and Huberman 1994). The validation 
of the hypothesized and the search for other factors that could account for the established 
variation relied on the integration of a case–oriented with a variable-oriented approach. This 
strategy guided the creation of the coding scheme (Table 18) that structured the iteration 
between understanding the case dynamics and determining the effects of the institutionalization 
of social services provision prior to the reform, and power and the representation of service 
users on the reform process and results.  
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Table 18 Verifying the predictions of the causal model: the coding scheme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Service type 
Home and foster care for children without parental care 
Home and foster care for the elderly  
Home and foster care for persons with disabilities 
Home care for the elderly  
Personal assistance for persons with disabilities 
Supervision of parental care 
Mode of implementation 
Novel consistent co-production 
Novel distorted co-production 
Performance embedded in enforcement 
Pre-existing institutional setting of service provision 
Formal rules and regulations 
Dense web 
Scant 
Working rules and standard procedures 
Rules-in-form referred by actors 
Rules-in-form rarely of not referred by actors 
Professional codes or bodies 
Present and active 
Not present nor active 
The power and representation of service beneficiaries  
The presence of an active individual or groups of users  
Present 
Absent 
The involvement of domestic or international organizations  
Present 
Absent 
I -Elite decisions on the reform content 
I - Reform process: metagovernance 
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As the goal of the second stage of the research was to validate and modify the proposed 
explanation of factors whose combination accounts for the variation in the implementation 
modes that the reform resulted in, pattern codes were used as the key codes. Inductive types of 
codes were assigned to those units providing new insights or adding new dimensions to 
predictions of the causal model. These two coding paths are illustrated in Figure 20 and Figure 
21, and results of analyses are presented in chapter four. 
 
Figure 20 Illustration of deductive coding in second stage: extract from an interview 
 
  
 
 
 
“The staff that works in homes for elderly, and in 
other homes of course, are professionals whose 
competences are defined, taught through specific 
education programs and work often licensed and 
supervised by professional associations, such is the 
Croatian chamber of nurses. The profession of care 
givers in the home care services is still undefined, 
there is no formal education program in which people 
can acquire needed skills there is no association of 
care givers. Last few years, there has been some 
progress, so there are more and more trainings 
offered by Croatian Employment Bureau or some 
private schools. But this is still in developmental 
stage, so in practice everyone can act as a provider 
of this service.” (Interview 51, coordinator of service 
provision team in county home for older persons).  
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Figure 21 Illustration of inductive coding in the second stage: extract from an interview 
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3.3.3 Data Analysis: building the mechanism of captured metagovernance 
In the third stage of the research, the collected data was processed by the qualitative analyses 
that mounted to build a plausible causal mechanism through which the reform led by patronage-
driven politicians can lead to the distortion of implementation with patronage practices in 
services qualified with non-existent or minimal institutional setting and weak or unrepresented 
beneficiaries. To enable the structured analysis, the theorized process of political 
metagovernance operationalized as a mechanism comprised of set of six parts (see Figure 9) 
was used as grid for data segmentation. In this initials step, as shown in Figure 22, extract 
paragraphs from interview transcripts and documents were segmented in relation to their 
alignment with the constitutive and directional governance on the system, the organizational 
and individual action scale. 
 
Figure 22 Data segmentation in the third stage of the research 
 
This segmented data was then coded with the use of a more specified scheme of codes (Table 
19) in which pattern codes resembled  the theorized activities of NPG-inspired constitutive and 
directional governance on the system, the organizational and individual action scale.  
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Table 19 Building the mechanism of captured metagovernance: the initial coding scheme 
 
As the aim of the process-tracing study was to complement the existing conceptualization of 
political metagovernance and to describe the potential political capture of implementation; the 
coding units segmented as referring to either one of the three levels of governance but that did 
not fit into provisional codes were subsequently extracted and further coded. Just like in 
previous stages, by using the initial coding scheme, segmented data was coded with provisional 
Presence of scope conditions 
NPG reform ideas 
Powerless status of the elderly in need for care 
Week tradition of service provision 
Causal Factor (X) 
     Patronage-driven interest of political leaders 
Institutional redesign 
Endorsing NPG reform and constituting an interactive policy arena 
Inductive coding 
Reforming the (inter)organizational setting 
Codifying mandate and securing the arena’s representativeness   
Inductive coding 
Ensuring internalization of core norms 
   Fostering internalization of NPG vision and constitutive norms 
   Inductive coding 
General rule-making for policymaking 
Framing policy-making and endorsing the negotiated solution 
Inductive coding 
Re-shaping the policy content 
Participating in the negotiated decision-making process 
Inductive coding 
Ensuring support and situation bound rule application 
Fostering acceptance of policy and interactive rule application 
Inductive coding 
Mode of implementation (Y) 
Managing policy process 
Managing inter-organizational relations 
Managing interpersonal contacts 
Management mechanisms 
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pattern codes and with more inductive types of codes used to new pattern codes through several 
cycles of coding. Each of these two coding paths is exemplified in following two figures. 
 
Figure 23 Illustration of deductive coding in third stage: extract from a document 
 
 
“Awareness of the need of additional care for family 
and the elderly, as well as the need for better 
connectedness, mutuality and solidarity among 
generations resulted in the forming of the ministry 
responsible for family, veterans of war and 
intergenerational solidarity in the year 2003. Up until 
that point, state care for family or family members 
was mostly directed towards socially-protective and 
interventions based on family acts and the like. 
However, by forming the ministry in charge of 
intergenerational solidarity, the Government of the 
Republic of Croatia wishes to affirm its dedication to 
special care for the elderly and highlight the intention 
of mutual connectedness between younger and older 
generations. The ministry in charge of 
intergenerational solidarity incites projects with the 
scope of improving the quality of life for the elderly, 
proposes measured for inciting families to keep the 
elderly and frail family members within the family 
circle, initiates the development of services for the 
elderly and non-institutional forms of care for the 
elderly, whilst performing other tasks related to 
elderly care.” (Program for Development of Services 
for Elderly Citizens in the System of Intergenerational 
Solidarity, 2007: 3) 
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Figure 24 Illustration of inductive coding in the third stage: extract from an interview 
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In the last coding cycle, the repeated regularities arising from inductive codes were formalized 
through new pattern codes assigned to the existing ones and included in the final coding scheme 
(Table 20) that enabled the inferences on the existence of parts of a plausible hypothetical 
mechanism to be presented in chapter five. 
Table 20 Building the mechanism of captured political metagovernance: final coding scheme 
Presence of scope conditions 
NPG reform ideas 
Powerless status of the elderly in need of  care 
Week tradition of service provision 
Causal Factor (X) 
     Patronage-driven interest of political leaders 
Institutional redesign 
Designing a new institutional setting for community-based elderly care 
Detaching a new setting from interlocking the rules of a traditional social care system 
Reforming the (inter)organizational setting 
Devolving mandate-committing resources to communities in need 
Ensuring political primacy in the selection of participating communities 
General rule-making for policymaking 
Establishing flexible framework for the formation of local elderly care policies 
Constituting dysfunctional accountability forums and procedures 
Re-shaping the policy content 
Empowering administrative leaders to nurture established partnerships 
Leaving local political executive with possibility to pursue own leadership style and 
interests 
Ensuring support and situation bound rule application 
Inviting care givers and users to co-create the service during its delivery 
Reinforcing users' dependence 
Mode of implementation: Clientelistic coproduction of elderly care (Y) 
System: Fostering local ownership but keeping informal political control. 
Organization: Leaving local executives with the possibility to pursue their own interests 
Individual: Local political leaders leaving or politicizing micro-management. 
Individual: Direct provider decides on service content with users 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: REFORM RESULTS AND FORCES 
BEHIND RESULTS 
This chapter presents the results of the comparative analysis of collected data in six selected 
social services. In the first section and its three subsections, the chapter describes and 
categorizes three modes of implementation that were produced by the reform of the 
management of service provision. Established implementation modes are, in a second section, 
treated as the variation on the dependent variable and their occurrence is analyzed with 
reference to factors that were hypothesized as influential in the shaping of the reform results.  
In third section, findings of comparable case study are discussed in the light of explanation 
proposed by the model of social service reform in clientelistic policy-making context.   
4.1 Reform results: three distinctive modes of implementation 
The analysis of data referring to the implementation of selected services has indicated the 
existence of three distinctive modes of implementation. Supportive services for families at risk 
and long term accommodation services for the elderly, persons with disabilities (PWD), and 
children without parental care fit in the first and personal assistance for PWD in the second, 
undistorted implementation mode. Home care for the elderly, on the other hand, proved to be a 
case of distorted implementation management in which reform was misused for the 
development of patronage practices. The implementation activities prevalent in each mode are 
summarized in the Table 21, while each mode is separately elaborated in the text that follows 
it.   
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Table 21 Summary of findings on reform results 
CASE 
Documented reform 
results 
Characterization of 
resulting mode 
Long-term care in homes and 
foster homes for the elderly  
(accommodation) 
 
 
 
 
Modernized version of 
the implementation 
mode prevailing 
before the reform  
 
 
 
Performance embedded in 
pre-existing enforcement 
mode 
Long- term care in homes and 
foster homes for children without 
parental care (accommodation)  
 
Long- term care in homes and 
foster homes for persons with 
disabilities  (accommodation) 
Psychological and social support 
for families at risk 
 
Personal assistance for persons 
with disabilities 
Novel implementation 
mode consistently 
reflecting reformist 
ideas 
 
Novel and consistent co-
production mode 
Home care for the elderly Novel implementation 
mode distorted with 
party patronage 
 
Novel and captured co-
production 
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4.1.1 Novel and captured co-production mode 
Home care, as indicated in the analysis of documents and interviews at hand, has represented 
one of the most developing, but also the most heavily fragmented social services over the past 
decade. Not only was this service locally supported and organized by a countless variety of 
actors at the time when research data was collected, but it was also nationally coordinated 
through two completely disconnected trajectories. Two trajectories are relevant for this 
dissertation; they were the ones functioning as national programs in the year 2013, 
encompassing over 16,700 beneficiaries, which was 2.3 per cent7 of the elderly population in 
Croatia at the time.  
While the service was provided within the traditional state social care system in the first 
trajectory, in the second one the provision relied on the ‘system of intergenerational solidarity’ 
in which home care was nationally coordinated, but managed by county and local governments. 
During 2013 and 2014, when data for the study was collected, both trajectories were 
coordinated by the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth, but until 2012 the second one was run 
separately by the Ministry for Family, Veterans and Intergenerational Solidarity (MFVAIS). 
After the change of government and the abolishment of MFVAIS, the second trajectory was 
placed under the umbrella of the new Ministry of Social Policy in 2012. Even though this 
institution also coordinated the home care within the social care system, the integration and 
restructuring of the arrangements for the provision of services for senior citizens was postponed 
until the full enforcement of a new Act on Social Care adopted at the beginning of 2014.  
As the analysis of documents and interviews has indicated, both trajectories perserved their 
structure in the meantime, as well as the activities and techniques developed by the previous 
government. The evidenced features of the home care implementation management are 
summarized in Table 22 and further elaborated in text that follows it.  
 
                                                 
7 According to census data from 2011, 758.633 persons older than 65 lives in Croatia  
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Table 22 Implementation management of the home care provision: the final pattern codes 
 
CASE 
 
Label of implementation 
mode 
Management of 
policy process 
Management of 
inter-
organizational 
relations 
Management of 
inter-personal 
contacts 
Central 
mgmt. 
mechanism 
Role of  government  
H
O
M
E
 C
A
R
E
 F
O
R
 O
L
D
E
R
 P
E
R
S
O
N
S
 
 
Novel clientelistic 
co-production 
overshadowing pre-
existing 
enforcement 
Parallel 
arrangements for 
service 
provision, with 
the domination 
of the new 
trajectory in 
which 
government was 
fostering local 
ownership, but 
kept informal 
political control 
In the novel 
dominating 
trajectory, local 
political executives 
left with the 
possibility to 
pursue their own 
interests and to use 
their own capacity 
in arranging care 
provision 
Local political 
leaders 
authorizing 
home care 
coordinators or 
politicizing 
micro-
management. 
Direct provider 
decides on 
service content 
with users 
Trust and 
the golden 
thread vs. 
party 
patronage 
overshado
wing rules 
Enabler vs. 
clientelistic capo 
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In the first, traditional, trajectory, the state maintained monopoly over assignment of the right 
to home care service and mandated it to the de-concentrated network of public bodies – to the 
Centers for Social Work (CSWs). Since the beginning of 2000s service provision itself was 
organized through contracts which CWSs were signing with Centres for Nursing and Care or 
Social Welfare Homes for the elderly. Even though the framework for subcontracting was 
allowing both private and non-profit actors to act as providers, contracting choices reflected the 
Ministry’s inclination toward public institutions. In the year 20128, for 73 per cent of the 
beneficiaries encompassed by this program, home care was outsourced to thirty-three Social 
Welfare Homes, all founded by county governments and subsidized by the central state. For the 
remaining 23 per cent of beneficiaries, care was provided by twenty nine Nursing Centres, 
institutions specialized for elderly care and founded either by municipal governments or non-
profit organisations such as the Caritas and the Red Cross.  
In relation with the CSWs, the central government preserved the director role and was providing 
them with resources and assignments defined by strict rules and protocols outlined in the thick 
social care regulation. With contracted providers, the state took up the role of a regulator and 
an inspector, while shifting its focus toward ensuring contract compliance. Contracts signed 
between CSWs and Welfare Homes or Nursing Centres were hence not so much about the 
stipulation of rules of conduct as they were about the specification of expected performance 
and outputs of service provision. Even though the CSWs had no mandate to interfere in the 
operative decisions made by contracted providers, the control over service delivery was ensured 
with the codification of quality standards and related overseeing authority of the state 
inspection.  
The contractual provision of home care with was marked by flexible, but at the same time 
standardized organization of service provision.  On the other hand, the assignment of the right 
to the service to individual beneficiaries proved to be not as flexible. Acting as case managers, 
the CSWs were applying strict means which were testing the approval of the right to home care. 
As emphasized by a professional providing home care, the combination of strictness in the 
                                                 
8 Source: Ministry of Social Policy and Youth (Katalog prava i usluga za starije i odrasle 
osobe. 2013. Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih). 
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approval and flexibility in implementation resulted in a nicely designed service that was rather 
resistant to any kind of manipulation, but was rarely used.  
“Home care is nicely designed and providers follow standards, but the fact 
is that this service is relatively rarely assigned based on the approval of the 
CSWs. The census prescribed by the Social Care Act is really low and not 
many citizens can pass the means test. Older citizens which could even be 
eligible, are either not aware of its existence or do not know how to get 
it.”(Interview 45, manager in Centre for Social Welfare) 
Official data confirms this statement and, as Figure 25 shows, in the year 2013, home care 
within this trajectory was provided only to seven per cent of the total number of beneficiaries 
encompassed by two national home care programs.  
More flexibility in implementation arrangement and a much wider outreach was accomplished 
with arrangements developed in the course of the reform by the Ministry of the Family, 
Veterans' Affairs and Intergenerational Solidarity (MFVAIS) which in 2004 established a pilot 
of home care services and expanded it to a nation-wide program in the year 2007. As Figure 25 
shows, by the year 2013, this program completely overshadowed the traditional home care and 
with more than 15.500 users and a 93 percent share in number of overall national home care 
beneficiaries, became the most comprehensive, most expensive, and was treated as prevailing 
trajectory among all home care services in the interpretation of findings due to this fact.  
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Figure 25 Users of ‘old’ and ‘new’ home care trajectory: trends over the past 10 years 
Source: Ministry of Demography, Family, Youth and Social policy9. 
                                                 
9 Annual Statistical Reports and various reports by the Ministry of Family, Veterans' Affairs 
and Intergenerational Solidarity: Rezultati evaluacije programa "Pomoć u kući stariji 
osobama" 2004. godina. 2005. Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske 
solidarnosti, Programi "Pomoći u kući" i Dnevni boravak" Izvješće za JIM. 2012. Ministarstvo 
socijalne politike i mladih, Program razvoja usluga za starije osobe u sustavu 
međugeneracijske solidarnosti od 2008 do 2011 godine. 2007. Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja 
i međugeneracijske solidarnosti, Programi Uprave za međugeneracijsku solidarnost (Prikaz 
programa ugovorenih 2015 godine), Izvješće Ministarstva obitelji, branitelja i 
međugeneracijske solidarnosti za Ministarstvo uprave, Godišnja statistička izvješća o 
korisnicima i primijenjenim pravima socijalne skrbi  u Republici Hrvatskoj. Ministarstvo za 
demografiju, obitelj, mlade i socijalnu politiku.  
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The declared objectives for the introduction of the new arrangement for home care provision 
were to mobilize community stakeholders towards a joint care for elderly citizens and foster 
the wider inclusion of elderly citizens, their empowerment and enhanced involvement in service 
delivery. This was also emphasized in the Program’s preamble (Program for Development of 
Services for Elderly Citizens in the System of Intergenerational Solidarity, 2007: 3)10: 
“Activities of intergenerational solidarity are contributing to the creation of 
conditions for a dignified living of elderly citizens, protection of their human 
rights, insurance of their independence, social inclusion and active 
participation in the decision-making about their life and the life of their 
community, awareness-raising among younger generations about aging and 
the need of their elderly family members, neighbors and community 
members, and engagement of young and elderly citizens in programs that 
meant to enhance mutual understanding, the sharing of knowledge and joint 
action that should bring benefit to all. Solidarity among generations at all 
levels; in family, neighborhood, local community, regional and state level 
follows the United Nations’ devotion to the creation of a society for all 
generations.” 
To attain the declared objectives, the government decided to rely on more horizontal types of 
steering and to promote the inclusion of a wide spectrum of actors in the implementation 
process. Both novelties in the management of home care were introduced by means of co-
production–with the national government signing an agreement on co-funding and cooperation 
with the units of regional/local self-administration, which then in turn organized the provision 
themselves or together with non-profit organisations and homes for the elderly. Agreements 
were signed for two versions of partnership arrangements: solo home care and home care that 
was complemented with the state’s support to local units that wanted to open a day care center 
in their community.  
                                                 
10 Program razvoja usluga za starije osobe u sustavu međugeneracijske solidarnosti od 2008. 
do 2011. godine, NN 90/2007. 
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While the program was managed by the MFVAIS, decisions on the funding of home care 
service were done through an open call and the process of competition among counties and 
municipalities which expressed interest for service provision. For the combined care, as the 
interviewed actors involved program coordination explained, funding was not decided based 
on open calls, but agreements were signed with those  municipalities that demonstrated devotion 
and results in implementing home care:  
“Combined day care and home care was more than the employment and 
management of service providers. It was also an infrastructural investment 
in the day care center.  In order to ensure a sustainable investment and 
service provision, we placed the focus on more evolved municipalities. So the 
decision was not made through public calls, but we were observing the 
progress of municipalities which had received funding for home care and the 
best ones were invited to expand their home care services with the day care 
element.” (Interview 4, managerial civil servants in Ministry of Social 
Policy) 
While fostering counties and municipalities to engage in the collaborative organisation of 
service provision, the MFVAIS acted as the enabler. The analysis of qualitative and quantitative 
data referring to the implementation of the program revealed that this role, however, was 
merged with the role of a clientelistic capo in practice, while the realisation of a co-production 
was followed by the distortion of implementation with patronage practices of the ruling party. 
The choices on the state funding, as the political official in the Ministry of Social Policy 
highlighted, reflected the real needs, but political links were employed as well: 
“The financing of home care within intergenerational solidarity is mainly 
centralized—counties and municipalities are participating in the costs with 
approx. 23%. As to, well, how to say, the management of the Program during 
the previous Government - cooperation agreements with counties and 
municipalities were not only reflecting the need to expand the network of 
services in certain communities, but were also a matter of discretional 
decisions made by politicians.” (Interview 1, Assistant Minister) 
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The perception of additional political criteria employed in the decision-making process was 
also present among counties and municipalities that competed for financial support: 
“We couldn’t get the funds because, to be quite honest, politics played a role 
here – we just have a different party in power. We contacted the Ministry of 
Intergenerational Solidarity and the Minister. Even more than that, the 
former county mayor and I went to Zagreb and reached an agreement with 
program coordinators…but we just could not reach the point of signing the 
contract. Unlike us, one municipality in our county area was able to get the 
signature, but the fact is that the local government there was formed by HDZ. 
That is why they were able to ensure the signature. That municipality does a 
great job with home care, no doubt about that, but we regret the fact that our 
home care, which, by the way, we ¸had developed even before the Ministry 
launched the program, did not get a chance for co-funding. So we decided to 
continue our work without the help from the Ministry.” (Interview 32, senior 
civil servant in regional/ local government). 
Here it is important to qualify that the affiliation of the mayor or the political profile of 
city/commune council most plausibly acted just as an additional, but not the only decision-
making criterion. As emphasized by the interviewed actors, for counties and municipalities that 
had a different political profile than the national executive it was still possible to receive 
funding: 
“We contacted the Ministry in 2006 and offered cooperation. The Ministry 
soon invited our representatives to a meeting and a few months later we 
signed the contract. In the beginning we thought that the funding decision is 
exclusively political - but as our county government was formed by a different 
political option, the Ministry demonstrated to us that we were wrong.” 
(Interview 29, senior civil servant in regional/ local government) 
Nevertheless, the fact that municipalities not fitting the political criteria were still able to receive 
funding does not dismiss the account of many an interview participant on the biased selection 
of actors participating in the implementation network. This account was also supported by the 
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statistical analysis on the structure of fund recipients.  By the end of 2011, which was the year 
in which HDZ lost the national election, the number of signed agreements for home care 
services encompassed fifty nine counties and municipalities, out of which 89 per cent had a 
mayor who was a member of political parties in government - HDZ and its coalition partners – 
even though HDZ and its partners were in power in only 66 per cent out of 576 Croatian 
counties, cities and communes (see Figure 26). 
 
 
Figure 26 New home care: structure of fund recipients in the period 2010- 2013 
Sources: Ministry of Social Policy and Faculty of Political Science11. 
In comparison, combined home and day care agreements were signed with 30 municipalities, 
70% of which were ruled by HDZ and partners. Combined care in which funding was primarily 
a matter of a discretional decision made by higher civil servants, not politicians, reflects a wider 
perspective of party power share much more than the solo home care funding. After the Program 
                                                 
11 Područja i provoditelji Programa "Pomoć u kući starijim osobama" u 2011 godini. 2012. 
Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih and Čular, Goran. 2013. Data base of results of county 
and municipal elections in 2009. 
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was placed under the new Ministry for Social Policy, there were no more open calls for solo 
home care. However, as the result of a strong opposition of supported localities to the 
restructuring of the program, partnership agreements from the end of 2011 were just re-signed 
at the beginning of 2012 and 2013.  
In the second half of 2013, when data on implementation management was collected, local 
actors included in the implementation network were still strongly opposing any changes in 
program management. In their interviews, they emphasized the fear of losing national funding 
and their devotion to keeping their authority over the actual organisation of care provision as 
the main reasons behind this opposition. The MFVAIS and its elected officials granted the latter 
role to local governments, but kept tight control over the selection process. Moreover, once the 
partnership agreements were signed, the central government would actually leave the local 
political executive with the possibility to pursue their own interests and to use their own 
capacity for making autonomous operative decisions. National civil servants acting as program 
coordinators were given the task of nurturing the realisation of the established implementation 
partnerships accordingly. 
Collaboration and local ownership instead of subordination and reliance on the national 
initiative were to be steered though managerial reliance on trust as well as by the ‘golden thread’ 
that implied steering through controlling the budget and personnel. Partnership agreements 
would specify the expenses and personnel for care provision on the basis of 100 or 200 
beneficiaries. As an illustration, home-care services for 100 beneficiaries were meant to be 
provided by teams with six members (geronto-hostess, a nurse and assistant worker) and a team-
leader. The government could, to some extent, monitor how many people are circuited as 
through the budget, but the number of beneficiaries that one team worked with could not be 
checked. So although reports sent to the Ministry by counties and municipalities ware pointing 
that standards outlined in partnership agreement were met by all municipalities, interviews with 
actors indicated that practice varied significantly in reality: 
 “In our home-care program the city government provides co-funding and 
doesn’t interfere in service provision. It is my responsibility, as a team leader, 
to coordinate and monitor the work of geronto-hostesses. I meet with them 
weekly and they write daily reports on services they have provided, 
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beneficiaries they have visited and materials they have spent……I am also 
writing reports to the Ministry. But I know about more than one case in which 
home care team-leaders are not the ones creating the narrative and financial 
reports. Municipality mayors are not letting them do so… They just say: 
“What do you care, just sign the financial report”… and those team leaders 
sometimes may not even know what is written in that report.” (Interview 53, 
home care team coordinator in a non-profit organisation) 
 
Due to the lack of nationally-applied oversight mechanisms and loose vertical couplings 
between civil servants in the Ministry and the funded units of regional/local self-administration, 
the actual application of co-production was dependent on the leadership style of local and 
national political executives. As a result, while in some counties and municipalities politicians 
left the micro-management to home care team leaders or community organisations, in others 
local governments decided to manage the care provision directly and politicize it. The latter 
choice in most cases implied that the decisions on recruitment of home care staff were made 
not only based on a candidate’s competences, but also in accordance with her/his party 
affiliation.  
In this way, trust as a management mechanism was often replaced by party patronage. As one 
local public manager described, in the localities in which this scenario took place, the 
recruitment of party supporters as service providers became the biggest concern for the local 
political executive and, when election time comes, so did the monitoring of their compliance 
with the clientelistic bargain: 
“In our county area, it was often the case that the biggest fuss was about the 
recruitment of direct service providers. The most important question was who 
will get the job, and in answering that question, party affiliation or 
connection with the party was crucial. Then, before the local election, the 
party would watch closely who was actively lobbying for whom.” (Interview 
28, senior civil servant in regional/local government) 
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As often indicated by the interviewed actors, politicized hiring of home care staff was more 
present in communities in which home care was designed as the municipal program with care 
givers as municipal employees. Despite the fact that since the Program was expanded into a 
nation-wide initiative in the year 2007, program coordinators were frequently reminding 
counties and municipalities that the practice corresponding with the Program’s premises would 
be to give up the recruitment and management of home care teams, out of a total of 1045 
caregivers that in 2012 acted as service providers, 39% of them were still directly employed 
and coordinated by local governments. 12 
In the communities included in the implementation network, the inclusion of beneficiaries in 
service provision was not associated with means’ testing, but was guided by general indicators 
such as age, the existence of a family support network, health condition13, and left to the 
discretion of home care teams. As the program guidelines were just framing the basic elements 
of service, such as cleaning the house or making lunch, direct service providers were the ones 
designing the specific combination of these elements and adjusting it to the needs of each 
beneficiary. Although the interviewed actors were often criticizing such a high level of 
discretion, they have nevertheless emphasised that the flexible implementation setting enabled 
the creation of relevant, accessible and user-centred service for the elderly.  
“This program reached beneficiaries who might have had an income slightly 
above the income census but did not have the service network available and 
were thus in need. What is more, as users of home care are passive by default 
and often not able to pursue their rights, the fact that the service was coming 
                                                 
12 Područja i provoditelji Programa "Pomoć u kući starijim osobama" u 2011 godini. 2012. 
Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih (List of Localities and Contracted Actors for the 
Implementation of Home Care Program in 2010-2013.) 
13 Program razvoja usluga za starije osobe u sustavu međugeneracijske solidarnosti od 2008. 
do 2011. godine, NN 90/2007. 
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to them gave solutions for obstacles which the social care system fights with 
because of its immobility”. (Interview 19, researchers/consultant)    
However, in communities branded by patronage practices, as vividly illustrated by a former 
program coordinator, staff recruitment choices were sometimes made in direct opposition to 
user needs or wishes: 
“We received complaints from the field that mayors were misusing their 
powers. For example, after the recent local election, the party that was 
running the government changed in City X. As soon as he/she gained power 
as the new mayor, he/she changed the whole home care team. Although we 
act as program coordinators, we had no mandate to give them orders. All we 
could do was to ask the mayor not to do that, but that had no effect. 
Unfortunately, after the old team was fired, beneficiaries were really sad and 
deprived because they grew attached to their former geronto-hostesses. But 
with politics there is no mercy.” (Interview 6, managerial civil servant in 
Ministry of Social Policy) 
4.1.2 Novel and consistent co-production mode 
The second service analyzed—personal assistant for PWD—was also created in the course of 
reforms as a special project of MFVAIS. It was designed in order to provide people with the 
most severe type and degree of disability help in their everyday activities such as personal 
hygiene, shopping, cooking, as well as assistance in children upbringing, travel and work-
related activities. Similarly to the new home care, as Figure 27 shows, personal assistance 
started as a pilot project in 2006 with 78 beneficiaries and gradually grew into a nationwide 
program encompassing 631 PWDs in the year 2012.  
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Figure 27 The growth of the personal assistance program over the years 
Source: Ministry of Social Policy and Youth14 
After the change of government and the abolishment of MFVAIS in 2011, the program was--
just like home care—placed under the umbrella of the new Ministry for Social Policy. The 
analysis of documents and interviews indicated that till the year 2013 the program kept its 
structure, activities and techniques in the form similar to what was developed by the previous 
government. The evidenced features of the personal assistant implementation management are 
summarized in Table 23 and elaborated in the text that follows it.
                                                 
14 Inicijalno izvješće Republike Hrvatske o provedbi Konvencije o pravima osoba s 
invaliditetom Ujedinjenih naroda- 2011. Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih, Izvješće o 
provedbi Nacionalne strategije izjednačavanje mogućnosti za osobe s invaliditetom od 2007. 
do 2015. godine u 2011. godini. 2012. Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih, Izvješće o 
provedbi Nacionalne strategije izjednačavanje mogućnosti za osobe s invaliditetom od 2007. 
do 2015. godine u 2012. godini. 2013. Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih. 
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Table 23 Implementation management of the personal assistance service: the final pattern codes15 
 
 
                                                 
15 Analysis presented in this section and elements of section were used in a published article co-authored by the author of this dissertation: 
Howlett, Michael, Anka Kekez i Ora Poocharoen. 2017. “Understanding Co-Production as a Policy Tool: Integrating New Public Governance 
and Comparative Policy Theory.” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 19 (5): 487–501. DOI: 
10.1080/13876988.2017.1287445. 
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Novel consistent  
co-production 
Establishing shared 
values and 
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associations 
representing 
disabled persons 
Civil servants 
nurturing 
implementation 
partnerships with 
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as autonomous 
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The National Strategy for Equalizing Opportunities for People with Disability16,was the 
policy base of the new service by means of which the government embraced collaborative 
arrangements with persons with disabilities (PWD) and their associations, while 
prioritizing services that fostered their independence, effective participation and inclusion 
in the society. The framework for this was provided by the grant scheme through which 
associations of persons with disabilities and other non-profit organizations were invited 
to propose programs envisioning independence and social inclusion of PWDs17. When 
designing this grant scheme, political and administrative leaders followed the spirit of the 
National Strategy and acted primarily as facilitators and evokers of joint responsibility.  
As regards the management of the policy process, this implied putting focus on 
establishing shared values,  done through the usage of quality standards which, among 
others, emphasised accessibility and appropriateness of service, encouraged a holistic 
approach to problem-solving and service delivery, and stressed the importance of 
enhancing users’ engagement in service provision18. These standards had a voluntary 
character, but the approval of projects within this grant scheme was attached to the 
expectation of the willingness and ability of associations to integrate these principles into 
service provision19. In order to foster a sense of ownership and responsibility, the 
government was inviting associations to propose their own design of a personal assistance 
                                                 
16 Nacionalna strategija izjednačavanja mogućnosti za osobe s invaliditetom od  2007. 
do 2015. godine, NN 63/07. 
17 Poziv za prijavu trogodišnjih programa udruga koje pružaju usluge asistencije 
osobama s invaliditetom u Republici Hrvatskoj za financijsku potporu iz Državnog 
proračuna i dijela prihoda od igara na sreću za razdoblje od 2013. do 2015. godine. 
2012. Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih.  
18 Pravilnik o standardima kvalitete socijalnih usluga, NN 143/2014. 
19 Upute za prijavu trogodišnjeg programa udruga koje pružaju usluge asistencije za 
osobe s invaliditetom u RH za  financijsku potporu iz Državnog proračuna i dijela 
prihoda od igara na sreću za razdoblje od 2013. do 2015. 2013. Ministarstvo socijalne 
politike i mladih. 
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program, to establish their own network of local partners, and to create an implementation 
structure that would be sustainable after the grant expires.   
Application assessment criteria reflected this focus. What is more, of a maximum of 100 
points per applicant, an association could score 25 for financial and management 
capacities for program implementation, 25 for relevance of proposed program, 25 for 
quality of implementation structure, 15 for sustainability, and 15 for budget and efficiency 
of their project proposals20.  Such grant scheme design raised standards for the entrance 
in the network of service providers to rather high level. However, in practice, standards 
proved to be too high for many associations, especially for those coming from less 
developed or rural areas. Moreover, as was highlighted by a representative of the manager 
of an organization of associations for PWD, the fact that the program functioned as a 
grant scheme and not as a right granted by law was impeding its potential for bigger 
outreach and sustainability. 
“The project was formed as the pilot project, but the idea was that it 
was soon supposed to become formulated as the legal act and the 
service would become a legally granted right. That has not yet 
happened, and not many associations can meet the criteria set by the 
grant scheme. Moreover, many small cities, villages and islands do not 
even have associations that could run such a program. Any person with 
a higher degree of disability should have right to this service, no matter 
if he or she lives in Split, or in Meden Dolac, Lastovo or any other small 
place. It is true, associations from bigger cities can and do apply for 
the grant to provide beneficiaries that live in areasreachable to them, 
but then again, this is not systematic solution”. (Interview 18, 
Representative of the umbrella organization of associations for PWD) 
                                                 
20 Upute za prijavu trogodišnjeg programa udruga koje pružaju usluge asistencije za 
osobe s invaliditetom u RH za  financijsku potporu iz Državnog proračuna i dijela 
prihoda od igara na sreću za razdoblje od 2013. do 2015. 2013. Ministarstvo socijalne 
politike i mladih. 
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Statistical data complemented this account as in the year 2011 the application on the grant 
was approved to 40 associations all registered in cities, and most of these cities were 
bigger or more development ones21. Nevertheless, the same data indicated that the 
described design of the grant scheme also resulted in a rather politically balanced structure 
of fund recipients. As Figure 28 shows, out of these 40 associations, 48 percent where 
from cities that had a mayor who was a member of political parties acting as national 
incumbents, while national incumbent were at that time ruling in 54 out of a total of 127 
Croatian cities. 
 
Figure 28 Personal assistance service: structure of fund recipients in 201122 
Source: Ministry of Social Policy and Faculty of Political Science. 
                                                 
21 Popis odobrenih programa u natječaju za osiguravanja usluge osobnog asistenta 
2011-2013. 2012. Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih (List of aproved grants for 
personal assistance service.) 
22 Popis odobrenih programa u natječaju za osiguravanja usluge osobnog asistenta 
2011-2013. 2012. Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih and Čular, Goran. 2013. Data 
base of results of county and municipal elections in 2009. 
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In addition, as interviewed actors were also emphasizing, the grant scheme was constantly 
improving so since 2013 it awarded funds for a period of three years instead just one year 
as was the initial case. As a managerial civil servant working on this program highlighted, 
this enhanced the prospects for sustainability of service and its results. 
“As this is now a multi-year grant scheme, associations are truly 
developing their capacities and the Ministry can count on them for the 
provision of the personal assistance service after the grant period 
expires. When it was just a one year program, it was really making 
associations feel insecure about next year’s funding, and it was 
impacting their focus and general atmosphere. The goal is that this 
program becomes a part of the Social Care Act, but we need to make 
condition for that- both in relation to budget and capacities for service 
provision in the communities.”  (Interview 3, managerial civil servants 
in Ministry of Social Policy) 
Even though grant arrangement did not mean complete weakening of vertical 
connections, in this service the Ministry relinquished a substantial part of its control. In 
line with that, in managing inter-organisational relations, the focus was placed on 
practicing and fostering partnerships. As assessed by those interviewed, the Ministry was 
giving grantees a space for discretion in managing the service.  
“We have autonomy in running the service, the Ministry treats us as 
equals and, more importantly, as equally responsible for achieving the 
outcomes. We have ability to arrange service provision to complement 
is with other services that we are providing to our members and to 
adjust it to the specific needs of the users of personal assistance. ….it 
is really flexible arrangement…and sometimes I even feel that the space 
for autonomy is too big, as we have to autonomously deal with many 
new issues that arise in everyday implementation and that are not 
codified or standardized by programmatic documents.” (Interview 54, 
Coordinator of personal assistants in an association for PWD) 
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Using trust as an important management mechanism, civil servants limited formal control 
to reports in which associations reported their expenditures, outputs and progress in the 
achievement of results. On an annual basis, Ministry representatives visited grant 
recipients, but these visits were more of the coaching nature than that of an oversight. 
Acting as a coach, the Ministry was also steering joint action in communities by validating 
more projects relaying on partnerships with other direct institutional service providers 
and/or counties/municipalities23. 
The partnership approach also marked the management of interpersonal contacts which 
was done by local associations whose members were also users of the service. An 
important aspect of service provision was the combination of professionalism and a user-
centred approach. On the one side personal assistants acting as service providers had 
defined working hours (20 hours weekly - 80 monthly) and activities which include 1) 
assistance with the core set of self-care activities; (2) maintenance of personal hygiene 
and basic health services, (3) assistance with legal or administrative tasks and (4) 
company during different social activities24. On the other side, the way the service was 
provided was determined primarily in partnership with beneficiaries. According to an 
Ethics Code designed especially for this service, the beneficiary of personal assistance 
was autonomously deciding on the content of the service while respecting the integrity 
and rights of his/her assistant. As stated by an interview service user, persons with 
disability have become subject of action, and not the object of help. 
“I have had a personal assistant for few years now and we decide 
jointly everything that she will do, when, for how long, how… it is a 
very close relationship… in which we make sure that both of us are 
satisfied with how our collaboration works… and thanks this service I 
                                                 
23 Upute za prijavu trogodišnjeg programa udruga koje pružaju usluge asistencije za 
osobe s invaliditetom u RH za  financijsku potporu iz Državnog proračuna i dijela 
prihoda od igara na sreću za razdoblje od 2013. do 2015. 2013. Ministarstvo socijalne 
politike i mladih. 
24 Etički kodeks za osobnog asistenta i korisnika usluga. 2008. Ministarstvo obitelji, 
branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti. 
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am able to do so much more than before… I am not sure how I could 
imagine my life without my personal assistant.”(Interview 65, user of 
personal assistance service) 
4.1.3 Enforcement upgraded with performance mode 
The provision of remaining four services which include supervision of parental care for 
families in risk and the accommodation in homes (or foster homes) for older citizens, 
children without parental care and persons with disabilities, takes place within the social 
care system, defined by a detailed regulatory framework. Analysis of this framework and 
interviews with policy actors engaged in its implementation revealed a layered character 
of the setting for provision of all four services. In the course of the reform managerial 
focus on performance proved to have dominant influence, while traditional input-based 
control was complemented with reformist output-based measurement and management. 
Nevertheless, the governmental monopoly and hierarchal structure of traditional social 
care system were not replaced but only upgraded with adding elements of contracting out 
type of provision. This reform brought about proliferation of service forms and providers, 
as the analysis highlighted, but the dominance of state-founded or state-subsidized 
institutions is still visible:   
“Although outsourcing has become the new fashion in social policy, in 
all accommodation of services, the state still plays the main role… 
Well, there might be differences between accommodations for different 
users’ groups, for example – contracting of non-state providers is more 
dominant in the homes for elderly persons than in, let say…, homes for 
persons with disabilities. But, even then, the state is still heavily 
involved in the organization of service provision.” (Interview 17, 
researcher/ consultant)  
Key features of this hybrid implementation mode are summarized in Table 24 and 
elaborated in the text that follows it.
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Table 24 Implementation management of the supervision of parental care and accommodation services: the final pattern codes25. 
 
CASES 
Management of policy 
process 
Management of inter-
organizational relations 
Management of 
(external and 
internal) inter-
personal contacts 
Central mgmt. 
instrument 
Role of  
government  
Accommodation in 
homes and foster 
homes for older 
citizens, children 
without parental care, 
persons with 
disabilities, and the 
supervision of 
parental care for 
families in risk 
Ensuring explicit mandates 
and creating a framework 
for contracting with general 
inclination to public care 
providers.  
The exception are long 
term care for children 
without the parental care 
where the most preferred 
providers are foster 
families 
Providing subordinate 
bodies with resources 
and assignments while 
ensuring contract 
compliance of service 
providers  
 
Vertical lines are 
loosened in relation with 
organizations contracted 
for service provision 
Service providers 
are guided with 
standard operating 
procedures  
 
Emergence of 
service orientation 
 
 
Rules and 
contracts 
Director vs. 
regulator and 
inspector 
                                                 
25 Analysis presented in this section and elements of section were used in a published article co-authored by the author of this dissertation: 
Kekez, Anka i Daniela Širinić (2017) „Neposredna implementacija javnih politika u zajednici: modeli u praksi hrvatske socijalne politike“ 
(Implementing Public Policy in Community: Models in the Practice of Croatian Social Policy). In Građani, javna uprava i lokalna samouprava: 
povjerenje, suradnja, potpora, Edited by Ivan Koprić,  Anamatija Musa and Teo Giljević, Teo, 423- 36. Zagreb: Institut za javnu upravu. 
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Among these four services, long-term care and accommodation for both elderly and 
persons with disabilities in 2013, for example, was primarily provided by social welfare 
homes which, if they were in line with national normative standards26, could be founded 
not only by state but also by county and local governments, private companies and the 
non-governmental sector, in particular the Caritas and the Red Cross.  
The reformist wave in 2001 brought the idea of decentralization of social and educational 
services with homes for elderly becoming first, and so far, the only county-owned welfare 
residential institutions. However, functional decentralization was not accompanied with 
the fiscal decentralization, and county homes continued to be heavily subsidized by the 
state. Since the ‘decentralization’ took place, state continued to transfer significant funds 
annually to counties for this purpose and is accompanying this transfer with the specific 
guidelines for allocation of funds27. 
At the same time, institutional accommodation for the elderly became the fastest growing 
type of long-term care, attracting considerable interest of the private sector. In 2013, as 
Table 25 shows, there were 130 homes for the elderly accommodating 2 per cent of the 
overall population of older persons in the country28. Although about 63 percent of these 
institutions were privately owned, county-founded public homes still accommodated 69 
percent of all elderly care home residents.   
                                                 
26 This relates to Social Care Act: Zakon o socijalnoj skrbi, NN 157/13, 152/14 and a 
number of lower level acts operationalizing it. 
27 Godišnja odluka o minimalnim financijskim standardima, kriterijima i mjerilima za 
decentralizirano financiranje domova za starije i nemoćne osobe. 
28 According to census data from 2011 in Croatia lives 758 633 persons older than 65 
years, while state, county and other homes are jointly accommodating 15 488 
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In the case of homes for children and adults with disabilities29, the dominance of public 
institutions in service provision is even more visible. Here, the state in 2013 acted as the 
founder of 68 per cent of 41 social welfare homes targeting this population and in 2013 
state facilities were accommodating 78 per cent of all residents.  
Table 25 Accommodation for older persons and persons with disabilities in residential 
facilities 
 
 
Type of facility by owner 
 
Number of facilities and users in 2013 
Facilities Users 
 
State homes for older persons  
 
2 
 
164 
County homes for older persons 45 10666 
Non-state homes for older persons 83 4658 
 
State homes for persons with disability  
 
28 
 
1864 
Non-state homes for persons with disability 13 534 
Sources: Ministry of Demography, Family, Youth and Social policy –Statistical Reports 
for 201330. 
                                                 
29 Analysis of official statistical data about users of service for persons with disables 
was guided by an official state categorisation and it, thus, encompassed children and 
adult persons with physical, intellectual and sensory disabilities.   
30 Reports are: Godišnje statističko izvješće o korisnicima i primijenjenim pravima 
socijalne skrbi u Republici Hrvatskoj u 2013. godini; Godišnje statističko  izvješće o 
domovima i korisnicima socijalne skrbi u 2013. godini. 
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Secondary providers of accommodation for both target groups are foster families and 
family homes that have emerged in the course of reform as alternative, non-institutional, 
forms of long-term care. In 2013 family homes functioned as a hybrid between foster 
family and standard homes. It usually provided care for five to 20 adult persons, or four 
to ten children which, just like with foster family, live with the family of the service 
provider.  
Even though family homes and –even more- foster families were by emphasized in 
several strategic documents31 as the solution for the lack of capacity and flexibility within 
the public sector, majority of interviewed actors have in 2013 assessed that when it comes 
to services provided to older citizens and persons with disability these homes still have 
only compensatory or supplemental role when compared to the importance of institutional 
long-term care. This assessment comes through clearly in the following remarks by a 
manager in the Centre for Social Welfare:  
“The accommodation of adult persons, be it elderly citizen in need for 
long term care or person with disability, in foster families or family 
homes still functions only as a compensating option. In the last ten 
years I can remember several situations where our Centre was facing 
big challenges when we had to accommodate an older person, but there 
was no available capacities in homes we had contract with…For 
persons who several years ago had no available family support, who 
could not stay at their home and wait for the place in a county home, 
and who had no financial means to go to private homes that are, to be 
                                                 
31 These documents are: Plan deinstitucionalizacije i transformacije domova socijalne 
skrbi i drugih pravnih osoba koje obavljaju djelatnost socijalne skrbi u Republici 
Hrvatskoj 2011- 2016 (2018). 2010. Ministarstvo zdravstva i socijalne skrbi; 
Nacionalna strategija izjednačavanja mogućnosti za osobe s invaliditetom od 2007. do 
2015. godine, NN 63/07. 
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frank really really expensive – we had to combine options with 
hospitals. Now in a similar situation we use foster families or family 
homes, but – especially in a case of an older citizen –  we are referring 
beneficiaries to these providers only when other options are 
exhausted”.  (Interview 48, manager in the Centre for Social Welfare) 
Official data are supporting this account. As the the Table 26 and Figure 29 show, in 2013 
family homes and foster families for both older persons and persons with disabilities had 
three times smaller capacity than social welfare homes. Interviewed actors and statistical 
data have equally showed that long-term care for both these groups was also provided by 
non-profit, religious or private organizations that were not registered either as home or 
foster family, but were allowed to accommodate either older citizens or persons with 
disabilities.  While in the accommodation for persons with disabilities this kind of service 
arrangement was primarily encompassing long term care traditionally provided by the 
religious organizations, in the accommodation for older persons the actors providing such 
care were mainly for-profit organizations.  
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Table 26 Key numbers on accommodation services provided to all three target groups in 2013 
Source: Ministry of Demography, Family, Youth and Social policy –Statistical Reports for 2013.
  
  
 
Persons with disability 
 
Older persons 
 
Children without parental care 
Number of 
users 
Share in total 
number of users  
Number of users 
Share in total 
number of users  
Number of users 
Share in total 
number of users  
State home 1864 54% 164 1% 697 24% 
County home  /  / 10666 59%  /  / 
Non-state home 534 16% 4658 26% 221 8% 
Other legal entity 115 3% 193 1% 114 4% 
Family home 77 2% 341 2% 24 1% 
Foster family  844 25% 2171 12% 1867 64% 
Total 3434 100% 18193 100% 2923 100% 
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In the long-term care for children without parental care and children in risk of losing parental 
care, the relation between institutional and non-institutional care is reversed, as foster 
families in 2013 were providing care for almost two thirds of children in this target group. 
The one third of children without parental care were living in 22 institutions, among which 
the primary role was held by 14 state homes that were caring for 24 per cent of service users. 
Apart from state facilities, institutional care was provided by two non-state homes32 and six 
institutions established by religious organization that were not formally established as a 
home but were still considered as institutional care givers by the state.    
The choice of foster families as main care providers for children without parental care was 
also established in key strategic documents33 that were emphasizing commitment to de-
institutionalization of care for this target group since late 2000s. This strategic orientation 
was also confirmed by policy-makers in interviews.   
“Children without adequate parental care are our priority group for the 
de-institutionalization process. This process implies the substitution of 
institutional accommodation with the alternative care that is provided in 
communities. Our plan is to achieve this by enabling and supporting the 
reintegration of children with their biological families. When or while 
that is not possible, then the first alternative option is placement in foster 
                                                 
32 Both of these homes are founded by SOS Children’s Villages that provides a special 
type of family based care with the special role of ‘SOS mothers’ and accommodation 
provided in houses located in a specially designed village. Nevertheless, such arrangement 
of service provisions in Croatia is categorized as the institutional care.  
33 Even more, these documents were envisioning that by 2013, 80 per cent children would 
be accommodated in alternative forms of care and only 20 percent in institutional. 
Documents are: Zajednički memorandum o socijalnom uključivanju, Plan 
deinstitucionalizacije i transformacije domova socijalne skrbi za razdoblje od 2011. do 
2018. godine, Nacionalni plan aktivnosti za prava i interese djece od 2006. do 2012., 
Strategija za zaštitu i pomicanje prava djece u Republici Hrvatskoj od 2014. do 2020.  
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family…..and there is the option of organized living of up to five users, 
primarily youth, who would be accommodated in living units and 
supported by professional staff of our homes.” (Interview 8, managerial 
civil servant in Ministry of Social Policy) 
The devotion to de-institutionalization was also stated by the documents outlining policy 
for persons with disabilities, only here it implied the focus on the placement of beneficiaries 
in units for assisted, but self-reliant, community living managed by associations or 
transformed homes. While for accommodation for persons with disability, the trend toward 
de-institutionalization in 2013 was still in a pilot stage and not even included in official 
statistics, for long-term care for children without parental care it was in a much more 
advanced stage.  
Therefore, foster care was since 2011 recognized by the Social Care Act as the only option 
of accommodation of children younger than seven years, and as the most preferred option 
for children older than seven years34. Due to that, during 2013 and 2014 several state 
homes35 were transformed into Centers for children and while others were designing their 
transformation plans. In the new form, state institutions were not meant to function as 
institutional care providers, but as hubs for community living units and as support centers 
for foster families, youth that have left the care and for families in risks.  
 
                                                 
34 According to Social Care Act adopted in 2011 (Zakon o socijalnoj skrbi, NN 57/11), the 
new placements of children in other forms of accommodation were allowed only in 
extraordinarily situations.  Similar stipulations were included in new versions of the Social 
Care Act that were adopted in 2012 (Zakon o socijalnoj skrbi, NN 33/2012) and, then, 
again in 2013 (Zakon o socijalnoj skrbi, NN 157/13, 152/14).  
35 Example was state home “Svitanje” that was during 2013-2014 transformed into a 
Center for Children of Koprivničko-križevačka county.  
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Figure 29 Compared shares of accommodation providers for all three target groups 
Source: Ministry of Demography, Family, Youth and Social policy –Statistical Reports for 2013.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Family home Other legal 
entity
Non-state home Foster family State home County home
Persons with dissability Older persons Children without parental care
140 
 
 
As in 2014 the availability of such institutions in all parts of the country was still far from 
realized, and was more a vision than reality, the support for families in risk was primarily 
provided by the Centers for Social Welfare through a measure called supervision of parental 
care.  This service was defined by the Family Act36 as a measure for the protection of the 
rights and well-being of the child. In 2013 this measure was assigned to 2 38437 parents for 
which Centers for Social Welfare had identified mistakes and shortcomings in parenting or 
the need for particular care in the upbringing of a child. The help given to families in risk 
through this service is of pedagogical and counseling in nature, and is provided by 
professionals working in the Centers for Social Welfare or by their external associates. In 
this kind arrangement, as was illustrated by managers of an association working for and 
with children, Centers for Social Welfare often acted as both managers and providers of the 
service. 
“So, the implementation of the supervision measure goes like this- when 
the Center for Social Welfare assigns the measure, it needs to find 
individuals that will act as the measure leaders and that will work with 
family providing supervision and assistance to parents and 
children…these individuals can be their colleagues - professional from 
some other Center for Social Welfare or they can be psychologist, 
pedagogues or even individuals –like teachers- from professions that are 
not helping professions but have competences that could important for 
family that the person would work with. In practice, teams in Center for 
Social Welfare that are assigning the measure tend to be keener on 
choosing professionals from Center for Social Welfare as they know them. 
Selected professional form Center for Social Welfare then works with the 
family in own extra-paid time. The only thing is that professional that is 
                                                 
36 Obiteljski zakon NN 116/03, 17/04, 136/04, 107/07, 57/11, 61/11, 25/13  
37  Source: Ministry of Demography, Family, Youth and Social policy –Statistical Reports 
for 2013 
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contracted cannot work for the Center for Social Welfare that is assigning 
the measure, they have to be employed in the other Center for Social 
Welfare” (Interview 15, representative of the umbrella organization of 
associations for children).  
The described combination of state-based and other types of arrangements for the provision 
of all four services, was in 2013 clearly reflected in the management of the implementation 
process in which the coordinating Ministry was combining traditional focus on ensuring the 
explicit mandates with novel managerial orientation towards the creation of a framework 
for contracting service delivery. In the provision of support to families in the risk, the 
explicit and densely codified mandate was given to Centers for Social Work who were often 
simultaneously managing and conducting the supervision of parental care.  
In accommodation services these Ministry’s arm length bodies were in charge of assigning 
the right to fully paid or subsidized accommodation in homes and of assigning rights for 
placement into foster family. While persons with disability and children without parental 
care were entitled to these rights no matter of their social status, census existed for elderly 
persons who could, if they failed to pass a census, self-finance own accommodation in 
public welfare homes. Less explicit legal provisions were used for the creation of 
‘interfaces’ or frameworks for contractual relations with organizations that were managing 
the provision of accommodation services.  
That interface was most straightforwardly designed in the relation with about twenty 
religious or non-profit organizations that were providing accommodation for persons with 
disabilities or children without parental care. As already established care providers, these 
organizations were more or less directly included in the state network of homes and could 
be used for outsourcing in situations in which state capacities were exhausted. The 
framework for contracting the service provision to foster families was, on the other hand, 
more comprehensive and it encompassed the process of licensing, education, and 
supervision of contracted providers. This framework was in 2007 codified with a first Act 
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on Foster Care38 which, as the framework became more sophisticated, was replaced by the 
new one in 201239. 
The most complicated framework was designed for the accommodation of older persons 
where contracts, in the course of reform, had become the main management mechanism. To 
enable contractual relations, Ministry for social policy was in regular intervals over several 
years adopting the act named Network of homes for older persons in which it was 
identifying capacity that would be fully or partially covered by the state. Along with the 
state and county homes, the Network was also specifying potential private providers that 
the service could be contracted to. The creation of Network, as indicated by interviewed 
actors, was not very structured nor transparent process. 
“Even though the law was stipulating public tendering procedures for the 
creation of the network of providers of the accommodation for elderly, 
public tendering never took place. The stipulation about tendering 
procedure was never operationalized, and one sentence in the law was 
not sufficient to ensure it.  …I cannot tell if decisions about which homes 
will be included in the network were expert or political decisions, because 
list of institutions included in the network is adopted behind closed doors 
on higher levels of decision-making. All I know is that when we would 
receive the Network with the list of providers to which service could be 
outsourced to, our actual contracting decisions would be based on expert 
opinion.” (Interview 2, managerial civil servant in the Ministry of Social 
Policy) 
Nevertheless, interviewed actors did not recognize decision on outsourcing to private actors 
in the role of political clients as a common practice, but more as a risk. As highlighted by 
one manager of the county home, contracts with the state are not as lucrative and running a 
                                                 
38 Zakon o udomiteljstvu, NN 79/2007 
39 Zakon o udomiteljstvu, NN 90/11, 78/12 
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home for elderly requires investments in technology and expertise, which decreases its 
attractiveness as tools for political patronage in potential clientelistic bargains.  
“The proper management of a private home that has a contract with the 
state requires a facility that fulfils all standards, qualified staff, quality 
standards…also there is so much bureaucratic works that comes with the 
contract with the state……that this constitutes too many prerequisites for 
good trade-off….and after all, or most of all, the state is not a great 
customer as the cost that it pays for their social beneficiaries is much 
smaller than the price on the private market.” (Interview 43, manager in 
home for older citizens)  
Moreover, in line with Ministry’s inclination toward public institutions, the entitlement for 
contractual provision is primarily given to existing county homes and just a small share of 
funds for contracted accommodation services is allocated to the private sector. As Figure 
30 shows, among 2177 persons for whom the state was in 2013 fully or partially covering 
the cost of accommodation in homes for older citizens, only one third was living in homes 
that were not funded by the county or by the state. 
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Figure 30 Distribution of beneficiaries whose accommodation was covered by the state in 
2013 
Source: Ministry of Demography, Family, Youth and Social policy –Statistical Reports for 
2013. 
The fact that the support for families in risk and all accommodation services were in 2013 
still embedded in the social care system reflected the inter-organizational character of 
subordination, but the emerging contractual nature of service provision loosened up vertical 
couplings. In relation with its executive bodies – the Centers for Social Welfare – the central 
government preserved the role of a director and was providing them with resources and 
assignments defined by strict rules and protocols outlined in the thick social care 
regulations. Similar relation was with the state homes for all three target groups, but here 
the role of a director was accompanied with the role of an inspector. This dual role become 
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even more prominent when in 2014 Ministry adopted new operative documents40 of the 
Social Care Act41 that were promoting the focus on performance indicators and have 
outlined new quality standards. With contracted private or non-profit homes, family homes 
and foster families, the government took up the inspector role, while shifting its focus 
toward ensuring contract compliance. That was primarily done by overseeing activities 
related to the fulfilment of the normative standards. Control in relation to non-state 
providers was also ensured through contracts specifying the expected performance and 
outputs of service provision. 
County homes for the elderly had somewhat ambivalent treatment. Firstly, due to their 
origins in state social care system and rather significant subsidizes from the state budget, 
Ministry for social policy tends to impose hierarchical relations on them. Secondly, as 
county administrations are in position of influence toward them, management of an 
institution is often accountable to two directors - political executive/higher servants in the 
Ministry and their counterparts in the county - which might not have the same policy 
priorities. The line of responsibility becomes even more blurred when, as emphasized by 
interviewed actors, county political executive perceives institutional resources (funds, jobs, 
accommodation capacity) as potential goods that could be used in a clientelistic exchange. 
Civil servants were then, together with the home management, placed in a very complicated 
position. 
“When mayor sees the county budget line of home for the elderly,… they 
have ideas on how they would like to spend that money … and often those 
ideas are not related with the needs of our older citizens…. because of 
this I am always under the pressure to follow mayor’s instructions when 
allocating funds. But the fact is that these funds are state money, and their 
spending is not flexible. In the annual decision on the funds that will be 
                                                 
40 Pravilnik o minimalnim uvjetima za pružanje socijalnih usluga, NN 40/2014 and 
Pravilnik o standardima kvalitete socijalnih usluga, NN 143/2014 
41 Zakon o socijalnoj skrbi, NN 157/13, 152/14 
146 
 
given to us for the coverage of home’s expenses, Ministry gives very clear 
guidelines what can be purchased. So, I use that as the argument when 
responding to political pressures.” (Interview 28, senior civil servant in 
regional government) 
As emphasized by interviewed actors, political pressure for control over resources is 
counterbalanced with regulations and inspection oversight while interference into staff 
recruitment is often constrained by requirements regarding staff competence and 
performance outputs. The latter argument is even more weighted in light of the fact, often 
emphasized by homes’ managers, that county homes, although heavily subsidized, more 
and more function on the open market, and after all, the big part of their revenue is collected 
via self-financing of beneficiaries.  
In 201342in all county homes 85 percent of beneficiaries were paying for service themselves, 
while the state covered, partially of fully, expenses for 14 percent or home residents. As 
represented in Figure 31, the share of self-financed beneficiaries43 increased over the years 
and in 2013 has reached same figures as were the ones in private homes.  For facility 
management that implies choice of good service quality and high performance over political 
demands.  
 
 
                                                 
42 Source: Ministry of Demography, Family, Youth and Social policy –Statistical Reports 
for 2013. 
43 Important note here is that the price of accommodation in county’s home is severally 
times cheaper than in private homes and the the difference is subsidized by State in 
accaorance with the the annual decisions on the transfer of funds.  
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Figure 31 Share of beneficiearis in homes for older citizens that are financed by the state 
Source: Ministry of Demography, Family, Youth and Social policy –Statistical Reports for 
the period 2005-2013. 
Finally, the management of inter-personal contacts in the provision of all four services 
clustered in this group reflects most clearly the dual, even internally conflicted, nature of 
the implementation management. Actors engaged in the management of homes for all three 
target groups, thus, were often reflecting upon the tensions that in 2003/2014 emerged 
between human resource management regulations stipulated by the Labor Act44 and the 
above-mentioned novel operative acts of the Social Care Act that were, among others, 
raising existing standards of quality. This tension was vividly illustrated by following 
remarks of a state home manager:  
                                                 
44 Zakon o radu, NN 93/14 
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“The work in our home is organized in accordance with the exiting 
regulation. The priority here are acts that are specifying the number of 
users per staff, elements and intensity of care, but when following this 
norm, we are placed under high pressure. The problem is that the number 
of professionals that we are allowed to hire and whose salaries are 
financed by the state is not matching the regulation on working hours. 
More specifically, our institution cares for users that need 24-hours 
attention, and we do not have enough staff – especially the nurses and 
care givers- to act in accordance with the Labour Act.  As we do not have 
funds to pay them for over-time work, we are compensating the lack of 
resources by boosting up the team work and we are trying to lower the 
pressure by engaging volunteers, interns and by cooperating with civil 
society organizations. But this is not systematic solution, the system 
cannot rely on of homes’ managers in filling the gaps that are created by 
the system.” (Interview 45, manager in state home for persons with 
disability) 
In the homes for older citizens that were financed by the public funds but were at the same 
time functioning on the market, the pressure on staff had additional dimension. As described 
by a professional working in a county home, the hybridity of the arrangement for service 
provision brought co-existence, and sometimes even collision, of dual accountability; one 
the one side toward their superiors and the rules, and on the other toward their clients. 
 “The demands for caring staff have become really high. We need to 
follow standards that Ministry has created, we need to listen to our bosses 
and … we need to respond to requests of our beneficiaries, who are, after 
all, paying for their services. OK, in our county home the price might be 
lower than in the private home, but nevertheless, users are paying and 
have expectations from us.” (Interview 62, care provider in county home 
for older citizens)  
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The tension between co-existing traditional and new management practice was visible also 
in the interpersonal contact with service users. While in contact with potential beneficiaries, 
the Centers for Social Welfare would still apply strict standards which tested qualifying 
conditions for the approval of the right on fully or partially covered accommodation, the 
contractual provision of accommodation was marked by standardized but flexible service.  
Although still strongly relying on standard operating procedures, social workers in Centers 
for Social Welfare and professionals providing all four services did recognize the emergence 
of a user-centered approach. When doing so, professionals working in the system were 
mainly referring to the more and more widespread usage of individual plans for service 
provision that are meant to be created in consultation with service beneficiaries. However, 
as accessed by the expert in the child care, there was still a long way to go towards the 
internalization of adaptable user-centered approach.  
“When planning the service, be it supervision or accommodation, Centers 
for Social Welfare are now making individual plans that should be based 
on children’s specific needs and situation. These plans are becoming a 
part of the solution for the problems, but our analysis of are showing that 
in practice neither parents nor children are well informed about the plan, 
and neither are they really participating it is design. In case of assigning 
supervision measure to families in risk, for example, these plans have the 
character of operative plans that the measure leaders should follow 
through. What happens is that Center for Social Welfare team adopts a 
plan, informs parents about it, and parent signs it.  The plan is then given 
to the leaders of the measure, who usually does not have proper tool to 
suggest substantial revision in the light of circumstances that he/she 
encounters when working with the family.” (Interview 18, 
Researcher/consultant). 
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4.2 Forces at work in shaping the process and results of the reform 
The analysis of the reform results set out above showed how reforms of six researched social 
services in Croatia, in a policy-making context characterized by the presence of clientelistic 
exchange, resulted not only in non-congruent management when it came to the provision of 
the same service, but has also triggered the emergence of three rather distinctive modes of 
implementation. On the one hand, in the cases of supportive service for families at risk and 
the accommodation services for older persons, persons with disability and children without 
parental care, reform has resulted in the implementation mode in with performance 
perspective on managing implementation was added on the pre-existing enforcement 
perspective.    
On the other hand, the ‘new’ home care and personal assistance services emerged during 
reforms as new initiatives directed toward the co-production of public services. The 
outcome of these new initiatives, however, proved to have quite several distinctive features. 
Thus, while the introduction of personal assistants led to co-production which resulted in 
substantial engagement of users and their organizations in service delivery, in the case of 
home care the ruling party used the idea and elements of co-production as a cover for the 
distortion of implementation of reform and for using delivery of services for introducing 
patronage practices.  
In the Table 27 and text that follows it, these findings are merged with findings of the cross-
case analysis of the effect of factors affecting the process and results of management reform; 
pre-existing institutional setting of service provision and the power and representation of a 
target group of each service.  
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Table 27 Cross – case analysis: merging findings on reform results (Y) and hypothesized factors affecting the reform (X) 
 
Initial conditions 
for service 
management 
reform 
 
 
 
National-level: civil 
sector politicization, 
domination of state by 
the party whose 
strong and wide 
territorial 
organization needed 
to be maintained 
through patronage, 
persistence of 
administrative 
‘double talk’, 
centralized state 
structure and 
decentralized job 
placement system. 
 
 
 
 
Social-policy level: 
ppresence of reform 
drivers: demographic 
and socio-economic 
pressures and the 
influx of new 
management ideas 
promoted by 
international actors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CASES 
Institutionalization of social services provision prior to 
the reform (X1) 
The power and representation of 
the population that is the target 
group of a policy (X2) 
Reform effects on 
the 
implementation 
management (Y) 
Formal rules and 
regulations 
Working rules 
and standard 
procedures 
Professional 
codes or bodies.  
 
The presence 
of an active 
individual or 
groups of users 
in service 
design or 
delivery 
The involvement 
of domestic or 
international 
organizations 
that promote the 
interests of 
service 
beneficiaries 
Modes of 
implementation 
Accommodation in 
homes and foster 
homes for the elderly 
Dense web of rules-
in form 
Rules-in-form 
referred to by 
actors 
Present Minimal Minimal Performance 
upgraded on the 
enforcement 
Accommodation in 
homes and foster 
homes for children 
without parental care 
Dense web of rules-
in form 
Rules-in-form 
referred to by 
actors 
Present Moderate  Significant 
(UNICEF 
especially) 
Performance 
upgraded on the 
enforcement 
Accommodation in 
homes and foster 
homes for persons 
with disabilities 
Dense web of rules-
in form 
Rules-in-form 
referred to by 
actors 
Present Significant Significant 
(UNDP 
especially) 
Performance 
upgraded on the 
enforcement 
Supervision of 
parental care for 
families at risk 
Moderate web of 
rules-in form 
Rules-in-form 
referred to by 
actors 
Present Moderate  Significant 
(UNICEF 
especially) 
Performance 
upgraded on the 
enforcement 
Home care for the 
older persons 
Scant rules-in form Rules-in-form 
not referred to 
by actors 
Absent Minimal Minimal Novel and captured 
co-production 
Personal assistance 
for persons with 
disabilities 
Minimal rules-in-
form  
No rules-in-use Absent Significant Significant 
(UNDP 
especially) 
Novel and 
consistent co-
production 
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Among all six services, the one with the least institutionalized pre-existing implementation 
setting was personal assistance for persons with disabilities. This service was created as 
completely new during the reform with no regulatory or professional foundations of any 
kind. In the beginning of 2000s, when reforms were launched, quite the opposite situation 
was the case in three accommodation services that were deeply embedded in the traditional 
social care system. Even though foster care in Croatia has a long tradition, and even though 
since the early 1990s non-state actors could provide residential care for older persons, 
accommodation services for children and adults prior to the reform were still mainly 
provided by the state institutions.   
In the overall organization of service provision, the Centers for Social Welfare acted as the 
State’s focal points, strictly applying rules when deciding on the eligibility of actors that 
could act as care providers and beneficiaries of state-funded accommodation services. The 
actual provision of services in such a system was, as pointed out by many interviewed actors 
and in some previous research, marked by a combination of formalism and the domination 
of experts, features inherited from the socialist era welfare policy (Stubbs and Maglajlić 
2012; Dobrotić 2016).  
The positions in between these of these two extremes were taken by the supervision of 
parental care and home care for older persons, two services introduced in the social care 
system during the 1970s45 as means of preventing institutionalization of vulnerable children 
and older citizens. The coordination of both services was handed to Centers for Social 
Welfare, whose professional employees were envisioned as key service providers in the case 
of supervision of parental care. On the other hand, home care was subcontracted from the 
very beginning. 
After a very slow growth and with less than 200 users in the first half of 1980s, the 
development of institutional capacities for the provision of supervision was intensively 
                                                 
45 The home care was introduced by means of the Social Care Act adopted in 1979 (Zakon 
o socijalnoj zaštiti, NN 19/1969), and the supervision was introduced via the Marriage and 
Family Act from 1978 (Zakon o braku i porodičnim odnosima, NN 11/1978). 
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supported through education of Center’s for Social Welfare professionals, the creation of 
protocols and joint analysis of exemplary work with families at risk (Ajduković and Laklija 
2015). As Center’s for Social Welfare professionals felt more comfortable to assign, provide 
or contract provision to their external associates over time, during first years of the 2000s 
supervision was provided to over 1.500 families at risk (Hrabar and Korać 2003). At that 
point, as interviewed professionals, and researchers with expertise in this field have 
indicated, the service provision functioned as an integral part of the social care system. Just 
like accommodation services, its management was also accessed as rather bureaucratic, but 
insufficiently adjusted to the real needs of users.  
Home care, on the contrary, had a fairly insignificant role in the general system of social 
care at the beginning of 2000s. In the year 2001 it encompassed only 499 older citizens 
(Puljiz et al. 2003). One group of factors that could account for its marginal institutional 
position and limited reach was aligned to the tradition of strong inter-generational family 
support due to which the use of home care service was associated with the stigma of 
abandonment. The other group, even more often emphasized by interviewed actors and in 
previous research, included managerial issues such as state reluctance to finance and support 
the development of the service network, and the lack of the Centers for Social Welfare 
initiative and local capacities for the organization of service provision in rural and less 
developed urban communities (Dobrotić 2016; Podgorelec and Klempić 2007) 
In practice, despite the fact that the allocation of right to access to service provision was 
guided by very strict rules, the organisation of service provision was only vaguely outlined 
by the general Social Care Act and was not operationalized through any lower level act or 
standard operating procedure. As the lack of rules-in-form was not compensated by the work 
of professional or educational organizations, the actual management of care provision and 
the work of care givers was minimally institutionalized and varied from one case to another. 
This was indicted in following remarks by a main nurse in one county home: 
“The staff that works in homes for elderly, and in other homes of course, 
are professionals whose competences are defined, taught through specific 
education programs and work often licensed and supervised by 
professional associations, such is the Croatian chamber of nurses. The 
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profession of care givers in the home care services is still undefined, there 
is no formal education program in which people can acquire needed skills 
there is no association of care givers. Last few years, there has been some 
progress, so there are more and more trainings offered by Croatian 
Employment Bureau or some private schools. But this is still in 
developmental stage, so in practice everyone can act as a provider of this 
service.” (Interview 51, coordinator of service provision team in county 
home for older persons).  
If these findings are merged with the cross-case analysis of data collected on the 
implementation modes management reform resulted in, it becomes visible that limitations 
to political pressures for control over the service provision were posed in the supportive 
services for families at risk and long-term accommodation services, all of them 
characterized by the highly regulated and bureaucratic institutional setting in which these 
services were delivered in the period preceding the reform.   
This connection was also indicated by the actors interviewed. Moreover, interview analysis 
showed that while strictly codified eligibility of actors that could provide or receive these 
four services made their provision hardly suitable for exploitation in patronage purposes, 
the bureaucratic state system for social care that these services were a part of proved to be 
very resistant to any rapid or overly comprehensive change. Due to that, the change of 
arrangements for service provision that did take place was very incremental and occurred 
as a part of the overall reform of the traditional social care system, without much public 
visibility and political attention. The crucial role in this process was played by senior civil 
servants that saw the development of cheaper and better alternative accommodation forms 
as a way to ease the strains on the system of facilities for residential care. This is the reason 
why the reform process did not attract much political attention and the main role in the 
transformation of implementation management was taken by civil servants and experts in 
social care.  
“Accommodation services were never interesting for politicians. It is 
massive system and very resistant to big changes. Even more, effects of 
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reforms cannot be quickly visible …due to that these services were rarely 
on the radar of political officials in our Ministry… so most of the changes 
were mainly initiated by us, civil servants who followed external trends 
and knew what service provision looks like in reality and what changes 
are feasible and what are not.” (Interview 7, managerial civil servant in 
Ministry of Social Policy) 
In the choice of the specific reform course, civic servants were guided by general “reform 
packages” through which international organizations such as the World Bank, United 
Nation Development Program, UNCEF and the European Union promoted the shift from 
traditional preferences for hierarchical or government-based public services towards 
performance-based or user-based orientation in Croatian social policy. Nevertheless, when 
making operative decisions through which the new management ideas were turned into 
practice, public servants often acted as representatives of institutional service providers. 
Due the bureaucratic character and prevailing domination of professionals engaged in the 
service design and delivery, both users and organizations advocating their interests had only 
limited ability to influence or monitor the reform of the service delivery modes in these four 
services. This came through vividly in following remarks by a researcher, engaged in the 
reform of policy toward children.  
“This measure of the supervision of parental care is, in the light of the 
Convection for the Right of the Child, a really important measure. 
However, the provision of measure in last decade was only slightly 
changed in line with the novelties in the approaches to the child care and 
chills’ right protection. In 2008 UNICEF supported domestic experts 
which are not working in the social care system to cooperate with Centers 
for Social Welfare in order to create tools for systematic planning, 
monitoring and reporting about the way measure was implemented. We 
tried to introduce the codebook or protocol for the initial assessments of 
the children’s’ safety and risks, but with only limited success. This tool 
would create a sort of a baseline which would improve the outsourcing 
practice, as Centers for Social Welfare would be able to monitor the 
progress of interventions. But this kind on novelty requires 
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comprehensive reform which includes not just the changes of regulation 
but the re-organisation of the Centres for Social Welfare…Of course, the 
tool encountered resistance and its application was considered as another 
burden on professionals that are already overloaded with tasks. I am 
sorry that the Association of Social Workers and other professional 
associations are not more agile in advocating the change of working 
conditions of their members which would, in turn, induce better treatment 
of users’ needs.” (Interview 18, researcher/consultant) 
In the resulting transformation of implementation management, governmental monopoly, 
and the enforcement perspective on managing service provision were not replaced, but only 
upgraded with performance management and contracting out elements. Even though 
introduction of outsourcing in the practice of care provision loosened up hierarchical chains 
of accountability, the attractiveness of exerting political influence over the contracting 
choices was minimized with the high cost of meeting norms that served as prerequisites for 
establishing long-term care institution and the low price offered by the state for service 
provision. With the layered nature of the reform process, political or any other kind or 
pressure for control over the resources was not only counterbalanced by the traditional 
inspection oversight but also with the introduction of the output-based monitoring practice, 
as senior civil servant vividly illustrated: 
“When a service is contracted, the inclusion of all beneficiaries and all 
payments is attached to the individual operative act adopted by the Centre 
for Social Welfare. Payment cannot be completed prior to the service 
having been completed.” (Interview 50, manager in Centers for Social 
Welfare). 
While demonstrating the strength of the traditional implementation setting, reforms of the 
supervision service for families at risk and the accommodation services for the elderly, 
persons with disabilities and children without parental care did not result in changes 
assessed as necessary by the actors interviewed, but more in the implementation mode 
which reduced the space for widespread political capture.  
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In other two services, home care and personal assistance, which had a minimal and no pre-
existing institutional setting, the strength of institutional and regulatory constrains was 
diminished by the establishment of a completely new Ministry and the programs in which 
politicians in government took a very proactive role and provided reformist efforts with 
tight guidance. By declaring commitment to collaborative arrangements of service 
provision, in the design of both services they detached their implementation from the social 
care system and invited local communities to engage in the production of flexible and user-
centered services.  
Although the creation of both services was inspired by the same set of ideas, the way these 
principles were integrated into implementation management differs significantly. While the 
development of partnership arrangements for a new home care meant focus on local level 
governments, in personal assistance government proved to be keen on developing 
partnership with associations of persons with disability. More importantly, while the 
national and local political executive acted as a unified action center pursuing interests of 
spoil-seeking party in the development of home care for the elderly, in the design of a 
personal assistant decision made by political executive was scrutinized by the actors 
representing the interests of the target population.   
The latter scenario was possible because, although both persons with disability and the older 
persons in need of care were treated as vulnerable and dependent segments of society in 
communist-era policies, persons with disabilities had gradually developed their 
mobilization potential and had enhanced their political strength. As the interviewed actors 
and previous research indicated, over the past fifteen years, some of the associations 
representing disabled persons have transformed from obedient service providers into 
persons with disabilities rights’ advocates. With the assistance of international organisations 
such as the United Nation Development Program, Word Bank and the European Union, 
whose approval was an important element of the HDZ’s reformist program, domestic 
associations were able to induce the transformation of disability policy goals and 
instruments from the medical to the human rights model in which persons with disabilities 
are not just recipients of help, but also empowered citizens (Petek 2011; Kekez-Koštro, 
Urbanc, and Salaj 2013; Urbanc 2006). This transformation was materialized, among other 
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tools, via the introduction and the use of a personal assistant that lies at the core of the 
human rights model. 
On the other hand, even though elderly citizens potentially may be a powerful target group 
in general as they make up 18% of all population, beneficiaries of long-term care services 
are perceived as apolitical and often socially constructed as vulnerable members of society 
that are left alone and thus in need of protection. In turn, as was highlighted by the 
representative of pensioner’s union, they lack potential for political mobilization and joint 
action among themselves.  
“Sometimes I feel that we are fighting like Don Quixote. Nobody takes us 
seriously. First, younger generations still do not recognize that the 
situation for older citizens in our county is very bad. They think that we 
have our pensions, and that that is enough…and that there are people in 
our society which are in much worse situation…but it is not like that, there 
are so many unaddressed need, so many older persons whose rights are 
in this moment jeopardized. ...but listen, there is one other even more 
problematic thing. Older citizens are not a homogeneous group, and 
never will be. To put it frankly, we are big group of voters, but we are not 
using that potential and we are not united in asking fulfillment own rights 
and interests. On a contrary, we are most heterogeneous and most silent 
voters in the country….and politicians are using that. The more we are 
disunited and disorganized, it is better for them as they do not need to 
take us seriously. They do not need put our needs in their calculations and 
they do not need to listen us.” (Interview 13, umbrella organization for 
pensioners). 
Additionally, unlike people with disabilities, the elderly in need of care had not been in the 
focus of the advocacy efforts of national civil society organisations and international 
organisations over the last decade. Only marginal involvement of external actors was that 
of the World Bank and the European Union who generated incentives for the reform of the 
overall social care system that the long term institutional care was a part of.  
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Due to the lack of potential of the elderly population to politically mobilize and absence of 
strong advocacy groups acting on their behalf in the implementation of home care service 
management - as was often emphasized by civil servants working with the elderly 
population - both national and local ruling politicians were the primary decision-makers 
whose actions could be disputed neither by implementers nor beneficiaries. Strong political 
engagement in the re-organization of service provision enabled rapid growth of service 
usage, but has at the same time induced a biased selection of actors participating in the 
implementation network and the distortion of extremely soft steering mechanisms, such as 
trust and the golden thread, which network management was based on. Both mechanisms, 
as reported by one of the program managers, proved to be less effective in fostering 
cooperation than in enhancing local politician’s ability to pursue their own interests while 
organizing the service provision.  
“We have to admit that local units are not controllable. After I have 
become in charge for the coordination of this program, when it was 
transferred to the Ministry of Social Policy, I soon realized that I have no 
means to actually control the local unite that were funded through the 
program. The program is not a part of Social care system act, nor is 
included in the Social Care Act. … and nothing that is prescribed in that 
act can be used here.  So, while social care system has its own inspection 
that inspection does not have mandate over this service...also, even 
though I control the program, it is local political executive who makes 
decision on the funds allocation and about the hiring of the staff. If they 
want to replace the whole home care team, they can do whenever they 
want. All I can do is to give them suggestions, but these suggestions are 
not binding for them…. So to put is in short, in this service we do not have 
effective control mechanisms and practice is constantly demonstrating 
that we do need them.” (Interview 6, managerial civil servants in Ministry 
of Social Policy). 
Local politicians inclined to engage in politicization or rent-seeking activities used this 
space to turn the mandate given for the organisation of service provision into an opportunity 
for the employment of local party members or supporters as service providers. Even though 
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patronage practices were not fully present in all communities granted with national funds, 
the possibility that this can happen proved to be a systemic governance failure. As civil 
servants in the coordinating ministry and officials in the social system inspectorate had no 
real oversight power over the actual service management, the choice between the 
clientelistic and programmatic strategy was dependent on the leadership style of local 
executive and their relationship with their national counterparts. In that way, the reform path 
toward horizontal steering and collaborative implementation for elderly care in Croatia 
resulted in the empowerment of political parties for clientelistic capture of service provision 
instead of in the empowerment of communities and users. 
Due to the effective pressure of advocacy organizations representing the interests of persons 
with disabilities, civil servants engaged in the coordination of this service reported quite a 
different meta-governing experience than their colleagues engaged in the provision of home 
care services: 
“The service was the initiative of the Croatian Union of Associations of 
Persons with Disabilities and other NGOs. The Ministry’s elected 
officials accepted it but left its implementation out of reach for local 
politicians. They knew that NGOs were prioritizing this service and that 
they were able to place potential implementation problems on both the 
media and the political agenda… Also, the Ministry executive recognized 
that personal assistance was a good instrument for social inclusion that 
started to dominate among the goals of disabilities policy, so they 
accessed they gain more by allowing us to do our job with the help of 
NGOs”. (Interview 7, managerial civil servant in Ministry of Social 
Policy) 
By reaching a balance of power with the political executive, NGOs of disabled persons were 
able to act not only as co-creators, but also as co-implementers of the service. In their doings, 
the NGOs induced substantive engagement at the individual level, so the beneficiaries 
effectively took charge of the content of the service, which is what turned this service into 
an exemplary case of co-production in Croatia. By the end of 2011 when HDZ lost power, 
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beneficial effects of the personal assistant were so widely acknowledged that even though 
new political officials in the Ministry of social policy wanted to detach themselves from as 
many of the ‘pilot initiatives’ developed by Ministry of Family, Veterans' Affairs and 
Intergenerational Solidarity as possible, they decided to keep and, moreover, to expand this 
service. On the contrary, the home care program ended on the new government’s list for 
complete restructuring. 
4.3 Back to the model of service reform: institutions and actors do matter 
The presented comparative case study has confirmed the importance of both institutions and 
actors, and more specifically, of the pre-existing institutional setting of service provision 
and the power and representation of service target group. Furthermore, as the cross-case 
analysis of six analyzed services enabled formation three modes of implementation that the 
reform resulted with and specification of meta-governing role that was taken by 
administrative and political leaders, model could be refined with more specific insights on 
the reform process and results. More refined version of the Model of service reform in 
clientelistic policy-making setting is presented in Figure 32 and elaborated in text that 
follows it.  
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Figure 32 Refined model of social service reform in clientelistic policy-making context 
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As the Figure 32 shows, in the reform of services whose provision was prior the reform well 
rooted in the traditional system of social care, as the cases of supervision of parental care 
and accommodation for vulnerable social groups showed, did not prove as attractive or 
prone to clientelistic capture. Among the institutional features of social care system, 
limitations to political pressures for control over implementation were posed not only by a 
dense web of legal acts that were set in place in the period of socialism, but also by numerous 
standard operating procedures that have over the years materialized rules-in-form in a very 
bureaucratic manner.  As the effects of rules were at street-level practice complemented 
with the effects of professional status and professional norms of professions engaged in the 
service provision, political executive was left with limited number of institutionally 
available options for the interventions in the hiring of service providers.  
In addition, the institutional conditions for the provision of these services also narrowed the 
space for the exertion of citizen pressure for management change. As the analysis of the 
implementation management showed, in services which were prior to reform provided in a 
well-established, formalized, implementation setting, experts still had a dominant position 
and users were provided with little opportunities to impact the creation or delivery of 
services they receive. This, in turn, significantly decreased the chances for integration of 
participatory instruments of the New Public Governance into the management of service 
provision.  
Due to limited interest of political actors and minimized space for the influence of users, the 
changes of operational management were induced by the need to ease the strains on the 
system, or were promoted by international organizations. In both cases changes were led by 
senior civil servants which in their meta-governing exercise demonstrated hesitation to 
abandon reliance on central steering and were reluctant to engage in any comprehensive 
transformation of the arrangements for service provision. When introducing changes, they 
proved to be keen on management ideas and tools that can be related with either New 
Weberian State or New Public Management models. Nevertheless, reformist ideas and tools 
were never fully integrated in the system, but just attached to the existing management 
activities and techniques. As a result, a decade after the reformist initiatives were launched, 
performance perspective on managing provision of social services functioned mainly as an 
addition to previously existing, and still prevailing, enforcement perspective.   
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In cases that were, on the other hand, characterized with non-existent or minimal 
institutional setting, the comparative study confirmed the importance of the target group 
potential to politically mobilize, or to have strong advocacy groups acting on their behalf.  
The presence of active individuals or organizations which advocate or represent the interest 
of target population in the introduction of personal assistant service reduced attractiveness 
of patronage strategy for the ruling party. As the service had no institutional roots that could 
limit the scope of the reform, elected office holders were incentivized to join their 
administrative counterparts in meta-governing efforts and, while doing that, to appeal to 
service beneficiaries with an offer of a programmatic package based on comprehensive 
innovations in service provision. Due to substantive engagement of civil society actors in 
the reform process, the design of the new arrangement for service provision was inspired by 
collaborative ideas and management instruments behind the New Public Governance reform 
model. In that way, introduction of a new service within the reform resulted in a novel 
implementation mode for Croatian context, characterized with a co-production perspective 
on implementation management. 
On the other hand, in the case of home care service that was prior to reform characterized 
by minimal institutional framework and politically weak and non-represented target group, 
the comprehensive transformation of the arrangements for service provision was used to 
enhance political control over the implementation. Free from limitations of institutional 
rules or opposition of a politically potent target group or advocacy actors acting to protect 
users’ interests, political actors took over the reform process and politicized their meta-
governing role. By deforming ideas and soft steering tools offered by New Public 
Governance model they were able to build political patronage practices into reformed 
management of home care provision. As a result of the reform, the management of inter-
personal relations became distorted with party patronage practices. Also, distorted 
application of reformist tools in the reform of emerging home care service, such as trust or 
informal network management, resulted in clientelistic variant of co-production.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PROCESS-TRACING ANALYSIS: CAUSAL MECHANISM AT 
WORK 
By building on the findings from the comparative study, this chapter further investigates the 
home care as a service in which reform led to the clientelistic distortion of implementation 
management. By using process-tracing techniques, chapter addresses the causal 
mechanisms through which, in a clientelistic policy-making setting, the reform governed by 
patronage-driven politicians led to distorted implementation, in line with patronage 
practices. In the first section and its five subsections, the chapter describes the captured 
metagovernance mechanism that was found in the reform of elderly care in Croatia. In the 
second section, chapter offers conceptualization of politicized metagovernance mechanism. 
5.1 Process tracing analysis: the captured metagovernance mechanism 
In the empirical analysis, the presence of reform drivers, a powerless status of the elderly in 
need of care, and the week tradition of service provision prior to the reform were found to 
function as policy-specific scope conditions in which metagovernance of the elderly care 
reform took place. In the iterative crafting of causal mechanism linking the patronage-driven 
interest of a ruling party (X) and the captured co-production of home care service in Croatia 
(Y), the theorized political metagovernance mechanism was found to be present but merged 
with new parts that served patronage purposes.  
Qualitative data analysis showed that in the Croatian elderly care reform, two parts of the 
theorized mechanism related to activities on the individual scale were merged, while in each 
part of the mechanism political leaders engaged not only in activities corresponding to the 
notion of political metagovernance, but were at the same time conducting activities through 
which they were politicizing their metagoverning role. This Politicized metagovernance 
mechanism is illustrated in Figure 33 and described in the text that follows it. 
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Figure 33 Politicized metagovernance mechanism of the elderly care reform in Croatia 
 
OUTCOME: Clientelistic coproduction of elderly care
CM part 5: Ensuring internalisation and interactive rule application
Political executive invites care givers and users to 
co-create the service during its delivery
Local politicians that were engaging in patronage 
practice reinforced users' dependence
CM part 4: Reshaping the policy content
Political executive empowers administrative 
leaders to nurture established partnerships
Local political executive left with possibility to 
pursue own leadership style and interests
CM part 3: General rule-making for policy-making
Political execeutive provides flexible framework 
for the formation of local elderly care policies
Political executive constitues dysfunctional 
accountability forums and procedures
CM part 2: Reforming (inter)organisational setting
Political executive devolvs mandate and commits 
resources to communities in need
Political executive ensures political primacy in 
the selection of participating communities
CM part 1. Institutional redesign
Political executive designs new institutional 
setting for community based elderly care
Political executive deataches new setting from 
interlocking rules of traditional social care system
CONDITION: 
Patronage-driven interest of political leaders
SCOPE CONDITIONS: 
Presence of reform drivers 
Powerless status of elderly in need for care
Week tradition of service provision
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5.1.1 Part 1: Institutional redesign 
The reform of the home care services, as the analysis of reformist documents and interviews 
with actors revealed, was initiated in 2003 as a top-down process of institutional design with 
the establishment of a new Ministry for Family, Veterans and Intergenerational Solidarity 
(MFVAIS). This institution existed during the two terms of the Croatian Democratic Union 
(HDZ) government and was abolished in 2011 after HDZ lost the national election to a 
Social Democratic Party-led coalition.  
Often referred by interviewed actors as “the Ministry of Pilot Projects”, MFVAIS launched 
a pilot program of home and day care services in the year 2004, presenting it as the new 
institutional setting for community-based elderly care and as an alternative to state-based 
programs that already existed within the social care system. As the last two words of the 
former umbrella ministry’s title suggest, the declared objectives for the constitution of this 
alternative governance arena were to mobilize local political leaders and community 
stakeholders towards a joint care for elderly citizens, as well as to foster a wider inclusion 
of elderly citizens, their empowerment and enhanced involvement in service delivery. This 
was also emphasized in the Program’s preamble (Program for Development of Services for 
Elderly Citizens in the System of Intergenerational Solidarity, 2007: 3)46. 
“Awareness of the need of additional care for family and the elderly, as 
well as the need for better connectedness, mutuality and solidarity among 
generations resulted in the forming of the ministry responsible for family, 
veterans of war and intergenerational solidarity in the year 2003. Up until 
that point, state care for family or family members was mostly directed 
towards socially-protective and interventions based on family acts and the 
like. However, by forming the ministry in charge of intergenerational 
solidarity, the Government of the Republic of Croatia wishes to affirm its 
dedication to special care for the elderly and highlight the intention of 
                                                 
46 Program razvoja usluga za starije osobe u sustavu međugeneracijske solidarnosti od 
2008. do 2011. godine, NN 90/2007. 
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mutual connectedness between younger and older generations. The 
ministry in charge of intergenerational solidarity incites projects with the 
scope of improving the quality of life for the elderly, proposes measured 
for inciting families to keep the elderly and frail family members within 
the family circle, initiates the development of services for the elderly and 
non-institutional forms of care for the elderly, whilst performing other 
tasks related to elderly care.”   
To mobilize the under-utilized local resources, as was emphasized by documents outlining 
the Program, the provision of new home care services was detached from the de-
concentrated network of bureaucratized social care institutions and organized via 
partnerships between state and local, typically non-profit community actors. To stipulate a 
better reach of citizens in need, eligibility for service usage was not associated with the 
testing of means, but was framed in a much more flexible manner47.  The introduction of 
both governance novelties, however, was limited only to the new home care trajectory, 
while the provision of traditional home care services was left out of the political and 
reformist focus. Such constitutive decisions resulted in a situation of institutional 
parallelism problematized by most interviewed actors and vividly illustrated by a highly 
ranked civil servant engaged in the governance of the traditional social care system at the 
time: 
“Home care services are heavily fragmented as they are nationally 
provided within two parallel systems that do not talk to each other. In the 
older one, the home care is institutionalized through the Social Care Act 
and a nuanced set of regulation that stipulates users’ eligibility, the 
content of the service and the key role that the Ministry for Social Care 
and its arm’s length bodies—the Centres for Social Welfare—play in the 
organization of service provision. In the second one, the content of the 
                                                 
47 Izvješće o provedbi programa pomoći u kući za Ministarstvo uprave. 2010. Ministarstvo 
obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti (Interni dokument). 
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service is quite similar to that in the old one, but the arrangements for 
provision include both state and society actors. Instead of defining rules, 
the Ministry for Intergenerational Solidarity provides with guidelines 
which can be interpreted rather broadly.” (Interview 5, managerial civil 
servants in Ministry of Social Policy)  
By creating a new institution and the alternative trajectory of service provision within it, 
political leaders have liberated own constitutive actions from the tangle of interlocking rules 
that was making traditional social care system difficult to fundamentally change. In that 
way, they have gained a large leeway for choosing the reform package that could not only 
induce an interactive and user-centered organization of home care provision, but could also 
accommodate political or even spoil-seeking interests of the ruling party.  
5.1.2 Part 2: Designing an (inter)organizational setting 
The ability of political leaders to combine policy with political aims while structuring new 
arrangements for home care provision was further institutionalized with the two sided-
design of (inter) organizational setting. On the one side, the mandate was devolved to local 
actors and financial resources committed to communities in need by means of partnership—
with the MFVAIS signing an agreement on co-funding and cooperation with the county or 
municipal government—which then would organize the provision themself or together with 
community organizations and homes for the elderly.  
On the one sidy, the devotion to inducement of meaningful participation and collaboration 
of local actors was declared through official announcements and documents outlining 
criteria for the selection of the recipients of national funding that were emphasizing the need 
to develop a service network in the most deprived areas as well as guiding local governments 
to demonstrate in their applications the willingness and ability to participate in service 
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funding with more that 10% of its costs as well as to elaborate a devotion toward partnership 
approach in service provision48.  
On the other side, the integration of the political dimension in the constitution of 
(inter)organizational setting was fostered via more internal procedures through which 
elected officials of the MFVAIS ensured political primacy over the selection of participating 
communities and actors. According to these procedures, not only were members of the 
committee for scoring applications and creating the funding ranking list appointed by the 
Minister49, but the Minister was also appointing the members of selection committee and 
approving their funding decisions. In that final step, as indicated by one member of selection 
committee, additional political criteria would be applied on the top of the formal ones: 
‘So when we had an open call for home care, the committee would make 
a ranking list of counties and municipalities that had applied. It was done 
according to the criteria set by the Open Call and the Program. That 
ranking was then to be approved by the Minister….well, before doing 
that, she/he would mark those municipalities which were to jump higher 
on the ranking list. Alternatively, if there were two municipalities from 
the same area among applicants, and with a similar need for the service, 
she/he would choose the one in which HDZ was in power - that would 
happen even in the case when committee assessed the other applicant with 
slightly higher scores. And that was it: the ranking list proposed by the 
                                                 
48 Odluka o Kriterijima za ocjenu i predlaganje suradnje na Programima međugeneracijske 
solidarnosti. 2006. Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti, Poziv 
za uključivanje jedinica lokalne samouprave u program međugeneracijske solidarnosti. 
2010. Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti. 
49 Odluka o osnivanju i imenovanju Povjerenstva za praćenje provedbe Programa 
međugeneracijske solidarnosti. 2007.  Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja I međugeneracijske 
solidarnosti. 
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committee then had to be changed’. (Interview 68, managerial civil 
servant in Ministry of Social Policy) 
In order to ensure the inclusion of their county or municipality in the Program, local 
politicians were often complementing formal application for funding with the informal 
lobbying and persuasion efforts targeting their national counterparts. When in 2008 the 
Program was rapidly growing, the practice of a direct communication between the Minister 
and political executive of local units that were trying to become a new member of the 
implementation network was even internally formalized. As demonstrated in the Figure 34 
(and 35) representing the internal document that was issued by the MFVAIS’s civil servant 
to a MFVAIS’s Minister, while the counties and municipalities that were already engaged 
in the program were guided to communicate with program managers, those that wanted to 
initially apply for funding were instructed to send their applications directly to Minister.   
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Figure 34 Internal statement by the MFVAIS – original version 
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Figure 35 Internal statement by the MFVAIS – translation on English 
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Such usage of additional political criteria and communication lines in the constitution of a 
new governance arena impeded the arena’s integrity and representativeness. While the 
prevalence of politicized rules-in-use over programmatic rules-in-form challenged the 
capacity of administrative leaders for managing constituted partnerships, biased selection 
of fund recipients resulted with, in the chapter four described, overrepresentation of 
localities politically aligned with the ruling party. 
5.1.3 Part 3. General rule-making  
Within this twofold setting, collaboration and local ownership was to be fostered through 
the establishment of a flexible framework for the formation of local elderly care policies. 
To do so, the MVFAIS’s efforts for the development of community-based home care system 
were in the first three years framed as a pilot initiative that was, as the analysis of documents 
revealed, structured mainly through internal procedures or the Minister’s decisions. In 2007, 
when the pilot grew into a nationwide program, the MVFAIS’s inducements for the 
development of the local programs of intergenerational solidarity were outlined in a 
strategic document that envisioned the regulation of the new home care system as its long-
term goal50.  
In a shorter run, the mobilization of local actors and resources, instead of subordination and 
reliance on the national initiative, was to be achieved through the employment of soft 
management tools such as shared values, trust and the “golden thread", with the latter 
including steering through controlling budget and personnel. Partnership agreements with 
supported localities were specifying desired expenses, the profile of the home care team and 
basic milestones in regard to the number of beneficiaries that the team should care for, while 
                                                 
50 Program razvoja usluga za starije osobe u sustavu međugeneracijske solidarnosti od 
2008. do 2011. godine, NN 90/2007. 
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the monitoring of operative conduct was to be done primary on the basis of the reports that 
the localities were supposed to be sending to the national program coordinators.  
In the spirit of trust, these reports did not have to be accompanied with the invoices or 
expenditures receipts and the national program coordinators were not assigned with 
overseeing power when paying visits to home care sites. As the provision of care was 
detached from the traditional social care system and its inspection, at the beginning of the 
each year, the Minister would appoint the up to five civil servants and external experts to 
act as the ad hoc Committee for the Monitoring of the Program that would access local 
reports and recommend their endorsement or rejection51. While basing the assessment on 
information provided by fund recipients, the Committee was mainly acknowledging that 
financial and personnel conditions and basic milestones set by MVFAIS were met by all 
supported sites52. Interviews with actors, as the analysis presented in previous chapter 
showed, indicated that constituted accountability forums and procedures proved to be 
dysfunctional in quite a few localities as localities-elected officials were shrinking their 
reporting duty.  
5.1.4 Part 4. Reshaping the policy content 
While MVFAIS’s elected officials kept tight control over the selection of communities 
participating in the new home care network, after the partnership agreements were signed, 
national-level executive politicians would rarely directly engage in the formulation of local 
elderly care policies. To make sure that local solutions did not depart from the overall goals 
                                                 
51 Odluka o osnivanju i imenovanju Povjerenstva za praćenje provedbe Programa 
međugeneracijske solidarnosti. 2007.  Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske 
solidarnosti , Poslovnik o radu povjerenstva za Programe međugeneracijske solidarnosti. 
2010. Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti. 
52 Minutes from Comittee's meeting in 2010. Zapisnik s 2. sjednice Povjerenstva za 
Programe međugeneracijske solidarnosti. 2010. Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i 
međugeneracijske solidarnosti. 
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of the Program, they had made the Ministry’s administrative leaders responsible nor only 
for nurturing the realization of established partnerships, but also for negotiating the policy 
content with local governments and other community actors.  When assigned with the 
former task, administrative leaders were empowered to go beyond enforcement and 
stipulated to rely on soft steering. In their new role of network facilitators, as was 
emphasized by the former program coordinator, they were particularly focused on fostering 
a sense of ownership and responsibility among local governments: 
“When communicating with local governments with whom we had 
partnership agreements, we were constantly repeating that the Ministry 
was providing guidance and support, but that they were the ones holding 
responsibility for the organisation of elderly care in their community.” 
(Interview 69, senior civil servants in Ministry of Social Policy) 
In assigning administrative leaders with negotiation tasks, however, political principals did 
not authorize them for the endorsement or rejection of a specific solution but decided instead 
to leave the local political executive with the space to pursue their own leadership style 
while shaping local home care programs. Accordingly, as the analysis presented in chapter 
four showed, while in some counties and municipalities politicians were keen on designing 
home care in collaboration with community organizations or homes for the elderly, in 
others, local governments decided to monopolize the given mandate for the organization of 
service provision and turn it into an opportunity for the employment of local party members 
or supporters as service providers.  
5.1.5 Part 5. Ensuring internalisation and interactive rule application 
The integration of a clientelistic strategy into the selection of organizational and individual 
actors that would participate in the elderly care network had rather ambivalent effects on 
the users of home care service. On the one hand, to capture a wider population in targeted 
communities, the inclusion of beneficiaries in service provision was flexibly framed and 
guided by general indicators such as age, the existence of a family support network, of health 
conditions. Situation-bound application of these criteria was left to the discretion of home 
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care teams that were even encouraged to reach the citizens that needed the service but lacked 
information about it. After joining the Program, citizens were invited not only to use the 
service, but also to guide their caregivers in the definition of intensity, regularity and 
elements of the care they would be receiving. In that way, elderly citizens that were lucky 
enough to live in the communities encompassed by the program were offered with a chance 
to co-create the service and adjust it to own needs.  
On the other hand, the politicized nature of the overall implementation management affected 
the position of beneficiaries to whom, as indicated by a participants in the interviews 
conducted, local politicians often presented home care services as direct material incentives 
for electoral behaviour.  
“Politicians were often using home care in pre-election campaigning, 
they were presenting it as their achievement with the sub-message: if you 
choose me, you will have this service, if you don’t choose me, the program 
will probably be abolished. Even the informative brochure that was 
created about the program was more about listing the cities included than 
about explaining the content or the way it could be expanded on some 
new communities.” (Interview 73, senior civil servants in regional and 
local government) 
This tendency to reinforce user dependence instead of empowerment was especially present 
in localities characterized by patronage practices. In that way, instead of in the 
empowerment of communities and users, the reform path toward horizontal steering and 
collaborative implementation for Croatian elderly care resulted in the empowerment of 
political parties for the clientelistic capture of service provision. 
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5.2 Crafting the mechanism: from political to politicized 
metagovernance 
The process presented in process-tracing study has demonstrated that the notion of political 
metagovernance can be very useful in the analysis of reform processes and for explaining 
of its effects, but has also revealed challenges that should be taken into consideration when 
conceptualizing it. The study has also showed that metagovernance role which New Public 
Governance reform model assigns to political leaders requires both their willingness and 
ability to use it. If this is lacking or is underdeveloped, the effectiveness and efficiency of 
metagoverance responsibility can be amplified if also exercised by public managers, but the 
democratic credentials of collaborative policy implementation and service delivery can only 
be secured if elected politicians are motivated to do so.  
If the motivation is missing and, as the case of home care reform showed, if metagovernance 
is to be performed by politicians incentivized to engage in rent-seeking activities and if 
political system and political competition operates in a way where they are not held 
accountable to citizens and the electorate for the quality and quantity of services provided, 
the reform inspired by New Public Governance might be used for political capture of the 
public service delivery.  The mechanisam though which, in services characterized by prior 
minimal or non-existent institutional setting of service provision and with politically weak 
beneficiaries, patronage-driven interest of executive politicians can lead to distortion of 
implementation with patronage practices is presented in the Figure 36 and elaborated in the 
text which follows it.  
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Figure 36 Politicized metagovernance: two sides of a coin 
180 
 
When engaging in the exercise of constitutive meta-governance, patronage-driven political 
executive may use ideas behind New Public Governance reform model not just to allocate 
policy functions to local communities and societal actors, but to do it in a politicized manner. 
On a system scale, politicized (re)design of governance arena may imply both introduction 
of flexible setting for policy-making, as well as the institutionalization of large degree of 
political discretion. This discretion can be used and further operationalized with the two 
sided-design of (inter) organizational setting in which selection of actors that are authorized 
to act as designers and implementers of a policy is done through parallel usage of formal 
and informal procedures and combination of prescribed and partisan or ascriptive criteria.   
Politicized exercise of directional meta-governance continues with two-sided activities. On 
the one side, the New Public Governance’s quest for mobilization of local communities and 
users is operationalized through the establishment of a flexible framework for the interactive 
formation of policy content, particularly the policy content negotiated and adopted by the 
local governments. On the other side, opportunities to use state resources for advancing 
political objectives are created though constitution of dysfunctional accountability 
mechanisms and procedures. Within this framework, the (re)shaping of policy content and 
the (re)organisation of service provision in local communities is devolved to local 
politicians, who can use the control of the policy to create an opportunity for the 
employment of local party members or supporters as service providers. Finally, politicized 
meta-governing activities on the individual level involve invitation of street-level workers 
and beneficiaries to co-create the service during its delivery. This invitation is, nevertheless, 
often overshadowed with the tendency to reinforce the dependence of service providers and 
users on politicians and changes in their will election results may produce.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
Theorizing and studying different public management reform models, particularly New 
Public Management and New Public Governance, has often proven to be laden with 
normative propositions about the design of management practices in the delivering of public 
services. This normative focus guided research of New Public Management and New Public 
Governance towards mapping of managerial practices designed to improve efficiency of 
service delivery, rather than towards identifying the effects of each model on the 
implementation process, the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms, representation of 
citizens’ policy preferences, and consequently on democracy itself (Eikenberry 2007).  
Although research focused on New Public Management is also heavily tilted towards 
normative prescriptions, frequent and wide practical application of the New Public 
Management strategy has nevertheless uncovered that the approach exhibits significant 
negative side effects on coherence and coordination in implementation of public policy 
(Pierre 2012). On the other hand, in normative discussions the effects of New Public 
Governance are still most commonly identified as strength of NPG model in acting as an 
amplifier of interactions between actors and facilitator of knowledge-sharing in the policy 
process, as well as ensuring that governmental actions are more legitimate in the eyes of 
citizens (Buuren, Klijn, and Edelenbos 2012).  
This dissertation illustrates the usefulness of a joint use of public policy, public 
management, and political governance perspectives in describing and analyzing the public 
management reform process and the effects it produces. The comparative analysis presented 
in this dissertation has demonstrated how New Public Management, Neo Weberian State 
ideas and New Public Governance have inspired reform paths of six social services delivery 
analyzed here in a very diverse manner. Comparative analysis also revealed how features 
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of institutional setting and the interactions of actors involved in re-organization of service 
provision helped explain the success, and failure, of reform initiatives, especially with 
respect to their expected political objectives, including objectives directed at the 
establishment of partisan patronage networks and expectations of political parties that the 
outcome of reform will have positive effects on office or vote seeking strategies.  
Although reform of ‘supervision of parental care and accommodation services for children, 
elderly and persons with disability’ brought about new focus of service managers on 
performance measurement-based control in services delivery and on holistic focus on 
meeting citizens’ needs, it did not replace traditional focus on regulatory and oversight 
functions and reliance on central steering by state agencies, i.e. ministries. While succeeding 
in limiting the ability of political parties to integrate political patronage in the 
implementation management, this mixture of hierarchical and market-driven accountability 
failed to bring about mobilization of under-utilized resources within local communities, 
including civil society networks, in the organization of service provision. Moreover, since 
in services in question New Public Management, or Neo-Weberian State ideas and tools, 
were added on the pre-existing bureaucratic management of service delivery, the reform has 
yielded a fairly non-congruent mix of enforcement and performance perspectives on 
managing of implementation.  
By contrast, an influx of New Public Governance reform ideas guiding the creation of a 
“new” home care, did bring changes directed toward more interactive horizontal 
management with use of extremely soft steering mechanisms. However, the change that 
took place in this case has also brought to light New Public Governance blind spots. These 
blind spots include blurring of accountability lines, increase in inequality and divisiveness 
of policy processes; enhancing local elite domination in deliberations about policy 
solutions; fostering of displacement of reason with passion and persistence in pursuing 
particularistic agendas; heightening of distrust in and disrespect of public officials 
(Eikenberry, 2007; Christensen and Laegreid, 2012; Lynn, 2012; Rouban; 1999).  
Managerial reliance on trust instead on contracts or rules, as this case showed, can lead to 
an engagement of a wide spectrum of actors in the implementation processes. However, it 
can also place rent-seeking politicians in the position of control of the process and enable 
them to use the process to insert political interests into the selection of actors that will act 
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as service providers or users. In other words, it can enable politicians to create opportunities 
and resources for political patronage and to use these opportunities and resources for 
advancing political objectives.  
As clientelist patronage relies on the exploitation of public jobs, the best opportunities for 
collecting this form of rents are created through politicization and misuse of policy 
implementation management. The distortive impact of such rent-seeking practices can 
encompass not only individual-level management, but can also creep into implementation 
management at the system and organization level. At the system level, in administrative and 
policy settings which are highly politicized, weakly institutionalized organization of the 
implementation of the policy objectives and service delivery can become adversely affected 
by the commitment of policy makers directed toward expanding of discretionary powers 
they have in the implementation process.  
At the organization and individual level, this can be observed through the misuse of the trust 
of key management mechanism and the mismatch between rules-in-use and rules-in-form 
where formally adopted fiscal, legal and discursive conditions of street-level work are not 
enforced in practice. The mismatch can disturb job placement and carrier management 
systems very severely, so much so that these become distorted by the usage of partisan and 
ascriptive criteria in recruiting and promoting public servants. In this way, co-production as 
the implementation mode might operationalize not only New Public Governance vision of 
an inclusive and flexible public sector, but also reveal its weaknesses with respect to 
accountability and oversight.  
In the newly created services or those services where implementation is minimally 
institutionalized, the bulwark against political capture of the New Public Governance reform 
ideas can emerge in the shape of empowered or represented beneficiaries. As the personal 
assistance case demonstrated, if the creation or substantive re-design of the arrangements of 
service provision includes a substantial involvement of users and their advocacy groups, the 
governing party politicians are incentivized to switch toward the programmatic re-election 
calculus which not only allows, but also fosters the fulfillment of authentic objectives of 
reform and the co-production of the public service.  
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In such a scenario, as was also demonstrated by findings of previous studies, placement of 
citizens in the position of participants in the design and delivery of services they receive can 
have both therapeutic and empowering effects. When users act as experiential experts, the 
service has more chances to effectively deal with the real needs of users and service 
provision is more likely to be accompanied with the development of user accountability 
(Bovaird, 2007; Ostrom, 1996). 
This case has also showed that, when reform is jointly metagoverned by political and 
administrative leaders, it will have the best chance to result in a mode of implementation 
that reflects not only the reformist ideas, but the real needs of the communities and 
beneficiaries. Such findings support the evidence of studies of governance practices in rent-
seeking regimes, which revealed that involvement of citizens and advocacy organizations 
plays an important role in improving accountability and effectiveness of government 
operations. However, the most successful transformations of service delivery are achieved 
when civic efforts are supported or even induced by the state (Tendler 1998; Tendler and 
Freedheim 1994; Leonard 2010).  
In the case of personal assistants, the consistency in the adoption of New Public Governance 
premises implied managerial reliance on voluntary quality standards and confidence in the 
committed work of associations of disabled persons which acted as partners in the delivery 
of service. While managerial reliance on trust and shared responsibility is said to discourage 
competitiveness and irrational hostility among participating organizations, partnership 
approach to implementation management can work as amplifier of knowledge sharing and 
mobilizer of underutilized community resources (Poocharoen and Ting, 2013; Sorensen, 
2012). These soft mechanisms were nevertheless supplemented with New Public 
Management tools such as performance indicators, annual reports and visits by civil 
servants. Even though the usage of these tools was more directed at coaching than on 
oversight, their presence in the implementation management of personal assistants suggests 
that effective and sustainable co-production in practice might be fostered by the appropriate 
mixture of managerial tools which balance accountability with inclusiveness and flexibility. 
Findings on the mixed nature of tools and management mechanisms that are found 
surrounding design and implementation of analyzed personal assistance case suggest that 
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co-production is equally dependent on both top-down and bottom-up forms of management. 
Intrinsic co-operation relies on trust and reciprocity, as well as on shared values and norms 
which function as a glue holding actors in cooperative forms of coordination (Rhodes, 
2012). However, effectiveness of a bottom-up interaction is also dependent on a skillful top-
down governance, or, in other words, metagovernance (Sorensen, 2012), which is capable 
of framing concerted action among different types of actors and interests in ways which are 
balancing accountability and flexibility.  
In a broader perspective, dissertation has demonstrated that, despite often emphasized 
beneficial effects it has on citizens and governments, the New Public Governance reform 
model functions primarily as a theoretical model and an empirical experiment with non-
traditional governance arrangements. Full effects of New Public Governance, and in 
particular its weaknesses and problems, are yet to be fully uncovered and explained in an 
empirical analysis. Moreover, the findings from both comparative and process tracing study 
support cautious warnings that theorizing and studying New Public Governance is quite 
often affected by normative and prescriptive considerations (Eikenberry 2007).  
Idealized assumptions regarding the actual implementation of New Public Governance in 
practice emphasize the role of a facilitator which is assigns to executive politicians. While 
New Public Management left elected officials with the authority over goal-setting, New 
Public Governance removed politicians away from deciding the substance of government 
policy and place them in the position of an actor in charge of the facilitation of a 
collaborative process –which should ideally generate common interest and solutions (Klijn 
and Koppenjan 2000). This rather prescriptive shift has been already challenged from two 
perspectives. First, it is not highly likely that politicians will be giving up authority over 
policy-content that easily, and willingly limit themselves to the role of process moderators 
(Politt and Bouckaert 2011). Second, even if that happens, politicians could act more as 
‘spoilsports’ then as ‘playmakers’ (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000).  
They could use the role of guarantors of compromise deals between multiple stakeholders 
they have within the framework of New Public Governance in order to advance their own 
interests and objectives. As process tracing analysis of the captured home care reform 
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showed, political exercise of metagovernance can induce development and implementation 
of contextualized creative solutions and generate engagement of a wide spectrum of actors 
in the implementation process, but if performed by elected officials which are incentivized 
to engage in rent-seeing practices, the metagovernance role can also be adjusted to serve 
particular political interests.  
For political executive inclined to engage in politicization or rent-seeking activities, New 
Public Governance-inspired re-design of the governance arena and policy-making process 
might provide opportunities for manipulating the design of rules governing this process in 
order to attain greater discretion over the selection of actors that will participate in the 
implementation network and act as public service providers. However, it also has to be noted 
that the analysis also showed that the politicization of the metagovernance process and of 
co-production might have positive effects. These include wider encompassment of citizens 
in targeted communities or the recruitment of organizationally underdeveloped, but 
politically important local units into a network of service providers.  
On the other hand, as public resources are often very limited, politicization might result in 
an unequal availability of the service, as well as in the perception that a transfer of funds to 
selected providers and the delivery of service to individual users are being used as direct 
material incentives directed at shaping electoral behaviour. This perception need not apply 
to all providers and beneficiaries of the service, but it can nevertheless seriously damage its 
sustainability prospects when the clientelistic party loses power and new political actors 
take over. If provision of services is heavily politicalized, change of governing party can 
result in a deliberate gutting of a policy or service provision directed at limiting resources 
available to actors affiliated with the previous governing party, or, in order to free resources 
for party patronage available to a new governing party. 
Due to that, after the 2011 national elections in which HDZ lost power, the home care 
program immediately ended up on the new government’s list for complete restructuring. 
After the several failed attempts, in the New Public Management inspired integration of the 
“old” and “new” home care that took place in April 2014, local units were removed from 
the implementation loop and Centers for Social Welfare became focal points in 
communities. To ensure better control over the implementation, partnership agreements 
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were replaced by licensing and contracting, mean’s test was re-introduced and service 
content prearranged for each category of users. Such restructuring fostered development of 
the perception that values of accountability, equal treatment and efficiency have been 
protected, but at the same time it reversed the course of service development by causing 
significant reduction in the number of service users and the inability of direct service 
providers to accommodate user’s full needs. 
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Zajednički memorandum o socijalnom uključivanju ožujak 2007 Ministarstvo zdravstva i 
socijalne skrbi. 
Zakon o braku i porodičnim odnosima NN, 11/1978 
Zakon o potvrđivanju Konvencije o pravima osoba s invaliditetom i Fakultativnog protokola uz 
Konvenciju o pravima osoba s invaliditetom. Narodne novine: Međunarodni ugovori 6/07 
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210 
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Appendix B Protocol for semi-structured interviews within 
comparative case study 
ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES PROVISION IN 
CROATIA 
- Doctoral Research - 
Protocol for semi-structured interviews 
Name of interviewed person: 
Organisation: 
Day and hour on the interview:  
At the beginning 
 Introduce the research: The interviews are part of the doctoral research conducted 
within the framework of a Doctoral Program in Comparative Politics at the Faculty 
of Political Science, University of Zagreb. In this doctoral dissertation a comparison 
is undertaken between reform practices and the management of services concerning 
three social policies: the policy for elderly citizens in need of long term care; policy 
towards persons with disabilities; and policy towards children with inadequate 
parental care. The following services are analysed herein:  
1. Long-term care and accommodation for the elderly 
2. In-home assistance for the elderly 
3. Long-term assistance and accommodation for persons with 
disabilities  
4. Personal assistance for persons with disabilities  
5. Accommodation for children with inadequate parental care 
6. Supervision of families at risk  
 Ask permission for recording (give the Statement of ethic)  
 Emphasise that all data collected by means of individual interviews will be 
processed cumulatively, with findings presented collectively in the dissertation 
without any mention of individual interviewees and their positions/jobs.  
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 Ask interviewees give their reply to questions based on the services they are familiar 
with and work on. Emphasis is placed on experience and attitudes of interviewees. 
QUESTIONS NOTES 
Current provision of the service  
1. Which among these six are related to your work? 
 Accommodation in homes and foster homes for elderly,  
 Home care for elderly,  
 Accommodation in homes and foster homes for children 
without parental care, 
 Supervision of parental care for families in risk,  
 Accommodation in homes and foster homes for persons with 
disabilities and  
 Personal assistance for persons with disabilities. 
 
2. How is/are  that/these services related to your work?  
3. Who are the actors engaged in the organisation of provision of 
these services? Who can act as service provider? 
 
4. What are activities prevalent in the management of the policy 
process? 
 Making mandates explicit  
 Creating ‘interfaces’  
 Appealing for responsibility 
 Something else 
 
5. What are the activities prevalent in the management of inter-
organizational relations? 
 Creating clarity on tasks and competences 
 Taking care of sufficient resources  
 Enhancing contract compliance  
 Realizing partnerships 
 Something else 
 
6. What are the activities prevalent in the management of external 
and internal inter-personal contacts? What is the role of users in 
service provision?  
 Enhancing motivation and internalization and leadership and 
training on the job 
 Realizing compliance to standard operating procedures and 
enhancing and maintaining service orientation, rewarding 
target compliance 
 Enhancing professionalization and organizing response 
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 Something else 
7. What role the government takes in the implementation 
management of service? 
 CEO 
 Inspector 
 Moderator 
 Something else 
 
8. What are the central and adjutant management mechanisms in 
them management of the service provision? 
 Laws and other type of regulation 
 Contract. Quality standards 
 Trust, shared values,  
 
Introduction of service and the features of its provision in early of 
2000s. 
 
9. When and how service was introduced?  
10. How did the provision of service look like in the beginning of 
2000s?  
 
11. How was it regulated?  
12. Where those rules followed? How, on what base, you/or actors 
that were engaged in implementation making everyday decisions? 
 
12. Were there any professional codes or active professional bodies?  
The role of users and other actors in the design and provision of the 
service in early 2000s. 
 
13. At that time, what was position of service users in the service 
provision? How organised they were among themselves? Were 
there any active individual users speaking on a behalf of other 
users?  
 
14. Did any domestic or international organizations that promote the 
interest of service beneficiaries? 
 
Service development in last 10 years: reforms and key actors  
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15. How would you describe the development of the arrangement for 
service provision in last 10-13 years? Were there any reforms? 
What were main ideas and tools promoted by the reform?  
 
16. Who were actors that promoted or supported the reform?  
17. What was the role of executive politicians in the reform process?  
18. What was the role of civil servants?  
19. Would you like to add something that we did not jet mentioned, 
but is important for the reform and current management of the 
service? 
 
 
THANK YOU  
  
215 
 
Appendix C Statement of ethics for interviews within comparative 
case study 
STATEMENT OF ETHICS (translation) 
ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES PROVISION IN 
CROATIA 
- Doctoral Research - 
 
CONTACT INFORMATION   
Name and Surname of Researcher: Anka Kekez Koštro 
Junior Researcher – Teaching Assistant  
Univerity of Zagreb, Faculty of Political Science  
Lepušićeva 6, HR 10 000 Zagreb 
Cell: + 385 91 8838 079 
E-mail: akekez@fpzg.hr 
 
RESEARCH SUMMARY  
The interviews are part of the doctoral research conducted within the framework of a 
Doctoral Program in Comparative Politics at the Faculty of Political Science, University of 
Zagreb. Doctoral research topic is the implementation of social policy in Croatia, with prof. 
Zdravko Petak, PhD, and Paul Stubbs, PhD, as mentors. In this doctoral dissertation a 
comparison is undertaken between reform practices and the management of services 
concerning three social policies: the policy for elderly citizens in need of long term care; 
policy towards persons with disabilities; and policy towards children with inadequate 
parental care. The following services are analysed herein:  
1. Long-term care and accommodation for the elderly 
2. In-home assistance for the elderly 
3. Long-term assistance and accommodation for persons with disabilities  
4. Personal assistance for persons with disabilities  
5. Accommodation for children with inadequate parental care 
6. Supervision of families at risk  
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Interviews with actors in the aforementioned policies form a crucial part of this doctoral 
research. The sample includes a large number of participants: civil servants at the Ministry 
of Social Policy and Youth who worked or presently work in the management of the said 
policies; employees at regional and local government bodies; experts dealing in social 
policies; founders and/or employees of organisations (public, private, non-profit) managing 
the provision of various social services; immediate services providers; and beneficiaries. 
The interviewing process will be conducted whilst adhering to the highest ethical standards 
in research and in full confidentiality. All data collected by means of individual interviews 
will be processed cumulatively, with findings presented collectively in the dissertation – via 
categories generated through coding – without any mention of individual interviewees and 
their positions/jobs. Such an approach will be viable due to the large number of interviewees 
(around 80). 
 
DESCRIPTION OF INTERVIEWS 
 
Each interview is conducted individually and in a semi-structured manner, with the research 
undertaken on the entire Croatian territory. A set of framework question is provided, but 
neither the sequence of questions nor the content of sub-questions is defined in advance. 
Interviewees give their reply to questions based on the services they are familiar with and 
work on. Emphasis is placed on experience and attitudes of interviewees. This interview 
consists of 4 groups of questions related to the following:   
 
1. Governance practices and institutional framework for the governance of services 
before the year 2000  
2. Actors and reform processes related to social services governance in Croatia from 
the year 2000 until today 
3. Results of social services governance reform in Croatia from the year 2000 until 
today  
4. Role of beneficiaries and their representatives in provision and reform of services. 
 
Expected duration of interview is between 50 minutes and 1 hour. With interviewee’s 
consent, the interview will be audio recorded; confidentiality is guaranteed and the 
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recording destroyed once it is transcribed.  Interviewee identity is irrelevant for research 
results and will not be stated in any part of the research or annexes thereto. Both in analysis 
and results layout, interviewees are grouped based on their position related to – or their 
knowledge/experience of – the level of social services governance system; this is either 
central state level, level of relations between organisations, or the end-user level.  
 
STATEMENT 
 
This research is conducted as part of a doctoral research within which reform and practices 
of governance over social services provision within three social policies, including the 
policy for elderly citizen in need of long term care; policy towards persons with disabilities; 
and policy towards children with inadequate parental care. Participation in this research is 
voluntary and data confidentiality is guaranteed. For simpler data handling and analysis, the 
interview is audio-recorded with the interviewee’s consent provided. Once the interview is 
conducted, the interviewer will transcribe the audio recording and will permanently delete 
its record 15 days after the interview at the latest. The interview and the attributed 
interviewee data will be coded and their name and surname will not be further used in the 
text, but will only be attributed with an appropriate code. It is thus known only to the 
interviewer that the said statements and quotes pertain to that particular interviewee alone. 
The transcript of the interview recording will be coded according to the selected research 
method. The interviewer will not disclose the identity of interviewees or any of their 
identity-related data to third parties. The interviewee is entitled to end their participation in 
the interview at any given moment.  
 
Researcher Signature:               Interviewee 
signature: 
____________________                                                                   
____________________ 
 
 
 
Date and Place: _____________ 
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ETIČKA IZJAVA 
ANALIZA UPRAVLJANJA PRUŽANJEM SOCIJALNIH USLUGA U 
HRVATSKOJ 
- Doktorsko istraživanje- 
KONTAKTNE INFORMACIJE  
Ime i prezime istraživača/ice: Anka Kekez Koštro 
Znanstvena novakinja- asistentica 
Fakultet političkih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu 
Lepušićeva 6, HR 10 000 Zagreb 
Mob: + 385 91 8838 079 
Email: akekez@fpzg.hr 
SAŽETAK ISTRAŽIVANJA 
Intervjui se koje kao dio doktorskog istraživanja u okviru doktorskog studija Komparativna 
politika na Fakultetu političkih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu. Tema doktorskog rada je 
implementacija socijalne politike u Hrvatskoj, a mentori su prof. dr. sc. Zdravko Petak 
i dr.sc. Paul Stubbs. U disertaciji uspoređujem prakse reforme i upravljanja pružanjem 
usluga u okviru triju socijalnih politika, uključujući politiku za starije i nemoćne osobe, 
politiku za osobe s invaliditetom te politiku za djecu bez adekvatne roditeljske skrbi. Usluge 
koje analiziram su: 
 
7. Dugotrajna skrb i smještaj za starije osobe 
8. Pomoć u kući za starije osobe 
9. Dugotrajna skrb i smještaj za osobe s invaliditetom 
10. Osobna asistencija za osobe s invaliditetom 
11. Smještaj za djecu bez adekvatne obiteljske skrbi 
12. Usluga nadzora za obitelji u riziku 
 
Važan dio doktorskog istraživanju su intervjui s akterima spomenutih politika. Uzorak  
uključuje veliki broj sudionica i sudionika: djelatnike/ce Ministarstva socijalne politike i 
mladih koji su radili ili rade na upravljanju navedenim politikama, djelatnike/ce jedinica 
područne i lokalne samouprave, stručnjake koji se bave socijalnim politikama, osnivače i/ili 
djelatnike/ce organizacija (javnih, privatnih, neprofitnih) koji upravljaju pružanjem 
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različitih socijalnih usluga, neposredne pružatelje usluga te korisnike. Proces intervjuiranju 
provodit ću uz maksimalno poštovanje istraživačkih etičkih standarda i 
povjerljivosti. Podaci prikupljeni individualnim intervjuima obrađivat će se zajedno, a u 
disertaciji će se nalazi prikazivati grupno - kroz kategorije dobivene procesom kodiranja - 
bez ikakvog spominjanja sudionika intervjua i njihovih pozicija/zaposlenja. To će biti 
moguće jer će u intervjuima sudjelovati velik broja aktera (oko 80). 
 
OPIS INTERVJUA 
 
Intervju se provodi kao individualni polu-strukturirani intervju, a istraživanje se provodi na 
području cijele Hrvatske. Kod polustrukturiranog intervjua postoji set okvirnih pitanja, ali 
redoslijed pitanja i potpitanja nisu unaprijed određena. Sudionici odgovaraju na pitanja s 
obzirom na usluge s kojima su upoznati i koje su im u djelokrugu rada. Pri tome je naglasak 
je stavljen na iskustvo i stavove sudionika. Ovaj intervju sastoji se od 4 grupe pitanja koja 
se odnose na:  
 
1.  Upravljačke prakse i institucionalni okvir za upravljanje uslugama prije 2000-te 
godine  
2.  Aktere i proces reforme upravljanja socijalnim uslugama u Hrvatskoj od 2000-te do 
danas 
3.  Rezultate reforme upravljanja socijalnim uslugama u Hrvatskoj od 2000-te do danas 
4.  Uloga korisnika i njihovih predstavnika u pružanju i reformi usluge 
 
Očekivano trajanje intervjua je 50 minuta do 1 sat. Uz suglasnost ispitanika intervju će radi 
lakše obrade podataka biti snimljen diktafonom uz osiguranje povjerljivosti te uništenje 
snimke nakon njenog prijepisa. Identitet ispitanika je nevažan za rezultate istraživanja te 
neće biti naveden niti u jednom dijelu istraživanja ili podržavajući dokumentacije. Ispitanici 
se u analizi i predstavljanju rezultata analize grupiraju prema njihovoj poziciji odnosno 
znanju/iskustvu u odnosu na razinu sustava upravljanja socijalnim uslugama- razina države, 
razina odnosa među organizacijama i razina krajnjeg korisnika.  
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IZJAVA 
 
Ovo istraživanje se provodi u okviru izrade doktorskog istraživanja u kojem se uspoređuju 
reforma i prakse upravljanja pružanjem usluga u okviru triju socijalnih politika, uključujući 
politiku za starije i nemoćne osobe, politiku za osobe s invaliditetom te politiku za djecu 
bez adekvatne roditeljske skrbi. Sudjelovanje u istraživanju je dobrovoljno, a povjerljivost 
podataka garantirana. Uz pristanak sudionika/ce intervju se zvučno snima radi lakše obrade 
i analize podataka. Nakon provedbe intervjua član voditeljica intervjua će napraviti prijepis 
audio snimke, a snimku će trajno izbrisati najkasnije 15 dana nakon provedbe intervjua. 
Intervju s pripadajućim podacima ispitanika će se kodirati te se njegovo ime i prezime neće 
koristiti u daljnjem tekstu, već samo dodijeljen kod. Na taj način samo intervjuer/ka znaju 
da spomenute izjave i citati pripadaju baš tom ispitaniku. Prijepis snimke intervjua kodirati 
će se sukladno odabranoj istraživačkoj metodi. Voditeljica intervjua neće trećim osobama 
otkriti identitet niti s identitetom povezane podatke o ispitanicima. Ispitanik/ca ima pravo 
prekinuti sudjelovanje u istraživanju u bilo kojem trenutku. 
 
Potpis istraživača/ice:               Potpis 
ispitanika/ce: 
 
____________________                                                                             
____________________ 
 
 
Mjesto i datum: _____________ 
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Appendix D Protocol for semi-structured interviews within process 
tracing study 
ANALYSIS OF THE HOME CARE REFORM IN CROATIA 
- Doctoral Research - 
Protocol for semi-structured interviews 
Name of interviewed person: 
Organisation: 
Day and hour on the interview:  
 
At the beginning 
 Introduce the research: The interviews are part of the doctoral research conducted 
within the framework of a Doctoral Program in Comparative Politics at the Faculty 
of Political Science, University of Zagreb. In this part of doctoral dissertation I am 
analysing the process of the reform of home care services in the last decade in 
Croatia.  
 Ask permission for recording (give the Statement of ethic)  
 Emphasise that all data collected by means of individual interviews will be 
processed cumulatively, with findings presented collectively in the dissertation 
without any mention of individual interviewees and their positions/jobs.  
 Ask interviewees give their reply to questions based on the services they are familiar 
with and work on. Emphasis is placed on experience and attitudes of interviewees. 
  
222 
 
 
QUESTIONS NOTES 
When and how was the home care within the system of 
intergenerational solidarity introduced?  
 
Institutional redesign  
How would you describe the process of the design of the new setting 
for community based elderly care in the first half of 2000s? 
 
Which actors were involved in this part of the process? What was the 
role of executive politicians? 
 
Reforming the (inter)organizational setting  
How and to whom was given mandate for the organisation of service 
provision?  
 
Which actors were involved in this part of the process? What was the 
role of executive politicians? 
 
Ensuring internalization of core norms  
Was the internalization of reform’s vision and ideas fostered and 
how? 
 
Which actors were involved in this part of the process? What was the 
role of executive politicians? 
 
General rule-making for policy-making  
How were framed flexible legal, finantial and discurssive conditions  
for the formation of local elderly care policies 
 
Which actors were involved in this part of the process? What was the 
role of executive politicians? 
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Re-shaping the policy content  
How did the decision-making about local elderly care policies looked 
like? 
 
Which actors were involved in this part of the process? What was the 
role of national and local executive politicians? 
 
Situation bound rule application  
What was the role of care givers and service users in the design of the 
service 
 
Which actors were involved in this part of the process? What was the 
role of national and local executive politicians? 
 
How did the actual provision of the service looked like?  
What was the role of service users? Was anyone representing their 
interest during the development of new home care 
 
Was the design of the service related with the social care system and 
its regulative framework? 
 
Would you like to add something that we did not jet mentioned, but 
is important for the reform and current management of the service? 
 
THANK YOU  
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Appendix E Statement of ethics for interviews within process tracing 
study 
STATEMENT OF ETHICS (translation) 
ANALYSIS OF HOME CARE REFORM IN CROATIA 
- Doctoral Research - 
 
CONTACT INFORMATION   
Name and Surname of Researcher: Anka Kekez Koštro 
Junior Researcher – Teaching Assistant  
Univerity of Zagreb, Faculty of Political Science  
Lepušićeva 6, HR 10 000 Zagreb 
Cell: + 385 91 8838 079 
E-mail: akekez@fpzg.hr 
 
RESEARCH SUMMARY  
The interviews are part of the doctoral research conducted within the framework of a 
Doctoral Program in Comparative Politics at the Faculty of Political Science, University of 
Zagreb. Doctoral research topic is the implementation of social policy in Croatia, with prof. 
Zdravko Petak, PhD, and Paul Stubbs, PhD, as mentors. In this doctoral dissertation a 
comparison is undertaken between reform practices and the governance of services 
concerning three social policies: the policy for elderly citizens in need of long term care; 
policy towards persons with disabilities; and policy towards children with inadequate 
parental care. Among those services, special attanetion is given to the refrom of the 
management of home care services in Croatia which is topic this interview.  
 
Interviews with actors in the aforementioned policies form a crucial part of this doctoral 
research. The sample includes a large number of participants: civil servants at the Ministry 
of Social Policy and Youth who worked or presently work in the management of the said 
policies; employees at regional and local government bodies; experts dealing in social 
policies; founders and/or employees of organisations (public, private, non-profit) managing 
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the provision of various social services; immediate services providers; and beneficiaries. 
The interviewing process will be conducted whilst adhering to the highest ethical standards 
in research and in full confidentiality. All data collected by means of individual interviews 
will be processed cumulatively, with findings presented collectively in the dissertation – via 
categories generated through coding – without any mention of individual interviewees and 
their positions/jobs. Such an approach will be viable due to the large number of interviewees 
(around 80). 
 
DESCRIPTION OF INTERVIEWS 
 
Each interview is conducted individually and in a semi-structured manner, with the research 
undertaken on the entire Croatian territory. A set of framework question is provided, but 
neither the sequence of questions nor the content of sub-questions is defined in advance. 
Emphasis in the interviews is placed on experience and attitudes of interviewees. This 
interview consists of 3 groups of questions related to the following:   
 
1. Refrom process 
2. Refrom results 
3. Influential factors  
 
Expected duration of interview is between 50 minutes and 1 hour. With interviewee’s 
consent, the interview will be audio recorded; confidentiality is guaranteed and the 
recording destroyed once it is transcribed.  Interviewee identity is irrelevant for research 
results and will not be stated in any part of the research or annexes thereto. Both in analysis 
and results layout, interviewees are grouped based on their position related to – or their 
knowledge/experience of – the level of social services governance system; this is either 
central state level, level of relations between organisations, or the end-user level.  
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STATEMENT 
 
This research is conducted as part of a doctoral research within which reform and practices 
of governance over social services provision within three social policies, including the 
policy for elderly citizen in need of long term care; policy towards persons with disabilities; 
and policy towards children with inadequate parental care. Participation in this research is 
voluntary and data confidentiality is guaranteed. For simpler data handling and analysis, the 
interview is audio-recorded with the interviewee’s consent provided. Once the interview is 
conducted, the interviewer will transcribe the audio recording and will permanently delete 
its record 15 days after the interview at the latest. The interview and the attributed 
interviewee data will be coded and their name and surname will not be further used in the 
text, but will only be attributed with an appropriate code. It is thus known only to the 
interviewer that the said statements and quotes pertain to that particular interviewee alone. 
The transcript of the interview recording will be coded according to the selected research 
method. The interviewer will not disclose the identity of interviewees or any of their 
identity-related data to third parties. The interviewee is entitled to end their participation in 
the interview at any given moment.  
 
Researcher Signature:               Interviewee 
signature: 
____________________                                                                   
____________________ 
 
 
 
Date and Place: _____________ 
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ETIČKA IZJAVA 
ANALIZA REFORME POMOĆI U KUĆI ZA STARIJE OSOBE U HRVATSKOJ 
- Doktorsko istraživanje- 
KONTAKTNE INFORMACIJE  
Ime i prezime istraživača/ice: Anka Kekez Koštro 
Znanstvena novakinja- asistentica 
Fakultet političkih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu 
Lepušićeva 6, HR 10 000 Zagreb 
Mob: + 385 91 8838 079 
Email: akekez@fpzg.hr 
SAŽETAK ISTRAŽIVANJA 
Intervjui se koje kao dio doktorskog istraživanja u okviru doktorskog studija Komparativna 
politika na Fakultetu političkih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu. Tema doktorskog rada je 
implementacija socijalne politike u Hrvatskoj, a mentori su prof. dr. sc. Zdravko Petak 
i dr.sc. Paul Stubbs. U disertaciji uspoređujem prakse reforme i upravljanja pružanjem 
usluga u okviru triju socijalnih politika, uključujući politiku za starije i nemoćne osobe, 
politiku za osobe s invaliditetom te politiku za djecu bez adekvatne roditeljske skrbi. U 
istraživanju je posebna pažnja posvećena refromi i rezultatima reforme upravljanja 
pružanjem uslule pomoći u kući, što je i tema ovog intervjua. 
 
Važan dio doktorskog istraživanju su intervjui s akterima politike za starije osobe u 
Hravtskoj. Uzorak uključuje veliki broj sudionica i sudionika: djelatnike/ce Ministarstva 
socijalne politike i mladih koji su radili ili rade na upravljanju navedenim politikama, 
djelatnike/ce jedinica područne i lokalne samouprave, stručnjake koji se bave socijalnim 
politikama, osnivače i/ili djelatnike/ce organizacija (javnih, privatnih, neprofitnih) koji 
upravljaju pružanjem različitih socijalnih usluga, neposredne pružatelje usluga te korisnike. 
Proces intervjuiranju provodit ću uz maksimalno poštovanje istraživačkih etičkih standarda 
i povjerljivosti. Podaci prikupljeni individualnim intervjuima obrađivat će se zajedno, a u 
disertaciji će se nalazi prikazivati grupno - kroz kategorije dobivene procesom kodiranja - 
bez ikakvog spominjanja sudionika intervjua i njihovih pozicija/zaposlenja. To će biti 
moguće jer će u intervjuima sudjelovati velik broja aktera (oko 80). 
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OPIS INTERVJUA 
 
Intervju se provodi kao individualni polu-strukturirani intervju, a istraživanje se provodi na 
području cijele Hrvatske. Kod polustrukturiranog intervjua postoji set okvirnih pitanja, ali 
redoslijed pitanja i potpitanja nisu unaprijed određena. U odgovaranju na pitanja naglasak 
je stavljen na iskustvo i stavove sudionika. Ovaj intervju sastoji se od 3 grupe pitanja koja 
se odnose na:  
 
1.  Proces reforme  
2.  Rezultate reforme 
3.  Čimbenike koji su utjecali na reform 
 
Očekivano trajanje intervjua je 50 minuta do 1 sat. Uz suglasnost ispitanika intervju će radi 
lakše obrade podataka biti snimljen diktafonom uz osiguranje povjerljivosti te uništenje 
snimke nakon njenog prijepisa. Identitet ispitanika je nevažan za rezultate istraživanja te 
neće biti naveden niti u jednom dijelu istraživanja ili podržavajući dokumentacije. Ispitanici 
se u analizi i predstavljanju rezultata analize grupiraju prema njihovoj poziciji odnosno 
znanju/iskustvu u odnosu na razinu sustava upravljanja socijalnim uslugama- razina države, 
razina odnosa među organizacijama i razina krajnjeg korisnika.  
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IZJAVA 
 
Ovo istraživanje se provodi u okviru izrade doktorskog istraživanja u između ostalog, 
analiziram refromu i rezultate reform upravljanj pružanjem usluke pomoći u kući za politiku 
za starije. Sudjelovanje u istraživanju je dobrovoljno, a povjerljivost podataka garantirana. 
Uz pristanak sudionika/ce intervju se zvučno snima radi lakše obrade i analize podataka. 
Nakon provedbe intervjua član voditeljica intervjua će napraviti prijepis audio snimke, a 
snimku će trajno izbrisati najkasnije 15 dana nakon provedbe intervjua. Intervju s 
pripadajućim podacima ispitanika će se kodirati te se njegovo ime i prezime neće koristiti u 
daljnjem tekstu, već samo dodijeljen kod. Na taj način samo intervjuer/ka znaju da 
spomenute izjave i citati pripadaju baš tom ispitaniku. Prijepis snimke intervjua kodirati će 
se sukladno odabranoj istraživačkoj metodi. Voditeljica intervjua neće trećim osobama 
otkriti identitet niti s identitetom povezane podatke o ispitanicima. Ispitanik/ca ima pravo 
prekinuti sudjelovanje u istraživanju u bilo kojem trenutku. 
 
Potpis istraživača/ice:               Potpis 
ispitanika/ce: 
 
____________________                                                                             
____________________ 
 
 
Mjesto i datum: _____________ 
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Appendix F Author resume  
Anka Kekez Koštro (born in Split in 1982), graduated from the Faculty of Political Science 
of the Zagreb University. She is currently enrolled in the doctoral program of Comparative 
Politics at the Faculty of Political Science. Since 2010 she has been employed as a research-
assistant at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Zagreb where she teaches seminars in the 
courses Introduction to Public Policy and Public Governance. Prior to her employment at 
the Faculty of Political Science, between 2005 and 2010, she worked as a consultant for 
MAP Consulting, responsible for evaluation studies and public policy analysis. 
During her work at MAP Consulting and at the Faculty of Political Science, she took part 
in a number of academic and applied research projects focused on public policy formation 
and implementation. In her research, she is focused on public policy implementation, public 
administration reform and clientelism. She also specialized in the use of qualitative research 
methods in the analysis of public policy. Since January 2017 she has participated in a project 
about the reconciliation of work and family life (IPA), a project about political priorities in 
Croatia (POLIPTIH) and a project related to the development of skills and qualifications of 
political science and journalism students (HKO). She is a member of the Centre for 
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